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      Introduction 
 
This report is the final product of a two-years research project funded by the 
European Commission, DG Sanco (Grant agreement 17.020100/05(04)408149) on the 
protection of energy consumers.  
More specifically, the Commission asked to: 
- List the competencies of National Regulatory Authorities regarding issues related to 
consumption in a general sense; make a comparison among Member States (are 
consumers considered homogeneously by NRAs? Have consumer associations a 
specific role?); 
- Evaluate and compare quality and added value of the NRAs' intervention to the benefit 
of consumers; collect concrete/practical examples; identify good practices as well as 
shortcomings; 
- Clearly illustrate useful recommendations, in order to have the NRAs consider 
consumers issues thoroughly. 
To accomplish these objectives, we proceeded as follows:  
a) Firstly, we collected national laws and regulations implementing the first 
and second electricity and gas directives; 
b) Secondly, we sent a questionnaire to each of the nine partners in this 
project and asked them to describe the main characteristics of their national 
energy systems, with a special emphasis on the measures aimed at protecting 
residential electricity and gas consumers in the new environment created by the 
liberalization process; 
c) Thirdly, we used the information collected to evaluate the effects of the 
liberalization process on the welfare of residential consumers and to advance 
some recommendations. 
The research project was conducted between July 2005 and June 2007.  
The first phase of the project was devoted to data collection. Three main channels 
were used: the first was a six-parts questionnaire with 42 questions on the most 
important aspects of regulation of retail energy markets. It was sent to partner consumer 
associations in October 2005 and returned by most of them in the Spring of the 
following year. The text of the questionnaire is reproduced in Annex A, while the 
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partners’ answers are available on the website of the project, also activated in the first 
phase (www.energyandconsumers.net). The second channel for data collection was 
information contained in the official publications of international, European and 
national institutions, as well as in academic studies on retail energy markets. The third 
channel was information on energy consumers’ complaints requested to the regulators 
of partner countries.  
In the second phase of the project a methodology for interpreting the data collected 
was developed. Building on the insights of Law and Economics, Comparative Law and 
the Economics of Regulation, we tried to identify the main issues in the transition from 
monopoly to competition in residential markets. The solutions experimented in national 
regulatory systems were subsequently evaluated according to such theoretical 
framework. An interim report with preliminary results was discussed with the partners 
in the meeting held at Bolzano, Italy in September 2006.  
In the third phase of the project the data on residential energy markets were further 
updated and the observations received by the partners were included in the Final Report. 
Whenever possible, we tried to make all information accurate as of July 1st, 2007. In 
this last phase the partners also conducted interviews with national regulators to collect 
additional information on the problems of retail markets and to get their impressions on 
the accuracy of the report. The transcripts of the interviews are available on the website 
of the project. The research team presented the Final Report to the European 
Commission in Brussels in May 2007. 
A special thanks to prof. Giuseppe Bellantuono, Department of Legal Sciences, 
University of Trento, who was in charge of the methodological and legal analysis and to 
dr. Federico Boffa, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen-
Bolzano, who was in charge of the collection of data and the econometric models, for 
their precious help and their accurate research. Federico Boffa wrote chapter six, while 
Giuseppe Bellantuono wrote the remaining part of the report. 
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Executive summary  
 
The object of this report is the regulation of residential electricity and gas markets 
according to the rules laid down in the second electricity and gas directives. 1st July 
2007, the date by which all European consumers must be free to choose their supplier, is 
a watershed for the European energy market, but nobody could believe it is the ending 
point of the liberalization process.  Much work remains to be done before something 
resembling competition shows up in energy markets. The research presented here tries 
to assess whether Member States were able to design a legal and economic framework 
that fosters the twin goals of efficiency and protection of domestic consumers.  
We now describe in brief the contents of each chapter. Then we summarize the 
main findings of the project. 
 
Contents of the chapters 
 
The first chapter describes the methodology employed to analyse residential energy 
markets. It highlights the incentive structure of legal rules and the need to assess the 
relevance of regulatory institutions according to the legal tradition of each country.  
The second chapter describes the main problems regulators shall tackle in 
residential energy markets. While they are not exclusive to such markets, it is suggested 
that they could be more difficult to solve than in other settings.  
The third chapter lists the national energy laws and regulations implementing the 
second electricity and gas directives in the 27 Member States. 
The fourth chapter describes the experiences of those countries that liberalized 
residential energy markets earlier than the European deadline. Problems encountered 
and solutions experimented could be very interesting for all countries that open their 
residential markets by 1st July 2007. 
The fifth chapter describes the regulatory systems in partner countries, with specific 
reference to the institutions of consumers representation and the distribution of 
regulatory powers. 
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The sixth chapter discusses the evolution of retail energy prices in partner countries 
since the beginning of liberalization and its distributive impact on different categories of 
consumers.  
The seventh chapter describes the main terms of residential energy contracts and the 
type of control on their contents. 
The eighth chapter describes quality regulation, with special emphasis on its impact 
on consumers’ welfare. 
The ninth chapter describes energy consumers’ complaints and alternative dispute 
resolution procedures  
The tenth chapter describes the role of consumers associations in energy markets.  
The eleventh chapter contains final recommendations addressed to the European 
Commission, to ERGEG and to national regulators. 
 
The methodology of Comparative Law and Economics 
 
The project emphasizes two methodological premises: the relationship between 
Law and Economics on one hand; the need to adopt a comparative approach to the 
analysis of national regulatory frameworks on the other.  
Law and Economics is one of the most successful interdisciplinary approaches to 
the study of markets and institutions. In the last forty years it has been developing a 
consequentialist approach to legal rules. Its main insight is that rules have incentive 
effects and can be employed to alter people’s behaviour. To discover the structure of 
incentives built in each rule or system of rules, the most important tool is a theory of 
behaviour, which Law and Economics borrows from economic analysis. While 
microeconomics studies how consumers and firms react to prices, Law and Economics 
studies how legal rules fix the ‘price’ for their addressees. Analogizing markets to 
institutional contexts, it is possible to make predictions on the likely impact of different 
legal rules.  
Focusing on incentives provided for by legal rules helps to avoid the mistake of 
believing that liberalization will automatically increase total welfare. Instead, markets 
are artificial phenomena shaped by the rules that govern them. Therefore, it is of 
paramount importance to get incentives right. 
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The need for a comparative approach is prompted by the observation that in Europe 
coexist many different legal traditions. Although it is the aim of the European directives 
to harmonize the regulatory framework in the Internal Energy Market, it should be 
recognized that complete uniformity is very difficult to attain and, probably, not 
desirable at all. We shall see that the countries represented in our project display 
considerable variation in the institutional solutions they chose on such topics as 
protection of vulnerable consumers, regulation of contracts and dispute resolution 
procedures. What we should try to do is to assess the efficiency and efficaciousness of 
each different answer to the same problem. The starting point, however, is that there are 
many ways to do the same thing. 
 
The problems of retail energy markets 
 
The report is organized around four problems. Before commenting on each of them, 
it is useful to make some preliminary observations on the relationship between 
competition and consumer protection. While competitive markets are usually the best 
means to increase consumers’ welfare, we cannot exclude that sometimes fostering 
competition and increasing consumers’ welfare go in opposite directions. For example, 
increasing the number of suppliers adds to the complexity of consumers’ choices. They 
now face costs that would not exist but for the opening of residential markets to 
competition. Because of such costs (and the cognitive problems to be discussed in a 
moment), we cannot be sure that an higher number of suppliers warrants lower prices 
and better quality. Therefore, consumers need help by regulators and consumer 
associations to make better choices and reap the fruits of liberalization. 
Now suppose that liberalization policies succeed in creating reasonably competitive 
markets. Should we conclude that we can forgo the regulation of residential consumers’ 
contracts ? The answer is no. The problems discussed below do not disappear even in 
competitive markets. Therefore, the question is not whether we need consumer 
protection measures, but what kind of measures are better able to protect consumers 
without hampering competition. 
We turn now to a brief discussion of the main problems of retail energy markets. It 
is clear that competition means enhanced ability to make choices. Unfortunately, the 
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choices residential consumers make are often quite poor. They do not have enough 
information to locate the supplier who offers cheaper prices and better quality. 
Moreover, they try to economize on their cognitive efforts by means of simplified 
decision-making processes called heuristics. These mental shortcuts allow people to 
make choices without considering all information that would be needed to make the 
optimal choice. They intentionally eschew a large part of such information and focus on 
those cues which can guide them in the appropriate direction. This type of behaviour is 
what the economic literature calls bounded rationality. 
Many consequences follow from these observations. Residential consumers will 
face search costs when trying to assess whether alternative suppliers are available. 
Moreover, they will incur switching costs, sometimes due to the psychological cost to 
leave a long-time supplier, sometimes artificially created by firms in subtle and difficult 
to detect ways. If search and switching costs are high, consumers will pay more and 
competition will be reduced.  
Another consequence of asymmetric information and bounded rationality is the 
presence of unfair terms in the standard contracts drafted by energy firms. They have 
every incentive to exploit consumers’ lack of information and bounded rationality by 
hiding onerous terms and making more difficult to appraise their cost. By so doing they 
earn supra-competitive profits that would not be possible had all consumers been able to 
read and understand contracts. 
There is also a direct link between contracting strategies and the competitive 
structure of markets. Firms can use complex standard forms not only because they want 
to exploit consumers’ bounded rationality, but also because such standard forms make it 
easier to raise prices. If consumers find it difficult to compare offers, each supplier can 
use harsh terms or rise his prices without fearing the loss of too many customers. As a 
result, we could have supra-competitive prices even absent collusion. Moreover, 
complexity of contracts can also serve as a barrier to entry of new firms into the market. 
Consumers will find it difficult to understand that the new entrant is offering a better 
deal. Therefore, less consumers will switch and entry will be less profitable. 
Asymmetric information is also relevant for the regulation of quality of supply. In 
this case, neither consumers nor the regulators have enough information to choose the 
optimal level of quality. Therefore, it is crucial to set incentive systems and mandatory 
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refunds that prevent energy firms from economizing too much on quality. This is 
probably one of the fields in which the differences among the partner countries are more 
striking.  
Finally, the design of energy markets should be completed with suitable dispute 
resolution procedures. From a Law and Economics perspective, alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms can be conceived of as cost-avoiding solutions for small claims 
litigation. However, a number of institutional choices have to be made if they are to 
work effectively. First of all, it should be decided if energy consumers are better 
represented by the sectoral regulator, by an independent but specialized body, by a 
generalist consumer body or by self-regulatory industry ombudsman schemes. Pros and 
cons can be detected for all available options. Many of the above mentioned designs are 
employed in the partner countries. The most difficult task, however, is to assess their 
effectiveness. 
 
The level of competition in retail energy markets 
 
The description of the experiences of some pioneer countries shows that, when 
retail markets were opened to residential consumers, the needed institutional 
infrastructure was not put in place. With the exception of the Flemish region, the low 
levels of active participation on the demand side and the high levels of concentration on 
the supply side can be traced back to the lack of regulatory measures that reduce search 
costs, switching costs and entry barriers.  
As far as search and switching costs are concerned, relying on general consumer 
law does not seem to be a fruitful strategy. Numerous factors foster consumers’ inertia. 
Therefore, their active participation depends on more specific measures aimed at 
reducing the cognitive efforts they must face in the new competitive scenario. 
Moreover, we noted in chapter one that energy companies are interested in raising 
search costs and making it difficult for consumers to compare alternative offers. 
ERGEG best practice propositions and Eurelectric Guidelines for Customer Switching 
are first steps toward the harmonisation of the different systems adopted in Member 
Countries. However, it is submitted that more attention should be paid to the heuristics 
residential consumers employ when comparing alternative offers. From this point of 
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view, the way information is communicated by firms and regulators, as well as the 
contractual terms concerning the beginning and the end of the commercial relationship 
with the supplier, carry more weight than is generally supposed.  
Entry barriers are the other side of the coin. Economics literature is increasingly 
supporting legal unbundling of distribution and retailing as the only measure able to 
stop cross-subsidies and difficult to detect strategic behaviour against new entrants. 
Besides structural measures, it is clear that successful retail markets presuppose efficient 
solutions for information exchange and switching procedures. Timing, too, is of 
fundamental importance. It is useless to anticipate opening if the institutional 
infrastructure is not ready to work. 
 
The regulatory systems in partner countries 
 
This chapter addresses two issues: firstly, how roles and competencies in the field 
of energy consumers protection are distributed among public and private institutions; 
secondly, which regulatory powers such institutions can use to discharge their duties. 
Energy laws of all partner countries include consumers protection among the 
objectives of the regulatory framework. However, significant differences can be 
detected in the institutional solutions aimed at its implementation. Partner countries 
employed four models of consumers representation: 
 
1) The powers are shared among NRAs and Government authorities  
2) All the powers are attributed to the NRA 
3) Some or all the powers are attributed to a specialized consumer body 
4) Some or all the powers are attributed to a general consumer body 
 
To assess advantages and shortcomings of each solution we need a more detailed 
description of the powers granted to the various institutions. For expositional clarity we 
distinguish four categories of regulatory powers:  
a) advisory powers: the institution can only make proposals to other 
authorities  
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b) rule-making power: the institution can independently enact 
binding rules for energy firms 
c) enforcement powers: the institution can independently detect 
violations and decide the appropriate injunctive or punitive measures 
(usually subject to judicial review) 
d) dispute resolution powers: the institution can settle disputes 
between energy firms or between energy firms and their customers 
 
Only in Belgium, Bulgaria and Greece sector regulators can exercise advisory 
powers, while formal rule-making powers were given to the competent Ministry. 
However, in Bulgaria it is suggested that the political authority usually accepts without 
significant modifications the proposals submitted by SEWRC. Because of the technical 
knowledge required to intervene in energy markets, we can safely assume that in other 
countries too the final decisions of the political authorities attach great weight to the 
opinions of the sector regulators.  
The fact that in most partner countries NRAs and governmental authorities share 
rule-making powers leaves space to at least two interpretations. On one hand, it could 
be suggested that the direct involvement of political institutions warrants careful 
consideration of consumers’ interests. On the other hand, it is equally plausible that 
governmental authorities give precedence to other interests, for example the 
maximization of the profits of energy firms under the control of the State. 
The uncertainty on the consequences of direct governmental interventions in energy 
markets suggests that more attention should be devoted to an institutional solution 
adopted in a few partner countries, that is the appointment of an independent body 
charged with the exclusive task of representing consumers’ interests. Its main advantage 
is the enhanced probability that energy regulation will be more favourable to 
consumers.  
As we mentioned in chapter one, this solution too suffers of its own shortcomings. 
A consumer body would need access to relevant information, strong technical 
competencies and adequate resources. Moreover, means of coordinating its activities 
with those of NRA and other institutions should be provided. There is also a serious 
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danger that the consumer body employs its powers to oppose competition and forestall 
any reform proposals.  
So far, available evidence does not permit to establish the superiority of one 
institutional solution over anyone else. There are trade-offs involved that require careful 
consideration of the national legal and economic environment. What can be said beyond 
any doubt is that an excessive fragmentation of competencies among many authorities is 
a source of unnecessary costs. It enhances the probability of conflicts and raises the 
complexities of the regulatory process. Above all, the fragmentation of competencies 
increases information costs for consumers, who must search for the competent authority 
to address in case of complaints against suppliers. Moreover, it increases the risk of 
inadequate funding. From this point of view, there seems to be room for improvement 
in the Finnish, Greek and Lithuanian regulatory frameworks. 
 
Econometric analysis of residential markets regulation 
 
Energy markets data in partner countries are used to identify, through the 
deployment of econometric and statistical techniques, the effects of relevant variables 
on the outcome of the liberalization process, and namely on prices.  
Liberalization is a recent phenomenon, a fortiori in the subset of partner countries. 
This may make inference from available data weak. In spite of that, some quantitative 
assessments emerge quite clearly.  
First, liberalization has generated advantages for the categories of customers that 
have been affected by it. Residential customers have indeed been advantaged by the full 
retail market opening, where this has already been implemented.   
Second, residential customers are particularly disadvantaged when the market is 
open only for industrial customers. In this case, while industrial customers enjoy the 
benefits of liberalization, residential customers are worse off than without any opening. 
In other words, opening only the market for industrial customers fosters a transfer from 
residential to industrial customers. 
Third, concentration or State ownership in the upstream market reduces, according 
to our sample, the effectiveness of the liberalization process.    
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Fourth, the characteristics of the retail energy markets, in terms of both market 
structure (number of retailers and their concentration), and market design (in particular, 
rules on switching costs and on barriers to entry) are a significant determinant of the 
outcome. The presence of many players with a low degree of concentration entails 
lower prices. The same happens with low switching costs and barriers to entry. 
 
 
Energy consumers’ contracts 
 
Most partner countries supplement general contract and consumer law with more 
specific protective measures. Of course, such measures can partly be explained by the 
lack of competition in those countries that did not complete the liberalization of 
residential markets. However, we can also uncover additional reasons why general 
contract and consumer law risks being inadequate to protect energy consumers. Its rules 
usually employ vague formulas aimed at catching many different unfair practices. 
Therefore, they leave to the judge the task to interpret their meaning ex post. Such a 
control strategy inevitably produces a state of uncertainty until enough cases are 
litigated and dominant interpretations become settled. It is suggested that newly born 
residential energy markets can not tolerate any uncertainty as to the fairness of the most 
important contractual terms.  
The inquiry in the CLAB database highlights an additional problem. Differences in 
the interpretation of unfair terms statutes by national courts lead to diverging 
assessments of the most common terms in energy contracts. It cannot be excluded that 
such differences hamper the development of competition on a continental level. A 
European standard contract could be the answer, but its drafting is far from easy.  
Another and more fundamental reason for regulatory interventions on contract 
terms is the difference between protecting consumers and fostering competition. While 
the two objectives frequently overlap, it is by no means clear that it is always so. Take, 
for example, consumers’ termination rights in energy supply contracts. Allowing the 
consumer to exit from the contract at any moment frees her from the constraints of 
unfair terms, but could hamper those suppliers who would like to offer fixed term, fixed 
price contracts. Because of the possible conflict between competition and consumer 
protection, it would be preferable to give NRAs the power to regulate ex-ante the most 
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important terms. Relying exclusively on the ex-post assessment of generalist courts 
without a detailed knowledge of energy markets could result in less balanced outcomes. 
A more focused analysis was conducted with regard to three important types of 
contract terms: 
a) termination of contract by the consumer 
b) termination of contract by the supplier 
c) modification of contract terms  
      
 As far as consumers’ termination rights are concerned, behavioral biases, search 
and switching costs all push in the direction of too much inertia. At least in the first 
period after complete opening of the residential markets it would be preferable to forbid 
any constraint on termination. There is no reason to suppose that, because of such 
measure, suppliers will not be able to tailor their offers to customers’ preferences. No 
one will terminate a long term contract that shields from price volatility, provided it 
does not deviate too much from wholesale prices. Of course, suppliers will bear some 
additional market risk, but they are in the best position to cover against it through 
financial instruments. 
Disconnections procedures are strongly intertwined with the presence of a supplier 
of last resort and with measures aimed at protecting vulnerable customers. While 
forbidding disconnection would impose too much risk on suppliers, it would be useful 
to draw some guidelines as to the procedure to be followed for those consumers who 
cannot afford to pay their bills. Useful examples are the guidelines for preventing debt 
and disconnection published by Ofgem in January 2003 and the industry-wide safety net 
procedure for vulnerable consumers developed by the British Energy Retail association 
in 2004.  
Finally, unilateral modifications could be uniformly regulated across Europe. The 
main points of such regulation are the cases in which modification should be allowed 
and the timing and contents of the communication sent to the customer. 
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Quality of supply 
 
This chapter discusses the regulation of continuity of supply and commercial 
quality in partner countries. We first describe the main characteristics of quality 
regulation in each country, then try to assess its impact on consumers’ welfare. Finally, 
we describe the measure and type of compensation paid to energy consumers when 
quality standards are not met. 
Our research highlights the many differences among the partner countries in the 
field of quality regulation. While most of them have been introducing new regulations 
in the last few years, their contents, extent and effectiveness are far from uniform. 
Moreover, only a few countries provide adequate compensation to consumers in case of 
blackouts.  
The reference to the right of household customers to enjoy the supply of electricity 
of specified quality at reasonable prices, inserted in art. 3 second electricity directive, is 
too vague to be of much help in building a regulatory system for quality of supply. Both 
CEER and ERGEG are trying to foster awareness of best practices in the European 
context and to suggest the course of action that promises to improve the performance of 
energy companies as quickly as possible. Tough, we argue that various kinds of official 
initiatives at European Union level could ease the convergence toward common models. 
Our proposals are threefold:  
a) insert quality regulation among the powers to be attributed to each NRA 
b) provide that continuity of supply be fostered through incentive systems 
c) provide for mandatory automatic refunds to consumers in case of quality 
failures. 
 
Energy consumers’ complaints and dispute resolution procedures 
 
This chapter discusses the procedures that partner countries adopted for resolving 
disputes between energy companies and residential customers. According to Annex A 
second electricity and gas directives these procedures should be transparent, simple and 
not burdensome. They should provide fair and fast resolutions of the disputes and 
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mechanisms of redress for consumers. Their structure should reflect the principles laid 
down in the Commission recommendation 257/98/CE.  
This survey shows that various problems must be solved to enhance the 
effectiveness of dispute resolution procedures in the energy markets. While in most 
cases NRAs are able to exert pressure on the firms to settle the controversy, there isn’t 
any proof that residential consumers are adequately informed about these procedures. 
Moreover, the experiences of Finland and Lithuania, that rely on general consumer body 
without direct knowledge of energy markets, advise against this solution.  
 
The role of consumer associations 
 
This chapter discusses the role of consumer associations and the opportunities for 
direct participation of consumers to regulatory proceedings in partner countries. 
Existing evidence attests both to the benefits and the hurdles of consumers’ 
participation and representation in the energy sector. On the benefits side, enhanced 
involvement of consumers in regulatory decisions could increase their quality, reduce 
conflicts among the different categories of energy users, strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the choices made by appointed experts, reduce the influence of business 
and industrial interest groups. On the other hand, almost nowhere does consumers’ 
participation, directly or through their representative organizations, reaches adequate 
levels. The technical complexity of the energy markets is the most important factor 
hampering a larger involvement of people lacking the needed expertise in the regulatory 
process. Moreover, it is suggested that both NRA and governments rarely support the 
active participation of consumers in all aspects of regulation. This is because of elitist or 
technocratic traditions that tend to discard the contribution from the general public and 
to give almost exclusive priority to technocratic judgements.  
While enhancing consumers’ participation in the energy sector could improve the 
regulatory process, it must not be forgotten that consumer associations have their own 
agendas. They could pursue short-term interests that do not coincide with the collective 
interests of their constituency, for example because in so doing they can get more 
funding from public or private contributors. Consumer associations can also become 
entrenched in the political culture of their country and develop strong linkages with 
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political parties that influence their action. Finally, consumer associations sometimes 
represent only a fraction of consumers and not the majority of them. For all these 
reasons, adequate mechanisms should be introduced that warrant responsiveness of 
consumer associations to the public’s long-term interests.  
Various models of consumer participation can be devised, ranging from the 
submission of written observations in regulatory proceedings to the creation of a 
consumer advocate funded by the State. We provide a detailed description of the forms 
of consumer participation in the regulatory process of partner countries. This theme is 
strongly connected to the power of consumer associations to file legal actions against 
energy companies, discussed in the chapter on the regulation of contract terms. 
 
Final recommendations 
 
The general conclusion of the report is that, with few exceptions, most partner 
countries were not ready to take up the challenges stemming from the liberalization of 
retail energy markets. Faced with the pressing needs to protect residential consumers, 
they tried to preserve the controls on prices and on other aspects of the supplier-
customer relationship. However, they did not pave the way for a smooth transition to 
competition. On the contrary, some protective measures were ineffective or hindered the 
entry of new suppliers.  
We suggest that much work has to be done to put in place the institutional 
infrastructure that will allow the benefits of liberalization to be fairly distributed to all 
categories of final customers. The consumer protection measures included in the second 
electricity and gas directives do not seem to adequately support the development of a 
workable competition. For each problem discussed in this report we now propose a few 
recommendations aimed at improving the workings of retail markets. Depending on the 
type of problem, the institution better positioned to find effective solutions can be 
located at the national or the European level. Therefore, our recommendations can be 
addressed to the European Commission, to supranational organizations like ERGEG and 
CEER or to the NRAs. We also suggest that an ample variety of regulatory tools be 
employed, including mandatory rules, default rules, soft law and self-regulation 
schemes. 
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 Search costs and switching costs 
 
The reduction of both types of costs is perhaps the most important task European 
and national regulators should focus on. The low switching rates documented in most 
partner countries show that consumers find difficulties in exercising their power to 
choose. At the same time, energy companies try to make it more costly for consumers to 
compare alternative offers. To provide effective answers to such issues, we make the 
following recommendations: 
– Recommendation 1 
NRAs should adopt a code of commercial practice dealing with the pre-
contractual phase. The code should enhance the comparability of offers and 
discourage energy companies from creating unnecessary complexity in their offers. 
Belgium and Italy provide useful examples of such codes. 
– Recommendation 2  
NRAs should sponsor a voluntary code of practice for advertising and 
marketing activities. It should specify the general principles laid down in the unfair 
commercial practice directive. Its main objective would be to help NRAs 
monitoring the behaviour of energy companies. 
– Recommendation 3 
The European Commission or ERGEG should draft guidelines on the legitimacy 
of practices widely used in the energy sector like fidelity programs, rebates and 
tying clauses. Because the validity of such practices depends on complex 
assessments that must balance various factors, it could be useful to set up a uniform 
legal framework at the European level. This measure could be justified on two 
counts: first, it avoids replicating the same assessment in each national regulatory 
system; second, it avoids the risk of contrasting judgements at national level that 
could hinder the development of the Internal Energy Market.  
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 Econometric analysis of residential markets regulation  
 
Econometric evidence tends to confirm that residential customers reaped the 
benefits of liberalization in those countries where full market opening has already 
been achieved. On the other hand, partial liberalization tends to thwart residential 
consumers, both in relative terms (with respect to the industrial customers located in 
the same country), and in absolute terms (with respect to the residential customers of 
the countries in which residential and industrial customers receive the same 
treatment).  
Although the full market opening of 2007 should induce a homogenization 
between industrial and residential customers and mitigate the bias against residential 
customers, a number of persistent problems must be addressed.  
– Recommendation 4 
                  High concentration levels in the upstream and downstream markets soften 
the price-reduction effects of the liberalization process. Therefore, more aggressive 
actions should be taken in order to enhance competition in electricity and gas markets. 
In particular, a strong supervision (either by sectoral Authorities or Antitrust authorities) 
on anticompetitive conducts, predatory pricing, and collusive behaviour by the key 
players in the retail market is strongly recommended. 
– Recommendation 5 
      The retail market design significantly shapes outcomes. Countries in which 
consumers are more informed and in which switching is easier have on average lower 
prices than those that do not display these features. Ensuring more information to 
consumers and a simpler and cheap switching procedure is crucial for an effective 
liberalization process. 
– Recommendation 6 
      Policy measures aimed at favouring industrial customers, such as, for example, a 
bilateral contract market and/or merchant lines accessible only to industrial customers, 
damage residential customers. It is likely that, under such circumstances, the supply side 
in the electricity market shifts its revenue from the industrial to the residential 
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customers, thus damaging the latter. It is crucial to understand that industrial policy 
measures tend to thwart residential customers. On the policy side, this trade-off has to 
be evaluated, and a complete welfare analysis, which includes also customers, has to be 
performed prior to any industrial policy decisions.  
 
 Energy consumers’ contracts 
 
Regulation of contractual terms in residential energy markets should balance the 
need to protect consumers with that of fostering competition. It is submitted that, at 
least for the most important aspects of the contractual relationship, ex-ante regulation is 
to be preferred to the ex-post judicial control provided by the unfair terms directive. We 
make the following recommendations:  
– Recommendation 7  
It would be useful to develop a model standard contract for electricity and gas 
supply at the European level. Industry associations could be charged with this task 
under the supervision of the European Commission or ERGEG. Alternatively, the 
model contract could be inserted in the forthcoming Charter of electricity and gas 
customers’ rights. The model contract could be applied on a voluntary basis in 
Member States, but it could also become the reference point for regulators and 
judges. To encourage its adoption, the model contract should escape additional 
public scrutiny at the national level.  
– Recommendation 8  
Residential consumers should have the right to terminate the contract at any 
moment. Allowing energy companies to apply restrictive conditions to consumers’ 
withdrawal risks increasing switching costs. Moreover, there isn’t any convincing 
evidence that energy companies are not able to bear the risk of early termination. 
– Recommendation 9  
NRAs should draw guidelines about the procedures to be followed for the 
disconnection of those consumers who cannot afford to pay their bills. The most 
detailed provisions on this topic are provided by the Belgian and Finnish statutory 
rules. Useful examples are also provided by the guidelines for preventing debt and 
disconnection published by Ofgem in January 2003 and the industry-wide safety net 
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procedure for vulnerable consumers developed by the British Energy Retail 
association in 2004. 
– Recommendation 10  
As far as unilateral modifications by energy companies are concerned, two 
principles should apply. Firstly, unilateral modifications should be restricted to the 
price element of the contract. Because of the volatility of energy prices, it is 
reasonable to give the supplier the flexibility to adjust its offers to rapidly changing 
market conditions. Secondly, enough information should be given to the consumer 
to enable him to understand the reasons of the change and decide whether to search 
for better offers. Thirdly, the supplier’s right to modify the contract to its advantage 
when market conditions are unfavourable should be balanced by a symmetrical 
consumer’s right to a price cut when market conditions allow suppliers to reduce 
procurement costs.  
 
 Quality of supply  
 
The report shows that quality regulation in partner countries is far from uniform. 
Different quality standards and measurement protocols make it difficult to assess 
whether liberalization pushed energy companies to improve their performance or 
had negative effects on quality. We suggest that the following three 
recommendations could ease the convergence toward common models:  
– Recommendation 11  
The European Commission should employ the power included in art. 28 second 
electricity and gas directives with reference to high levels of public service and submit 
to the European Parliament and the Council a proposal aimed at extending the 
competencies of NRA to quality regulation.  
– Recommendation 12  
The implementation of incentive systems for improving continuity of supply should 
be encouraged. CEER and ERGEG should draft more detailed proposals aimed at 
harmonizing the measurement protocols and at developing common indicators for 
incentive schemes. Moreover, the forthcoming Energy Customers’ Charter should 
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include specific reference to the duty to adopt incentive schemes that promote optimal 
levels of quality.  
– Recommendation 13  
Automatic refunds to consumers in case of quality failures should be mandatory. 
We suggest that the Charter lists the main continuity and commercial quality standards 
whose breach gives the customer a right to compensation. The amount of compensation 
could be left to the discretion of NRAs, but it should be high enough to stimulate firms 
to comply with quality standards. 
 
 Dispute resolution 
 
The report points out various problems with alternative dispute resolution 
procedures in the energy markets. Consumers seldom have adequate knowledge of 
their mechanisms. Often there isn’t the possibility to obtain financial redress without 
filing an action in court. Moreover, general consumer bodies lack the financial 
resources and the expertise needed to adequately assist energy consumers. 
Therefore, we make the following recommendations:  
– Recommendation 14 
A specialized consumer body should be created through public or self-
regulatory schemes to assist energy consumers in their controversies with energy 
suppliers. It should have the power to award financial compensation. 
– Recommendation 15  
NRAs should have the task to spread information on the competencies of the 
dispute resolution body and make access by complaining consumers as easy as 
possible 
 
 Consumer representation 
 
Various initiatives could be promoted to enhance consumer representation in 
regulatory proceedings. We make the following recommendations:  
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– Recommendation 16  
Consumer representation should be guaranteed through advisory organisms or 
directly in the board of the NRAs. The Czech Republic and Belgium are examples 
of such solutions. 
– Recommendation 17  
The participation of consumer representatives should be enhanced both through 
periodic public hearings and the implementation of electronic consultation 
procedures. 
– Recommendation 18 
Training programmes, including e-learning, should be organized by NRAs to ensure 
consumer representatives have the skills needed to assist energy consumers and to 
actively participate in regulatory proceedings. 
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1. The methodology of Comparative Law and Economics 
 
1.1 Rules and incentives 
 
The present report discusses the structure and evolution of retail energy markets 
from the point of view of Comparative Law and Economics (CLE). In this chapter we 
propose a brief introduction to such methodology.  
CLE blends together two strands of legal research, Law and Economics on one hand 
and Comparative Law on the other. Law and Economics is one of the most successful 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of markets and institutions. It was born in the 
United States in the sixties, but in the last twenty years it has been gaining a large 
consensus in Europe too.1 Comparative Law has a long tradition in legal thought, but its 
collaboration with Law and Economics in recent years promises to deliver new and 
interesting results. 
Legal and economic scholars have employed Law and Economics in two different 
ways: to analyse legal rules through economic concepts or to analyse the impact of legal 
rules on markets. It is clear that these two perspectives are not incompatible. They 
simply reflect a different emphasis on the factors each group of scholars is interested in 
exploring. In general, we can say that legal rules and economic systems are linked by a 
two-way relationship: no market could work without the support of legal rules (be they 
produced by the State or not); at the same time, the legal system must consider the 
behaviour of economic actors if it does not want to compromise the objective of 
efficient allocation of resources.  
It must be stressed that a consequentialist perspective is the main difference 
between Law and Economics and a purely legal approach. In the tradition of legal 
positivism, which is still the dominant approach in legal studies, rules are applied and 
interpreted according to deductive modes of reasoning. The aim is to safeguard the 
coherence of the system. Law and Economics focuses on the impact of legal rules on the 
                                                 
1 Among the most widespread Law and Economics text-books see POSNER (2003); SHAVELL (2004); 
COOTER and ULEN (2004); POLINSKY (2003); SHAVELL and POLINSKY (2007); SCHÄEFER and OTT (2004). 
There are two encyclopaedic works on this subject, too: P. NEWMAN (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law, McMillan, 3 vols., 1998; B. BOUCKAERT and G. DE GEEST (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 5 vols., Elgar, 2000 (also available at 
http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/). 
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behaviour of those to whom they apply. Its objective is to analyse the interaction of 
legal and economic decisions in a given institutional context.  
An example helps to clarify the difference between consequentialist and non 
consequentialist approaches to legal rules. Suppose you want to study products liability 
rules. A positivistic approach would focus on a textual analysis of the requisites for 
producer’s liability: the meaning of “defect” and “product”, rules of causation and so 
on. Law and Economics would try to answer completely different questions: if 
producer’s liability is justified by asymmetries of information that prevent consumers 
from maximizing their utility; if the rules push the producers to choose the optimal level 
of safety; if safer products really increase the welfare of all consumers or damage those 
groups that do not want to pay higher prices; and so on.  
The general lesson of this example is that Law and Economics is interested in 
discovering the structure of incentives built in each rule or system of rules. In pursuing 
this objective, the most important tool is a theory of behaviour, that Law and Economics 
borrows from economic analysis. While microeconomics studies how consumers and 
firms react to prices, Law and Economics studies how legal rules fix the ‘price’ for their 
addressees. Analogizing markets to institutional contexts, it is possible to make 
predictions on the likely impact of different legal rules.  
There are many ways in which the legal system can influence behaviour. Following 
the terminology of game theory, the branch of economic theory that analyzes strategic 
interactions,2 we can list four different kinds of influences:  
a) legal rules can alter interested parties payoffs: e.g. by granting 
damages for breach of binding promises contract law modifies the breaching 
party’s expected utility.  
b) Legal rules can alter interested parties’ preferences: e.g. when the 
State forbids smoking some people may come to dislike it 
c) Legal rules can alter (shrink or enlarge) the set of available 
options: e.g. by forbidding anticompetitive agreements the State reduces the 
action space of economic actors 
                                                 
2 On the application of game theory to legal problems see BAIRD et al. (1994); BENOIT and KORNHAUSER 
(2002). 
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d) Legal rules can alter people’s beliefs as to the behaviour of other 
people: e.g. if the State credibly announces that it will strictly enforce 
copyright laws most people could stop illegal downloading from Internet 
It is important to notice that economic analysis has developed many theories of 
behaviour. From the forties onwards, rational choice theory dominated the scene. 
However, in the last years new theories of behaviour, based on different premises, have 
been gaining ground. One of the most promising avenue of research is Behavioral 
Economics, strongly influenced by psychological studies. Following in its footsteps, the 
new branch of Behavioral Law and Economics proposed to apply these newer theories 
to the analysis of legal rules.3 Also influential has been the notion of bounded 
rationality, firstly proposed in the forties by Nobel prize-winner Herbert Simon. It is 
clear that adherence to a specific theory of behaviour exerts a profound influence on the 
role and content of rules to be applied in a specific context. In the following chapters we 
will explain in more detail why theories of bounded rationality are better able to 
describe the workings of retail energy markets. 
Besides theories of behaviour, another tool frequently employed by lawyer-
economists is the notion of transaction costs. Its intellectual paternity is usually ascribed 
to Nobel prize-winner Ronal H. Coase and his famous 1960 article on the problem of 
social cost. Transaction costs have subsequently been put at the forefront of New 
Institutional Economics, the branch of economic theory interested in studying the 
governance mechanisms of firms and markets. In Law and Economics transaction costs 
are often pointed out as the ultimate justification for the intervention of the State. In a 
world without transaction costs, legal rules would be useless because interested parties 
could easily reach an agreement to maximize total wealth. However, in the real world 
various categories of transaction costs are a constant hurdle to first-best allocation of 
resources. In general, it can be said that transaction costs include the costs to acquire 
information, the costs of bargaining and the costs of enforcing agreements.  The level of 
such costs in each context is one of the most important factors to think of when 
designing the optimal institutional structure.  
 
                                                 
3  For collections of essays on the subject see SUNSTEIN (2000); GIGERENZER and ENGEL (2006). 
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1.2 Institutions matter  
 
There is ample evidence of a close correlation between sustained growth rates and 
market institutions. According to Nobel prize-winner Douglass C. North, institutions 
fuel economic development by reducing the transactions costs and opening new and 
larger choice sets for economic actors.4 The relationship between institutions and 
growth has also been explored from other perspectives. For example, economist Dani 
Rodrik shows that traditional factors like geography, resource endowment or openness 
to international trade are far less important that an institutional infrastructure tailored to 
the needs of each country.5 On the other hand, the Law and Finance approach, based at 
Harvard University and the World Bank, has tried to empirically confirm the link 
between the legal origins of a country and its ability to implement strong financial 
markets and investors’ protection measures.6  
These results help to frame the questions this report is bent on answering. It is not 
enough to pay attention to economic indicators to complete the liberalization process 
and build the internal market for energy. Instead, the endeavours of European and 
member States institutions should be directed to an in depth analysis of the regulatory 
structures that govern the new energy markets. The studies on economic growth 
mentioned above show that only a carefully constructed institutional infrastructure, 
together with a strong consciousness of national peculiarities, is able to prompt the huge 
investments needed in energy markets. These conclusions are shared by that part of the 
economic literature that includes institutional factors in benchmarking analyses for the 
energy sector.7 A Law and Economics approach to retail markets aims at pushing 
further such line of research by discussing the micro-level rules that can offer efficient 
solutions to the economic problems encountered in these settings. 
Before addressing the role of Comparative law, one criticism often levied against 
Law and Economics must be considered. It concerns the conflict between efficiency and 
equity. Critics of Law and Economics forcefully argue that efficiency can’t offer any 
guide to the choice of legal institutions. On one hand, the notion of Pareto efficiency 
                                                 
4 See NORTH (1990, 2005). For an application of Norh’s ideas to the electric industry see CHABAUD et al. 
(2005). 
5 See RODRIK (2003, 2004). See also EGGERTSSON (2005). 
6 See generally DJANKOV  et al. (2003). 
7 See, e.g., GREEN et al. (2005); JAMASB et al. (2005); STERN  and CUBBIN (2005); BROWN et al. (2006). 
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would be useless because it incorporates a criterion of unanimity which is unable to 
tackle the complexities of real institutional contexts. On the other hand, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency would promote interventions that benefit some people and damage someone 
else. In this case the problem is the lack of a widely accepted criterion to choose those 
who must bear the burden of a specific policy and to set an adequate measure of 
compensation. 
In the field of public services the clash between efficiency and equity is at its 
height. It is clear that the liberalization process gives a privileged status to the objective 
of efficiency, but does not guarantee that its benefits will be distributed among all 
categories of consumers. This is the reason why the gas and electricity European 
directives gave member States the power to implement public service obligations in 
their national regulatory systems. 
Therefore, it seems that the European regulatory model tries to overcome the 
conflict between efficiency and equity and asks member States to resolve the tensions 
provoked by their coexistence. As we shall see in the following chapters, this is more 
easily said than done. 
 
1.3 Comparing regulatory options 
 
Comparative law is the branch of legal studies that tries to discover and explain 
similarities and differences among legal systems. In the twentieth century it contributed 
to the development of knowledge about western and non-western legal traditions. In the 
last twenty years it also promoted awareness of the problems the construction of a 
European common law shall deal with.  
The blending of Comparative law and Law and Economics has been proposed as 
the solution to the shortcomings of both disciplines.8 Comparative law is a purely 
descriptive approach. It aims to give an accurate picture of the law as it is, but lacks the 
tools needed to sustain prescriptive proposals aimed at legal reforms. Moreover, it is not 
able to employ quantitative methods to measure similarities and differences among legal 
systems. 
                                                 
8 See generally MATTEI (1997); ANTONIOLLI et al. (2000); DE GEEST  and VAN DEN BERGH (2004); 
FAUST (2006). 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
29
Law and Economics can address such weaknesses. The economic notions of 
efficiency and transaction costs give at least some guide on the desirable institutional 
choices and their probable impact. Moreover, quantitative research can help uncover 
new information that traditional legal research methods could not be able to detect. 
However, Law and Economics suffers from its own shortcomings.  First of all, lawyer-
economists pay scant attention to the peculiarities of national legal systems. Most of the 
literature in this field refers to American examples. When other legal systems display 
significant differences, models built with American law in mind cannot be relied upon. 
Secondly, Comparative law can save Law and Economics from the excesses of 
functionalism. It is a mistake to suppose, as lawyer-economists often do, that every 
observable institution is the efficient answer to economic problems. Comparative law 
shows the role that historical accidents and unforeseen consequences play in moulding 
institutions. This lesson has been absorbed in the branch of economic literature that 
employs the notion of path dependence. Moreover, Comparative law shows that the 
same economic problem can be solved in different (and equally efficient) ways in 
different legal systems. Therefore, it injects a more sophisticated and realistic vision of 
legal dynamics in Law and Economics.  
Putting together the various strands of legal and economic research summarized 
above, it is now possible to discuss how they apply to the analysis of retail energy 
markets. 
 
1.4 The Law and Economics of retail energy markets 
 
In the economic literature the analysis of retail energy markets is usually focused on 
the level of competition, the performance and strategies of firms and the choices of final 
consumers. The main drivers of the analysis are the factors that influence prices and 
costs on both sides of the markets. A Law and Economics approach shifts attention to 
the connection between economic problems and incentives induced by the regulatory 
framework. The working hypothesis is that legal rules shape the environment in which 
firms and consumers make their choices. From this point of view, the main drivers of 
the analysis are not economic or technological, but of an institutional type. It could be 
said that Law and Economics rejects the idea of a one-way causation mechanism going 
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from markets to rules. Instead, it proposes to explore the reverse chain from rules to 
markets. To be sure, it could seem that such an approach falls prey to the well-known 
chicken-and-egg problem. However, analyzing only the economic side fares no better 
and risks offering wrong answers to policy-makers interested in the smooth operation of 
energy markets.  
For example, let’s consider suppliers’ entry strategies in retail markets. It is often 
suggested that new entry is too limited despite there being significant gains for those 
firms which manage to steal clients from incumbent suppliers. It could be that such 
conduct has economic explanations. What is argued here is that compelling reasons for 
the low levels of entry in retail energy markets can also be found in the rules that govern 
the transfer of clients, the exchange of information, the marketing practices of 
incumbent suppliers and so on.  
More generally, a Law and Economics approach to retail energy markets means a 
sustained attention to the institutional determinants of contractual relationships between 
energy firms and residential consumers. We do not neglect economic factors (e.g. 
technological choices and production costs), but they are not the end point of the 
analysis. In the chapter that follows we will discuss the most important problems 
residential consumer must face. Building on the insights of economic theory, we should 
be able to describe the regulatory answers (or the lack thereof) devised in the partner 
countries, evaluate their efficiency and suggest improvements when needed. All the 
tools designed by Law and Economics in the last forty years, from the analysis of 
incentive structures to transaction costs, can be usefully redeployed in the study of retail 
energy markets.  
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      2. The problems of retail energy markets 
 
 In this chapter we propose a brief survey of the main problems regulators shall 
tackle in retail energy markets. They are information asymmetries and bounded 
rationality of consumers, unfair terms in standard contracts drafted by suppliers, quality 
of supply and dispute resolution procedures. None of them is a peculiarity of energy 
markets. On the contrary, they are well-known in most other markets as well. This 
commonality is often underlined in the economic literature to argue that energy 
consumers do not need additional protection over and above that already provided by 
consumer law. This argument is not very convincing, however.  
 First of all, we should not consider only the type of problem, but also its relevance 
in each market. It has not been demonstrated that the four issues discussed below are 
easier to solve in energy markets than elsewhere. Instead, there is reason to suppose 
that, at least for some of them, the reverse could be true. Each country has to make a 
huge educational investment before consumers learn to exercise their freedom to choose 
the cheapest supplier. Because of such learning effects, in the period immediately 
following liberalization information asymmetries and cognitive errors could be 
widespread. Moreover, in the new scenario the fairness of some terms inherited from 
the monopoly era could be debated and dispute resolution procedures could not work 
well or not exist at all.  
  Secondly, consumer law is not a perfect tool. It causes both underdeterrence 
problems, by not stopping inefficient and unfair practices, and overdeterrence ones, by 
barring practices that would increase the welfare of businesses and consumers alike. In 
energy markets, statutory and regulatory interventions could complement and 
strengthen consumer law, as well as remedy to its weaknesses. Of course, the 
coexistence of two groups of rules could be a source of conflicts whenever regulatory 
policies collide with those of civil judges, consumers’ associations and other 
stakeholders empowered to enforce consumer law. Though, this observation cannot be 
disposed of by cancelling regulation in retail markets. It is up to regulators and 
legislators to devise coordination mechanisms that lessen the risk of conflicting 
interventions in energy markets.  
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
32
Thirdly, electricity (and partly gas) display an array of physical and economic 
characteristics that complicate consumers’ choices: 
a) electricity cannot be stored economically; 
b) it must be supplied through a non duplicable network in which supply 
and demand must be always in equilibrium (the same for gas); 
c) short-run demand elasticity is very low and, combined with inelastic 
supply at high demand levels, contributes to the inherent volatility of 
electricity prices; 
d) technical characteristics of the networks and high fixed costs in the 
production segment constrain the development of competition.9 
All these factors point in the same direction: electricity (and partly gas) are very 
peculiar goods for which we should not expect that all domestic consumers are able to 
make rational and informed choices. 
 Before discussing in more detail each of the four categories of problems mentioned 
above, it is useful to make some preliminary observations on the relationship between 
competition and consumer protection. While competitive markets are usually the best 
means to increase consumers’ welfare, we cannot exclude that sometimes these two 
objectives push regulators in opposite directions. Moreover, we should reflect on the 
need to deploy measures that foster competition both on the supply and the demand side 
of energy markets, as well as on the justification for such measures in reasonably 
competitive markets. The analysis proposed in this chapter will be used to interpret the 
data on energy consumers protection collected in the remaining part of the report. 
 
2.1 The relationship between competition and consumer protection 
 
There is a large consensus on the proposition that competition increases consumers’ 
welfare. However, the liberalization process pushes both public institutions and 
academic scholars to confront some deeper questions. First of all, is it safe to assume 
that removing entry barriers is all that is needed to reap the benefits of competition ? Or 
should we also introduce measures that help final consumers to profit from competition 
? Secondly, are there cases in which policies aimed at promoting competition collide 
                                                 
9 JOSKOW (2005). 
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with consumer protection ? Thirdly, which conditions should regulators verify before 
they decide to dispense with consumer protection measures beyond those already 
provided by general laws ? 
To begin with, scholars increasingly reject the view that competition policies should 
only be addressed to the behaviour of firms. In newly born markets, where consumers 
did not choose suppliers for a long time, regulators should encourage them to be more 
active in searching for information and switching supplier.10 This means that measures 
directed to the demand side are as important as those directed to the supply side. In this 
case we can observe regulations that reduce consumers’ search and switching costs, but 
at the same time foster competition because they make it easier for new entrants to steal 
customers from incumbent operators.   
A less straightforward relationship between competition and consumer protection 
can be detected in other cases. Increasing the number of suppliers adds to the 
complexity of consumers’ choices. They now face costs that would not exist but for the 
opening of residential markets to competition. Because of such costs and the cognitive 
problems discussed below, we cannot be sure that a higher number of suppliers warrants 
lower prices and better quality. Therefore, we are confronted with the paradox that 
liberalization policies aimed at benefiting consumers could instead damage them.11 
Of course, the reverse could also be true: consumer protection measures have the 
potential to hamper competition. For example, imposing mandatory terms in residential 
energy contracts allows consumers to call on a minimum level of contractual quality. At 
the same time, it could hamper innovation and make more difficult for energy firms to 
tailor contractual terms to the needs of consumers.12 
                                                 
10 See WATERSON (2003); VICKERS (2003); ENNIS and HEIMLER (2004); CSERES (2005, p. 325ff.). 
11 See the analysis provided by SYLVAN (2004) and CSERES (2006). Another example of possible conflict 
between competition and consumer protection is offered by GOMEZ (2003, p. 17f.): new entrants need to 
employ aggressive advertising campaigns to overcome the loyalty usually displayed by consumers toward 
incumbent operators. However, strict enforcement of misleading advertising laws could frustrate the 
efforts of new entrants and reduce the level of competition in the market. It is suggested that judges and 
regulators should grant more leeway to new entrants when evaluating their ads. This approach could 
increase competition and produce benefits that outweigh the costs borne by misled consumers. However, 
it is not clear that regulators are able to balance these conflicting ends. The risk is that the diffusion of 
unfair commercial practices fosters distrust in markets and dampens the ultimate objectives liberalization 
is bent to reach.  
12 For a more general discussion of the tension between competition and consumer policies see CSERES  
(2005, p. 327f.). 
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One final aspect of the relationship between competition and consumer protection 
must be discussed. Suppose liberalization policies succeed in creating reasonably 
competitive markets. Should we conclude that we can forgo the regulation of residential 
consumers’ contracts ? The answer is no. The problems discussed in more detail below 
do not disappear even in competitive markets.  
A further problem relates to the goals and tools of different regulatory approaches. 
If we believe that competition is all that matters, we should be willing to rely on 
competition law as the main regulatory tool. However, competition and consumer law 
do not pursue the very same goals. The former is mainly interested in the total welfare 
of consumers and firms, while the latter is concerned with consumer welfare in terms of 
price, choice and availability.13 This means that the two standards could lead to 
conflicting assessments: a market that is working well from the point of view of 
competition could produce bad outcomes from the point of view of consumer law. An 
interesting example is the legitimacy of standard terms according to antitrust and 
consumer law. In some cases they enhance transparency and comparability of offers. If 
anti-competitive effects are lacking, antitrust rules do not apply. However, standard 
terms could still take unfair advantage of consumers without interfering with the 
operation of the market.  A parallel assessment conducted by different authorities with 
different criteria could easily produce conflicting outcomes.14 
Therefore, the question is not whether we need consumer protection measures, but 
what kind of measures are better able to protect consumers without hampering 
competition. We can summarise our discussion as follows: 
a) competition can benefit consumers, but it can also hurt them; 
b) when designing regulatory measures aimed at fostering competition, 
attention should be paid both to the behaviour of firms and to the behaviour of 
consumers; 
c) increasing competition can damage consumers, whereas protecting 
consumers can hamper competition. Therefore, in both cases regulators should 
balance costs and benefits for all the interested parties; 
d) one cannot rely exclusively on competition to protect consumers. 
Depending on the structure of markets and the institutional context, various 
                                                 
13 This point is developed by CSERES (2005, p. 307ff.). 
14 On this topic see MIRONE (2003); NEBBIA (2006). 
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kinds of measures can be introduced that improve on the decision-making skills 
of residential consumers and ensure efficient market equilibria.  
 
 2.2  Information asymmetries and bounded rationality 
 
 Both information asymmetries and bounded rationality manifest themselves 
whenever somebody has to make a choice. Economic literature started to build a 
coherent analytical framework for the first problem in the sixties. The second one 
gained widespread attention in the last decades thanks to suggestions coming from the 
psychological literature.  
 In general, firms are better informed than their clients about two things: The quality 
of the product or service they supply and the quality of the terms they drafted. 
Consumers, on the other hand, are better informed about their own preferences and the 
way they want to use the product or service. This informative advantage is bound to 
disappear when firms can discover their clients’ preferences by observing their past 
behaviour or the choices their clients make among a menu of offers.  
Contracts made in situations of asymmetric information do not warrant efficient 
outcomes. That is, consumers could buy products or services they value less than they 
pay for. Alternatively, they could buy too much or too little of a product or service. In 
both cases, asymmetric information precludes the optimal allocation of resources that 
would obtain in a perfectly functioning market.  
In retail energy markets the attention devoted to the issue of transparency is an 
explicit recognition of the relevance of information asymmetries. Art. 3 second 
directives on electricity and gas states that adequate measures must be implemented to 
guarantee transparency of prices and other contractual conditions. Further indications on 
information that must be provided to consumers are in Annex A to the directives. In its 
report and best practice proposition on this subject, ERGEG emphasized that 
transparency gives consumers the possibility to choose among different suppliers and 
furthers the goal of strengthening competition.15  
It is easy to notice that, whenever legislators and regulators face a problem of 
asymmetric information, their almost automatic reaction is to multiply the duties of 
                                                 
15 See ERGEG (2005c, 2006c).  
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disclosure on behalf of the firms and to make available the largest number of 
informational sources. This ‘more is better’ approach is not always successful, however. 
Many studies show that duties of disclosure are often unable to increase the awareness 
of consumers and their ability to make a rational choice.16 To understand the reasons for 
such failure, we must turn to the notion of bounded rationality, that is to the way 
individuals process and use information.  
According to Herbert Simon, the scientist who coined the term in the forties, winner 
of the Nobel prize for economics in 1978, decision-making processes must be 
understood as the outcome of two interacting factors: the computational abilities of the 
human brain and the complexities of the environment in which the decision-maker 
performs her tasks.17 Until recent years, this was a minority’s view.  Mainstream 
economic literature was entirely built on rational choice theory. Its main assumptions 
are that individuals have unlimited computational abilities and wish to maximize their 
own utility. No attention is devoted to the processes that real people employ when 
making choices, nor to the influence the context can exert on them.  
Rational choice theory is unable to explain why duties of disclosure fail to raise 
consumers’ awareness. Bounded rationality offers an immediate answer. People do not 
have unlimited cognitive resources. Moreover, they often confront complex 
environments rife with uncertainties. Therefore, they try to economize on their cognitive 
efforts by means of simplified decision-making processes called heuristics. These 
mental shortcuts allow people to make choices without considering all the information 
that would be needed according to rational choice theory. They voluntary eschew a 
large part of such information and focus on those cues which can guide them in the 
appropriate direction.  
Heuristics can have two opposite consequences. If they match to the decision 
environment, individuals will be able to reach satisfying results. On the other hand, if 
heuristics fit poorly to the task that must be performed, individuals will make erroneous 
and biased choices. Two different strands of the psychological literature have 
emphasized the positive and negative sides of heuristics. It is clear that a deeper 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., HOWELLS (2005) and references therein. 
17 See, e.g., SIMON (1982-1997). For a thorough analysis of his work see the essays collected by AUGIER  
and MARCH (2004). 
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understanding of how heuristics are selected in different contexts is needed.18 For our 
purposes, suffice it to note that regulatory strategies thought to enhance transparency 
could be less helpful for boundedly rational consumers. If not provided in the right 
format, information supplied to them could be simply discarded or interpreted in the 
wrong way.  
It is interesting to notice that signs of bounded rationality have been uncovered in 
the British energy retail market, one of the most mature in the world. Residential 
customers can make three different kinds of mistakes: a) do not switch to a cheaper 
supplier; b) switch to a more expensive supplier; c) switch to a cheaper supplier, but not 
the cheapest one.19 Other studies on the British retail markets confirm these findings. A 
research commissioned by Ofgem, the British regulator, shows that 60% of customers 
that switched to a new suppliers were satisfied of their choice. Thus, the remaining 40% 
could be victim of cognitive errors.20 Another research conducted on behalf of 
Energywatch, the British energy consumers’ representative, highlights that consumers 
generally prefer to be told what supplier is better for them rather than having to work it 
out for themselves.21 This reaction is perfectly compatible with bounded rationality, but 
casts a shadow on the many regulatory initiatives aimed at improving the ability of 
consumers to choose among suppliers. 
The implications of asymmetric information and bounded rationality can now be 
discussed with reference to two issues: how energy consumers choose a supplier and 
what kind of regulation should be introduced for energy contract terms. 
 
2.3 Switching costs  
 
Switching costs arise when a customer wants to change her supplier. They come in 
different guises:22  
a) transaction costs, related to time and effort needed to change supplier 
                                                 
18 See generally GILOVICH et al. (2002); GIGERENZER and ENGEL (2006).  
19 WILSON and WADDAMS PRICE (2005, 2007). The authors also note that the accuracy of choices does not 
improve after many years from the opening of the retail market.  
20 See the survey conducted by Accent in the Annex to Ofgem, Domestic Retail Market Report – June 
2005 (www.ofgem.gov.uk ). 
21 See Accent Marketing and Research (2005). 
22 See generally OFT (2003); POMP  et al. (2005); KLEMPERER and FARRELL (2005). 
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b) compatibility costs, related to connections among parts of the equipment 
employed for the supply. In the energy sector a compatibility issue could arise 
when a customer has to change her meter equipment if she wants to change 
supplier. 
c) Learning costs, both on the supplier’s side, who knows better the needs 
of her long-time customers, and on the customer’s side, who must learn how to 
deal with a new supplier.  
d) Contractual costs, created by suppliers through specific terms or fidelity 
programs. 
e) Uncertainty costs, related to the difficulty of appraising the quality of the 
products or services of the new supplier. 
f) Psychological costs, related to trust relationships with actual suppliers. 
g) Shopping costs, which increase the propensity to buy different products 
or services from the same supplier. 
h) Search costs, incurred whenever the customer wants to find an alternative 
supplier. 
 
     The economic literature points out that switching costs can alter the competitive 
structure of markets, but their presence should not be taken as proof of diminished 
consumer welfare. Only an in-depth analysis can say if firms are able to exploit 
switching costs to the detriment of consumers. Moreover, the level of switching should 
not be assumed to be a reliable indicator of the measure of such costs. Low levels of 
switching could mean that suppliers offer the same quality and prices. In this case, 
switching costs can be high or low. On the other hand, there could be a socially 
excessive level of switching when suppliers pay consumers to switch.  
Notice also that  switching rates say nothing about levels of concentration in retail 
markets. High switching rates can be accompanied by strong re-concentration trends, as 
seen in England, while low switching rates are documented in countries with a large 
number of suppliers (e.g. Finland).23 
With these caveats in mind, we share the common view that switching costs shall be 
monitored and reduced whenever possible. In 2005 ERGEG surveyed switching 
                                                 
23  See GLACHANT (2006). 
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practices in European countries and showed the existence of divergent rules and 
procedures. ERGEG best practice proposition on supplier switching process, published 
in 2006, aims at establishing uniform basic principles that ease switching.24  
As shown in chapter 4, however, the effectiveness of such principles should be 
assessed with reference to the problems of asymmetric information and bounded 
rationality that real people face. If regulators introduce duties of disclosure and price 
comparison sites, we should assess whether they reduce search costs. Bounded 
rationality could be relevant, too. Low switching rates are documented all over Europe. 
Even in the British retail markets, amongst the most developed in the world, there is a 
lot of inertia. People often prefer not to switch even though they could save money. Is 
such behaviour irrational ? Or are we putting a heavy cognitive burden on the shoulders 
of residential consumers ? To answer these questions we need a better knowledge of 
mental processes at work in the decision to switch. Some plausible suggestions can be 
derived from psychological studies on the procrastination bias.25 
Like many other choices, the decision to change supplier has a strong inter-temporal 
dimension. More specifically, the consumer has to incur the immediate costs of 
switching in order to reap the future benefits of cheaper bills and better service. In a 
variety of contexts with analogous time structures individuals show time-inconsistent 
preferences. That is, they overestimate the probability of undertaking activities with 
current costs and delayed benefits.26 Usually, costs are delayed for as long as possible 
so as to gain the benefit of not incurring them.  
The procrastination bias has clear and worrying implications for regulatory 
interventions on switching costs. If this psychological mechanism hinders the decisions 
of energy consumers, strategies aimed at increasing the information on alternative offers 
and smoothing the switching process could be less efficacious than one would hope. 
More information could not overcome inertia. If this is the case, subtler strategies are 
needed. For example, automatic renewals are a well established practice for residential 
energy contracts all over Europe.27 Though, they risk reinforcing the procrastination 
bias. One year after the other, consumers are tempted to delay the investment in time 
                                                 
24 See ERGEG (2005b, 2006b). 
25  See generally the works collected in LOEWENSTEIN et al. (2003). 
26  With specific reference to switching behaviour see DELLA VIGNA  and MALMENDIER (2004). 
27 See the analysis of energy contract terms in chapter seven. 
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and effort required to switch supplier. Now suppose automatic renewals were forbidden. 
At the end of each contractual period, consumers would be forced to subscribe a new 
contract with the same or a different supplier. Arguably, the effort requested for each 
subscription could reduce the distance between the costs of renewing the contract and 
the costs of switching supplier.  
It is easy to forecast that energy firms will try to structure their contracts so as to 
exploit consumers’ biases. Moreover, they will deploy all kind of marketing techniques 
which help to fence off their competitors. For example, win-back strategies are 
incumbents’ strategies aimed at contacting a former customer who switched to a new 
entrant, for the purpose of regaining that customer back. The economic literature points 
out that such strategies are widespread in the network industries and can have the same 
anti-competitive effects of other predatory strategies. No less dangerous could be more 
traditional strategies like rebates and fidelity discounts.28 Another common marketing 
strategy is the offer of a range of value-added services. It is suggested that this strategy 
increases the complexity of comparisons among competing offers and diminishes the 
probability of switching. The same effect can be obtained with ad messages that stress 
the uncertainty inherent in dealing with a new supplier.29 
It is the task of regulators to monitor business practices and forbid any initiatives 
which could reinforce market power. However, it must not be forgotten that practices 
supposed to be detrimental to consumers can often be explained on competitive 
grounds. Moreover, a suspect term can benefit some categories of consumers and 
damage another. Each regulatory intervention should be supported by a careful 
assessment of its economic and psychological consequences on consumers. 
 
2.4 Unfair terms 
 
Unfair terms are a recurring theme in consumers’ contracts. Asymmetric 
information and bounded rationality explain their presence in standard forms. Reading 
and understanding contracts can be very costly for consumers. At the same time, the 
benefits they can hope to gain are limited. Firms know most consumers do not read. 
                                                 
28 See NICITA (2006); OECD (2003). 
29 See HARTMANN  e IBÁÑEZ (2007). 
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Therefore, they are free to insert terms that transfer risks to their clients without 
compensating them.30  
Law and economics scholars disagree on the best solution to the problem of unfair 
contract terms. Some argue that such terms should be banned altogether. Others suggest 
a more cautious approach, pointing out that an all-encompassing ban could adversely 
affect some groups of customers, forced to pay higher prices or to accept mandatory 
terms they dislike. Moreover, it is suggested that, because of reputational constraints, 
firms enforce unfair terms in a selective way: they are applied against opportunistic 
consumers, but not against clients with whom firms wants to preserve a long and 
cooperative relationship.31 
Various economic models show that, with boundedly rational consumers, we cannot 
simply trust the market.32 Firms have more to gain by increasing the complexity of their 
forms than by disclosing to consumers all the risks they transfer to them. It is plausible 
to assume that in energy markets, as in any other markets, there are sophisticated 
consumers (those that read contracts) and naïve consumers (those that do not read 
contracts). Firms have every incentive to exploit consumers’ naivete by hiding onerous 
terms and making more difficult to appraise their cost. By so doing they earn supra-
competitive profits that would not be possible had all consumers been able to read 
contracts. While naïve consumers pay more for the product or service, sophisticated 
consumers pay less because they learn to avoid disadvantageous terms. Therefore, naïve 
consumers subsidize sophisticated ones. The crucial point is that all firms have the 
incentive not to educate naïve consumers and to find new ways to exploit them.  
There is also a direct link between contracting strategies and the competitive 
structure of markets.33 Firms can use complex standard forms not only because they 
want to exploit consumers’ bounded rationality, but also because they make it easier to 
raise prices. If consumers find it difficult to compare offers, each supplier can use harsh 
terms or rise his prices without fearing the loss of too many customers. As a result, we 
could have supra-competitive prices even absent collusion. Moreover, complexity of 
contracts can also serve as a barrier to entry of new firms into the market. Consumers 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., KOROBKIN (2003). 
31  See, in this vein, GILLETTE (2004); BEBCHUK and POSNER (2006); JOHNSTON (2006). 
32 See ALCES (2006), who relies on the model by GABAIX  and LAIBSON (2006). See also GANS (2005) and 
BAR-GILL (2006). 
33 See GILO and PORAT (2006). 
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will find it difficult to understand that the new entrant is offering a better deal. 
Therefore, less consumers will switch and entry will be less profitable. 
Directive 93/13/CE on unfair contract terms applies in the retail energy markets. 
However, we ask whether the ex-post judicial control introduced by such statute 
warrants an adequate level of protection to energy consumers. Annex A to the second 
electricity and gas directives lists the consumer protection measures member States 
shall apply at least to households. This report tries to understand if partner countries rely 
on general consumer law or recur to more specific interventions to protect energy 
consumers. Alternative solutions include  ex-ante approval of terms and conditions, 
mandatory terms drafted by the legislator or the regulator, industry self-regulation. 
Information on energy consumers’ contracts was collected by ERGEG in 2005. In 
2006 a best practice proposition for customer protection was published that focuses on 
timely connections to a distribution network, reliable and continuous supply and 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms.34 In this report we provide more detailed and 
updated information on this topic, evaluate the content of the terms drafted by 
legislators or regulators and discuss national case law on energy consumers’ contracts. 
Moreover, the report is interested in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
measures adopted in each country.  
 
2.5 Quality of supply 
 
According to CEER definitions, quality of supply in energy markets involves two 
aspects: commercial quality and continuity of supply.35 The first relates to the nature 
and quality of customers service provided to energy consumers. The second relates to 
the number and duration of supply interruption. While commercial quality can be 
ensured both by suppliers and network operators, continuity of supply only refers to 
obligations fulfilled by network operators. Recently, the new dimension of voltage 
quality, related to power disturbances on transmission and distribution network, has 
been added to the debate on quality regulation.  
                                                 
34  See ERGEG (2005a, 2006a). 
35  See CEER (2005a). 
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This report is interested in evaluating the improvement or worsening of quality after 
the start of liberalization. The topics explored in more detail include the content of the 
standards introduced by regulators, the structure of incentive mechanisms that should 
push energy firms to improve quality and the compensation paid to energy consumers 
when quality standards are not met.  
It must be emphasized that quality regulation is by no means a simple task. In 
theory, the optimal level of quality corresponds to the point in which the marginal costs 
of additional investments by firms and the marginal benefits for consumers are equal. 
Beyond such point, quality costs more than consumers are willing to pay.36 However, 
regulators lack information needed to choose the optimal level, that is firms’ costs and 
consumers’ preferences. Therefore, quality regulation is often conducted on the basis of 
strong information asymmetries and cannot be supposed to maximize social welfare. 
What’s more, standards are not tailored to the specific needs of each consumer, but 
represent average estimates. This means that some consumers could pay more than they 
receive, while others could pay less. Benchmarking quality standards at European level 
could be useful, but the differences among national networks and commercial practices 
blur the conclusions regulators are able to draw from such exercise.  
 
2.6 Dispute resolution 
 
According to Annex A of the second electricity and gas directives, member States 
must ensure that energy consumers can avail themselves of transparent, simple and 
cheap dispute resolution procedures, in accordance with European Commission’s 
Recommendation 1998/257/CE. Data on dispute resolution procedures in the energy 
sector were collected by ERGEG in 2005.37 This report provides further data on this 
topic, with specific reference to the following aspects: 
a) whether dispute resolution tasks are assigned to the regulator, to a 
specialized consumer body or to a general consumer body; 
b) the procedure to be followed and the remedies available 
c) the number of complaints received by each dispute resolution 
authority and their outcomes 
                                                 
36 See generally SAPPINGTON (2005); AJOHDIA  and HAKVOORT (2005). 
37  See ERGEG (2005a, p. 19-38). 
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d) case law of national courts concerning residential energy 
consumers’ contracts. 
 
     From a Law and Economics perspective, alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms can be conceived of as cost-avoiding solutions for small claims litigation.38 
However, a number of institutional choices have to be made if they are to work 
effectively. First of all, it should be decided if energy consumers are better represented 
by the sectoral regulator, by an independent but specialized body or by self-regulatory 
industry ombudsman schemes.39 Pros and cons can be detected for all available options. 
When the regulator handles disputes, he has the technical knowledge needed to appraise 
the merits of the claim. On the other hand, he could give more weight to the 
development of competition and decide not to enforce aggressively consumers’ rights. 
An independent but specialized body could avoid such trade-off, but should have large 
human and financial resources to acquire credibility. It should also have the power to 
force firms to comply with its orders. An industry ombudsman scheme could be less 
expensive for the State, but its independence from the industry should be guaranteed. 
Moreover, there should be the possibility to apply substitute remedies when self-
regulation does not deliver the expected results. 
It must be added that socio-legal studies raise many doubts on the effectiveness of  
ADR procedures. They point out that some groups of consumers have no access to such 
procedures. These groups include the elderly, low-income consumers and immigrants. 
In general, they are less willing to complain and less successful when they do complain. 
Moreover, psychological biases such as cognitive dissonance could further reduce the 
number of complaints. Consumers often tend to downplay the negative aspects of 
choices they made. Therefore, they do not complain (or do not exercise termination 
rights) because they do not want to admit they made the wrong choice.40 We do not 
                                                 
38  See DUGGAN (2003). 
39 A further option is to combine the enforcement of competition law and consumer protection in the 
hands of the National Competition Authority. The main advantage of this solution is to avoid the conflicts 
between the goals of the two approaches and to produce useful synergies. It was adopted in USA with the 
Federal Trade Commission, in UK with the Office of Fair Trading, in Australia with the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, in Hungary with the Office for Economic Competition. See 
CSERES (2005, p. 411ff.). However, it remains to be seen how the National Competition Authority 
weights the competing interests of firms and consumers, as well as the interests of different categories of 
consumers. 
40  See RAMSAY (2003). 
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have data to confirm such predictions, but we do show that in many partner countries 
there is much room for improvement of dispute resolution procedures. It is clear that the 
design of dispute resolution procedures should take in account the problems faced by 
some groups of consumers. Regulators should endeavour to improve the awareness of 
such groups by targeting their campaigns, reducing any psychological barriers and 
prevent outcomes biased against more vulnerable groups. 
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3. An overview of the liberalization process in the 27 Member States  
 
The foundation of a European energy and gas market began with the Directive 
1996/92 for electricity and Directive 1998/30 for gas. They were repealed by Directives 
2003/54 and 2003/55, which set the objective of full liberalization by 1st July 2007.  
The proper and complete transposition of the European directives by all the 
Member States is a fundamental requisite for the achievement of such an objective. The 
Commission monitors the process, providing yearly benchmarking reports on the 
liberalization process.  
In Annex E we list the national laws and regulations that implemented the first and 
second electricity directives within the 27 Member States, together with a short analysis 
of the national market. To give the reader an overview of the liberalization process, in 
the two tables below we synthesize some data that help to grasp the level of competition 
in domestic retail markets so far and the role consumers’ interests play in the regulatory 
process.  
Table 3.1 shows the full opening dates of retail markets in those countries that 
decided not to wait for the European deadlines. The switching rate is the percentage of 
domestic consumers that decided to avail themselves of the opportunity to change the 
electricity or gas supplier. In general, high switching rates mean that there are many 
suppliers, barriers to entry are low, consumers are well informed and their choices are 
not hampered by unnecessary costs. Some caveats are worth repeating, however. Firstly, 
as already mentioned in chapter 2, switching rates are only one indicator of market 
competitiveness among many. Therefore, markets with high switching rates should not 
be assumed to work smoothly and viceversa. Secondly, the criteria employed to 
measure switching rates in Member States are far from uniform. From time to time they 
refer to the total number of switching consumers from the beginning of the 
liberalization or the annual switching rate, they consider the number of injection points 
or the consumption volume, they distinguish residential consumers from small 
businesses or give aggregate data.  
These shortcomings do not prevent us from taking home a general lesson. With the 
exception of the UK, all countries that experienced with full opening of residential 
markets display low switching rates. Although in many cases consumers gained from 
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competition by renegotiating their contracts with the traditional supplier, it is not 
farfetched to suggest that almost nowhere residential markets met with instant success. 
Low switching rates seem to be the sign of deeper troubles, whose causes we shall 
investigate in the following chapters. There is much that can be learnt from the 
experience of pioneer countries, and these lessons should not be lost. Chapter 4 
proposes further reflections on the beginnings of residential market liberalization in 
partner countries. 
Table 3.2 shows the institutional solutions that Member States employed to give 
voice to the consumers’ interests. Three different roles of consumers’ representatives 
can be highlighted:  
a) direct involvement in regulatory proceedings;  
b) channels for information diffusion 
c) dispute resolution. 
 
The dominant solution is clearly to assign the NRAs the task of implementing 
consumer protection measures. Usually an internal division lays down the rules for the 
residential market and processes the complaints. However, in six countries a specialized 
consumer body was introduced for the resolution of disputes among energy companies 
and their customers. Consultative bodies were introduced in six countries. Eight 
countries relied, exclusively or in parallel with specialized bodies, on general consumer 
bodies. So far, only France included consumers’ representatives in the board of the 
NRA. 
It is clear that specialized consumer body render more visible the interests of 
residential consumers in regulatory proceedings, could attract more financial resources 
and develop sound policies in the management of consumers’ complaints. However, it 
should not be forgotten that energy regulators have to balance the interests of different 
categories of consumers. For this reason, it would a mistake to think that there is a 
single solution for all countries. On the contrary, the national institutions of consumers’ 
representation should be evaluated according to their effectiveness in promoting their 
goals. 
Further suggestions on this topic are proposed in chapter 10 after a broader 
discussion of the institutions of consumers’ representation adopted in partner countries. 
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Table 3.1 – Early liberalizations of the residential market 
 
Country Electricity Natural gas Switching rate (%) 
Austria  1.10.01 1.10.02 2,8(elec.), 1,6(gas) 
Belgium 1.1.03 (Flemish R.), 
1.1.07 (Walloon 
and Brussels-Cap. 
R.) 
1.1.03 (Flemish 
R.), 1.1.07 
(Walloon and 
Brussels-Cap. R.) 
15,5 (elec.), 13(gas) 
(Flemish R. only) 
Czech republic 1.1.06 - N.A. 
Finland  Oct. 1998 - 11 
Germany April 1998 April 1998 2,2 (elec. 2005), 
0.01 (gas 2005) 
Italy  - 1.1.03 1 
Netherlands  1.7.04 1.7.04 13,5 (elec.), 10,9 
(gas) 
Portugal 4.9.06 - N.A. 
Spain 1.1.03 1.1.03 7 (elec.), 5,8 (gas) 
Sweden 1999 - 1,7(Apr.05-Mar.06) 
(32% total since 
deregulation) 
UK May 1999 1998 48 (elec.), 47 (gas) 
Denmark 1.1.03 1.1.04 4,8(elec.), 0,24 (gas 
2004) 
Ireland Feb. 2005 - Negligible (elec.),  
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Table 3.2 – National institutions for the protection of energy consumers  
 
Country  NRA SCB GCB 
Austria E-Control   
Belgium  CREG, VREG, 
CWAPE, BRUGEL 
Comité Energie 
(Walloon Region), 
Cons. Usagers elec. Gaz 
(Brussels-Cap. Reg.) 
 
Bulgaria SEWRC   
Cyprus  CERA   
Czech Rep. ERO Advisory Corps  
Denmark DERA Energy Supplies 
Complaint Board 
 
Estonia EMI  Consumer Protection 
Board 
Finland EMV  Cons. Complaint Board, 
Fin. Cons. Agency 
France CRE Médiateur nat. énergie  
Germany Federal Network 
Agency 
  
Greece RAE Settlement Body for 
metering disputes in the 
gas sector 
Consumer Ombudsman, 
Body for consumer 
protection of pub. serv. 
companies 
Hungary HEO EIRB  
Ireland CER (cons. complaints 
from 2007) 
Energy Group Gen. 
Cons. Council NI 
Consumer Council 
Italy AEEG  Chambers of Commerce 
Latvia PUC   
Lithuania NCC, State Energy 
Insp., Government 
 NVTAT 
Luxembourg ILR   
Malta MRA   
Netherlands DTe  ConsuWijzer 
Poland ERO (spokesman for 
energy consumers) 
  
Portugal ERSE (NACE)   
Romania ANRE, ANRGN Advisory Council  
Slovak Rep. URSO   
Slovenia Energy Agency   
Spain CNE Electricity and 
Hydrocarbons 
Consultative Boards, 
Regional or local energy 
authority 
 
Sweden STEM Consumers’ Electricity 
Advisory Bureau 
Swedish Nat. Board for 
Consumer Complaints 
United Kingdom OFGEM Energywatch, Energy 
Industry Ombudsman 
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4. The level of competition in retail energy markets  
 
In this chapter we describe the degree of residential markets opening, the 
concentration ratios and the switching rates in the countries of partner consumer 
associations. At European level, on the whole 12 Member States opened the electricity 
residential market and 8 the gas residential market before the mandatory deadline of 1st 
July 2007. We focus on the experience of those countries described in the questionnaire 
compiled by the partners of the project. After defining the competitive structure of retail 
energy markets, we try to understand the hurdles (if any) that consumers must confront 
with when exercising the right to choose the supplier. Data also come from European 
Commission reports, NRA’s documents and independent studies. 
 
4.1 Retail markets opening 
 
The following table summarizes the degree of retail markets opening in the 
electricity and gas sectors of the partner countries. 
 
Table 4.1 - Residential markets opening  
Country Electricity Gas 
Austria 1.10.2001 1.10.2002 
Belgium 1.7.2003 (Flemish 
region),  1.1.2007 (Walloon 
and Brussels-Capital 
regions) 
1.7.2003 (Flemish 
region),  1.1.2007 (Walloon 
and Brussels-Capital 
regions) 
Bulgaria 1.7.2007 1.7.2007 
Czech Republic 1.1.2006 1.1.2007 
Finland October 1998 Exemption 
Greece 1.7.2007 15 November 2009 
(derogation) 
Italy 1.7.2007 1.1.2003 
Lithuania 1.7.2007 1.7.2007 
Slovak Republic 1.7.2007 1.7.2007 
 
For the four countries in the electricity sector (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland and 
the Flemish region in Belgium) and the three countries in the gas sector (Austria, Italy 
and the Flemish region in Belgium) that were ahead of the European deadlines we now 
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consider two indicators of the effective level of competition: concentration ratios of 
suppliers and the percentage of households who switched supplier. If not indicated 
otherwise, data come from Annual Reports of the NRA. 
 
Table 4.2 – Concentration ratios in electricity residential markets 
Country Active 
suppliers 
Suppliers 
independent of 
DSOs 
Top 3 
suppliers’ share 
(very small 
comm./household) 
Austria  114 2 70% 
Belgium 
(Flemish region) 
17 6 95,52% (only 
households)  
Czech Republic +300 10 99% 
Finland 70 8 33%  
 
Table 4.3 – Concentration ratios in natural gas residential markets 
Country  Suppliers 
independent of DSOs 
Top 3 suppliers’ 
share (very small 
comm./household) 
Austria  6 99/100% 
Belgium (Flemish 
region) 
13 96,48% 
(access points) 
Italy 123 47,3% 
 
It can be noted that the level of concentration is generally high and new entrants 
face consistent difficulties in gaining significant market shares. In some cases (Finland 
in electricity and Italy in gas) there are many suppliers, but the markets are very 
fragmented: each firm acts as a monopolist in its geographic zone and doesn’t try to 
invade other incumbents’ markets. Because of limited competition, it doesn’t come as a 
surprise that switching rates are generally low. The percentages are shown in the 
following table. 
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Table 4.4 – Switching rates in the electricity and gas residential markets 
Country  Electricity  Gas  
Austria  2,8%  1,6% 
Belgium (Flemish 
region) 
12%41 23%42 
Czech Republic N.A. - 
Finland 11% - 
Italy - 1% 
 
What we want to do now is to clarify whether, besides other structural reasons, 
switching costs are one of the  determinants of the low level of competition in retail 
energy markets. For the countries listed above we first describe the measures they 
adopted to ease the choice of a new supplier and then their effectiveness in reaching that 
objective. 
 
4.2 Early liberalizations: Focus on partner countries 
 
4.2.1 Austria  
 
The low levels of switching in Austrian residential electricity and gas markets are a 
clear sign of the many problems that still persist six years after the completion of the 
liberalization process.  Investigations conducted in 2004 by the Austrian Federal 
Competition Authority (BWB) in cooperation with the energy regulator Energie-Control 
GmbH and with the involvement of the Austrian Federal Cartel Prosecutor pointed out 
                                                 
41 This figure refers to the percentage of households that, according to the VREG Annual Report for 2006, 
chose a new entrant since the beginning of liberalization. According to CREG, Rapport Annuel 2005 à la 
Commission Européenne, 6 juillet 2006, p. 28, the total switching rate is 15,5%, but it is not clear whether 
this figure includes contracts with traditional suppliers. Other statistics on the switching rate of residential 
electricity customers are available on the website of the Flemish energy regulator (www.vreg.be). 
42 This figure includes both residential consumers that switched to new entrants and those that switched to 
traditional suppliers. According to CREG, Rapport Annuel 2005 cit., p. 43, the total switching rate is 
13,75%. 
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that entry barriers and switching costs were the main causes of limited competition in 
residential markets.43  
As far as entry barriers are concerned, it was shown that new electricity suppliers 
must overcome a lot of difficulties before they can hope to make attractive offers to 
incumbents’ clients. First of all, insufficient unbundling of network and supply 
functions allows vertically integrated firms to retain an advantage on the management of 
existing customers’ data as well as of newly connecting ones’. This information is not 
easily available to new entrants.44 Secondly, the large number of system operators and 
the existence of three control areas is a source of additional administrative costs for new 
entrants. Billing practices of system operators are neither uniform nor competition 
neutral. Moreover, alternative suppliers that do not have a large customer base and 
flexible generating capacity risk paying higher balancing costs than vertically integrated 
incumbents. Thirdly, the customer transfer process is often expensive and time-
consuming. According to the standardised administrative procedure introduced by E-
Control market rules, the transfer may not take more than three weeks. However, 
electronic information exchange is still missing and noncooperative behaviour by 
incumbents has been reported.  
On the demand side, BWB investigation points out that in February 2005 residential 
electricity consumers switching to the lowest-cost supplier could save between 15 and 
31% on the energy price. In the gas sector savings of 10% could be achieved in the first 
two post-liberalization years. Despite such opportunities, decreasing switching rates 
were documented, with some consumers even switching back to incumbents.45 Various 
motives explain the unwillingness of most residential consumers to change supplier. 
The most important is the lack of transparency in the pricing policies of energy firms. 
All-inclusive prices, in which the energy price is not stated separately from transport 
                                                 
43 See BWB (2004 and 2005a, b). See also E-CONTROL, Report to the European Commission 2005, p. 
38f., and E-CONTROL, Annual Report 2006, p. 22ff.. The Final Reports on the Sector Inquiries into 
Electricity and Gas Markets were published in November 2006.  
44 The Gas Market Rules version 2 – August 2003, laid down by E-Control, provide now [sec. XXIV (6)] 
that “The distribution network operator must, if it has not already done so, assign a standard load profile 
to the network user and transmit this information, as well as the consumption data for the previous year, 
to the new supplier and/or balancing group representative.” 
45 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007, p. 165f.) points out that in 2004 over 95% of new Austrian electricity 
customers without previous connections, supposedly the class of customers least affected by switching 
costs, chose to contract with a supplier affiliated to a distributor.  
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charges, taxes and levies, are the most widespread type of offer, but they do not allow 
consumers to compare competing offers.  
It must be noted that Austrian domestic consumers can use a number of tools 
deemed to reduce the costs of searching for alternative suppliers. A tariff calculator is 
available on E-Control’s website. In its 2006 Annual report the energy regulator states 
that in that year about 750.000 calculations were made, 90% concerning domestic 
tariffs. In the same year almost 7.000 customers were regularly informed of changes in 
the tariff of their choice through the WatchDog service, also available on E-Control’s 
website. Moreover, the energy regulator runs a hotline for consumer inquiries, receiving 
on average 400-500 calls every month.  
The availability of a tariff calculator is one of the suggestions included in the 
ERGEG best practice proposition on supplier switching process.46 Tough, it is clear that 
many Austrian consumers still find difficult to compare alternative offers. Strikingly, in 
2004 one-third of all residential consumers said that they were unaware of the existence 
of alternative suppliers.47  
The commercial strategies of energy firms also contribute to reduce the willingness 
to switch. BWB investigations point out that incumbents recur to such strategies as 
rebates, fidelity schemes, bundling and tying. Advertising, too, is often employed to 
send misleading messages, to reinforce customer loyalty or to warn consumers against 
the risks of doorstep selling, in such a way precluding to new entrants the best channel 
to win new customers.48 
It must be stressed that, apart from some general rules on bill transparency, the 
Austrian regulatory framework did not provide for any specific measure aimed at 
reducing switching costs, but relied almost exclusively on general contract and 
consumer law. The findings of BWB investigations prompted E-Control to draw up a 
package of measures designed to reduce both entry barriers and switching costs. The 
Energy Security of Supply Act 2006, which entered into force on 1 January 2007, 
inserted sec. 45b-c in the Electricity Act of 1998. These provisions should help 
                                                 
46 An alternative to the tariff calculator arranged by the regulator, the most widespread solution in 
Continental Europe, is the offer of price comparison services by private companies, whose activity is 
supervised by public institutions. See on this The energywatch Confidence Code – A voluntary code of 
practice for price comparison services (www.energywatch.org.uk ). 
47  E-CONTROL, Market Report 2004, p. 99. 
48  See BWB (2005, p. 75ff.); E-CONTROL, Market Report 2004, p. 86ff.. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
55
customers to compare prices, because energy suppliers will have to itemise the different 
price components and explicitly state the actual energy price not only on invoices but 
also on all other documents such as contracts, offers and information material. 
Additionally, price increases have to be announced 3 months in advance. The same 
measures were implemented by the Natural Gas (Amendment) Act 2006. 
Action was taken to speed up supplier transfers. In the electricity sector the 
amended Act empowers the Energy Control Commission to require system operators to 
state in their general terms and conditions the notice period for the electronic 
communication of the metering point code – the unique identifier for customer 
installations – to customers and their new suppliers. The same applies to the notice 
period for supplier transfers. Under an agreement between the regulator and the 
electricity companies, since 1 January 2007 an amendment to the Other Market Rules 
has made it sufficient to simply to state the customer’s name and address when effecting 
a transfer.  
 
 
4.2.2 Czech Republic49 
 
Only three vertically integrated companies that hold both a licence for electricity 
distribution (DSOs with more than 90,000 customers) and for electricity trading on the 
electricity market are currently operating on the Czech electricity market. So far, most 
eligible customers have been selecting the above companies as their electricity 
suppliers; the reasons are the relatively small number of active independent traders on 
the Czech market and the negligible differences in the supply prices offered. In the case 
of customers connected to the LV level (low-demand business customers and 
households), these three companies are the only electricity suppliers who regularly offer 
energy, as a product, to these low-demand categories. These three suppliers’ electricity 
market share is more than 95% of final customers’ total consumption in the Czech 
Republic; in the case of customers connected to the LV level their share is more than 
99%. 
                                                 
49 This paragraph draws on information reported in The Czech Republic’s National Report on the 
Electricity and Gas Industries for 2005, July 2006, p. 19ff., and on  The 2005 Report of the Activities and 
Finances of the Energy Regulatory Office, as well as on the answers to the questionnaire.   
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Several (about ten) more important traders independent of regional distributors also 
operate on the market; their total market share is currently only up to a few per cent of 
eligible customers’ total consumption. So far, these suppliers have been offering 
electricity bought from smaller generators or imported from other countries mainly to 
large industrial customers. The reason has been the gradual opening of the Czech 
electricity market. Going forward, these suppliers’ share in the low-demand customers 
and households segment can be expected to grow. As at 31 May 2006 the total number 
of electricity trading licences issued in the Czech Republic was 273; however, most of 
the licensed traders are not active, or their share of the domestic market is negligible. 
In connection with the market opening to households on 1 January 2006, as many as 
3,164 entities switched their suppliers over the first quarter of 2006 (business and 
household customers). According to Operátor trhu s elektřinou, a.s. approximately 
0.25% customers connected to LV and 3.3% of customers connected to HV and EHV 
switched their energy supplier in 2005.  
In comparison with 2005 the increase in the price of electricity supply (commodity 
+ distribution and related services) to households, averaged across the Czech Republic, 
is 9%. This increase is attributable mainly to the price of energy on the wholesale 
market, which is more than 15% higher. The increases in electricity prices to individual 
customers connected to the low voltage level differ by the region, the tariff selected, and 
nature and size of demand. 
As regards the option of electricity supplier switching, eligible customers may 
choose their suppliers of energy, and the choice is free of charge. However, the physical 
transport of electricity takes place through the distribution or, as applicable, 
transmission system to which the customer is connected. For this reason an eligible 
customer usually has two contracts in place, i.e. one agreement on 
distribution/transmission and one agreement on electricity supply. The distribution 
agreement is executed between the final customer and the respective operator of the 
distribution/transmission system to which the customer is connected. These agreements 
are usually signed in perpetuity (they apply for as long as the taking of electricity lasts), 
and supplier switching does not affect them. The supply agreement is executed between 
the final customer and his electricity supplier, i.e. an entity holding an electricity 
generation licence or an electricity trading licence. Electricity customers can also enter 
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into a single aggregate agreement with their electricity suppliers (referred to as 
agreement on bundled services), which contains the supplier’s obligation to arrange for 
electricity transport to the customer in addition to electricity supply. The terms and 
conditions governing the supply and billing of electricity, as well as the terms and 
conditions governing contract termination (including the relevant time limits and 
potential penalisation) are subject to a contractual relationship entered into under the 
Commercial Code. 
Public Notice No. 541/2005 on the electricity market rules, principles of pricing the 
electricity market operator’s activities and the implementation of certain other 
provisions of the Energy Act, lays down the rules and obligations for the various market 
participants (final customers, electricity suppliers, DSOs, TSO, market operator); for 
supplier switching, the sequence of the steps to be taken and the applicable time limits 
are set out. The overall supplier switching process has been shortened and currently may 
not be longer than 17 business days (i.e. 23 calendar days) from the moment the 
customer files an application for supplier change. No fees are charged to the customer 
for such supplier switching. Finally, more precise provisions were laid down on the 
billing of electricity supplies to eligible customers, including the extent of the items in 
the invoice, with a view to informing customers about the structure of the resulting 
payment for electricity. 
  
4.2.3 Flemish Region 
 
The high switching rate in this part of Belgium testifies to the success of the 
liberalization process in the domestic markets.50 However, the initial stage was not 
without problems. A report commissioned by CREG to London Economics showed the 
presence of many entry barriers in the generation, trading and supply segments. With 
specific reference to the supply segment, the report pointed out that incumbent suppliers 
slowed the switching process and refused to deliver metering and consumption data. 
                                                 
50 The VREG published on August 31, 2006 a comparison of residential prices in the Flemish and the 
Walloon Regions. In the former the switch to an electricity supplier different from the standard one is 
worth a saving of 15% or 200 euros less that in the latter. In the gas market the differences are less 
apparent, but Flemish households save almost 120 euros on average. 
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Moreover, the designation of incumbent suppliers as default suppliers reinforced their 
dominant position.51 
 Specific rules aimed at increasing transparency and reducing switching costs were 
later introduced. The most important measure was the agreement proposed in 2004 by 
the federal Minister of Industry to all electricity and gas suppliers. It includes rules of 
conduct on price transparency, marketing and selling practices, the procedure for 
changing supplier, fair and balanced general terms, information to be delivered to the 
consumer, payment methods and complaints handling procedures. Annexed to the 
agreement is a code of conduct on doorstep and distance selling.52 
The Belgian agreement contains interesting solutions to the problems discussed in 
this chapter. For example, the new supplier can be charged with the task of terminating 
the old contract and paying any connected expenses in place of the consumer. Being 
relieved of any liability, the consumer should be more willing to switch to the new 
supplier. Moreover, price transparency is enhanced by asking each supplier to insert a 
tariff calculator on its website.53 The same information must be available to consumers 
free of charge through other means of communication.  
It could be useful to recall the provisions introduced in the Walloon Region to help 
residential consumers to choose a new supplier from 1st January 2007.54 The supplier of 
last resort must send all captive consumers a communication explaining the new 
opportunities available after that date. This measure allowed all residential customers to 
became aware of the possibility to switch supplier soon after the opening of retail 
                                                 
51 LONDON ECONOMICS, Structure and Functioning of the Electricity  Market in Belgium in a European 
Perspective, October 2004 (www.creg.be ). 
52 The text of the agreement is available at http://mineco.fgov.be . It applies to suppliers but not to 
distributors that supply electricity to residential consumers. Moreover, only those suppliers that 
voluntarily subscribe to the agreement (eight so far) are bound to follow it. Some problems with 
aggressive sale tactics were noticed before the agreement entered in force: see Fourniture d'énergie: 
contrats plus équilibrés s.v.p.! (Budget&Droits n° 176, septembre-octobre 2004) (www.test-achats.be ). 
The same Belgian consumer magazine points out that electricity suppliers do not always comply with the 
agreement: see Les fornisseurs d’énergie et leurs conditions, Budget&Droits n° 190, Janvier 2007.  It 
must be noted that EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007, p. 166f.) reported concerns of Belgian suppliers about 
insufficient compliance with the statutory deadlines of the switching procedure and discriminatory 
conduct of network operators.  
53 Tariff calculators are also available on the websites of the three regional energy regulators, as well as at 
www.monenergie.be and www.test-achats.be (registered users only). 
54  Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon 11 March 2006 relatif aux clients éligibles au 1er janvier 2007 dans 
les marchés de l'électricité et du gaz. 
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markets.55 At the same time, the Walloon government asked distributors to send all 
residential customers the information needed to compare alternative offers and change 
supplier, that is the European Article Number for the unique identification of the access 
point, the synthetic charge profile and the estimated annual consumption. Moreover, to 
overcome the resistance of vertically integrated incumbents against new entrants, the 
distributors had to send each supplier all data they needed to conclude a contract, that is 
the EAN code, the meter number and the complete address of the access point for each 
captive customer. All data had to be provided in electronic format.56 
 
4.2.4 Finland  
 
In the electricity residential market there are striking differences among the prices 
offered by each supplier. This means that there are consistent savings available for 
consumers who switch.57 However, only a few residential consumers do switch. Various 
reasons have been advanced to explain the inertia of Finnish consumers. One important 
factor seems to be the attitude of the Energy Market Authority (EMV) toward the 
competitive sectors of the electricity industry. Until the 2004 amendments to the 
Electricity Market Act implementing the second electricity directive, EMV had general 
supervisory powers on the retail supply market, but its mandate did not include a more 
specific task to support competition through focused interventions. Deregulation was 
supposed to foster competition almost automatically.  
Reality shows how misguided was such assessment. None of the conditions 
required to increase residential consumers’ activity were present in the Finnish retail 
electricity market.58 On the demand side, most consumers display a limited awareness 
of alternative opportunities, do not have a clear idea of the consequences of 
competition, think it is difficult to acquire information and compare the offers of 
different suppliers. On the supply side, electricity companies tried to retain their pre-
                                                 
55 In the Flemish Region VREG developed an advertising campaign through complementary channels: 
see ERGEG, Customer Information Handbook – A review of Good Practices, 6 December 2006, 18. 
56 The Walloon regulator reports that, as of January 1°, 2007, 5,9% of electricity consumers and 5,2% of 
gas consumers switched to a new supplier: see CWAPE, Rapport CD-7a16-CWaPE, 18 janvier 2007. 
57 According to the presentation made by P.E. LEWIS (2006), as of February 2004 the gap between the 
lowest and the highest price in the residential market amounts to € 360 per year. As far as savings are 
concerned, P.E. LEWIS  et alii (2004, p. 46) estimate that, depending on various assumptions, they could 
be between  € 223 and 410.  
58  See LEWIS  et alii (2004); NORDREG (2005). 
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deregulation market share and did not use aggressive marketing tactics to reach new 
consumers. Moreover, until the 2004 amendments they were authorised to charge fees 
for meter reading upon switching. Other problems concern the electronic exchange of 
information in connection with supplier switching. Whilst such exchange is 
recommended by the Finnish Energy Industries association, its performance is 
sometimes poor and some network operators keep on using old methods as telephone 
and fax.59 Price comparison sites have been offered by private operators, but they do not 
seem to warrant the regular updating, comprehensiveness and independence that are 
needed to become a reliable source of information. There are even suspects of 
manipulation of consumers’ preferences by suppliers. They tried to convince the general 
public that price rises were unavoidable and that, compared to other European countries, 
Finnish consumers had a good deal. Such messages are clearly meant to discourage 
active search of better offers. 
The 2004 amendments to the Electricity Market Act tried to remedy most of the 
above mentioned shortcomings. Sec. 15a forbids the collection of separate fees when 
the customer changes supplier. According to sec. 21, dominant retailers shall make 
publicly available their prices. They shall not include conditions that would restrict 
competition. Section 23 introduces new provisions on billing transparency.   
Meanwhile, EMV implemented a price comparison system on its website.60 Almost 
all electricity retailers registered as system users. Approx. 45 electricity companies use 
the online service frequently to send quotations for electric energy to customers outside 
their areas of operation. Electricity users started to use the service right away. By March 
2007, more than 1.5 million searches had been made within the IT system, which means 
that several hundreds of thousands of people have visited the web site. 
Moreover, an on-line market place is offered by Vaihtovirta.fi, which is an 
independent service provider whose services are open to all electricity users. The 
retailers may make offers through the service and the customers may also empower the 
Vaihtovirta.fi to make their electricity retail contract with the chosen retailer. The 
                                                 
59  ERGEG  (2005b, p. 34) also notes that suppliers are charged the costs of electronic information 
management. These costs can be so high to make it unprofitable for suppliers to take only one or a few 
new suppliers outside they own obligation to supply area. This problem reduces the alternatives available 
to consumers. 
60 The online service was opened on the web site of the Energy Market Authority on 3 February 2006, at 
the address www.sahkonhinta.fi.   
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benefit of this service for customers is that they are able to ask for commercial offers 
from many retailers at the same place. 
Most of the new measures accord with the best practice proposition for supplier 
switching process advanced by ERGEG. However, information exchange was not 
regulated and marketing practices of electricity suppliers are only controlled through the 
general provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. Time will tell whether the 2004 
amendments can foster competition in the residential electricity market.61 
 
4.2.5 Italy 
 
Although the gas residential market was liberalized since 1° January 2003, up until 
the end of 2005 only a handful of consumers changed supplier. According to data 
collected by Aeeg, the Italian energy regulator, from 1° January 2003 to 1° June 2005, 
only 0,6% of consumers with annual consumption below 5.000 cubic metres changed 
supplier. For consumers with annual consumption between 5.000 and 200.000 cm the 
cumulative switching rate was 3,6%.62 Although in some parts of Italy (especially 
Northern regions and the biggest cities) many customers changed supplier, the general 
evaluation seems to be that in the residential gas market competition is almost 
completely absent.  
On the supply side, more than 60% of suppliers limit their activity to one region. 
This means that alternative offers are seldom available. Moreover, residential 
consumers who change suppliers can save modest amounts. For annual consumptions of 
5.000 cm savings are on average  36,5 Euros/year.  
A follow-up inquiry conducted by Aeeg and published at the end of 2006 reaches 
the same conclusions. In 2005 the switching rate for consumers with consumption 
below 5000 mc is 1,09% (more than 155.000 clients). However, if we exclude those 
consumers that switched to one large supplier, the switching rate for 2005 goes down to 
0,24%. More switching is reported for higher consumption levels. On the supply side, 
                                                 
61  Switching rates up to November 2005 remain low. See the graphs on www.peace.com/customer-
switching . 
62  See Aeeg dec. n. 31/06 and Annex A (www.autorita.energia.it ), as well as AEEG, Annual Report 2006, 
p. 93ff.. 
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market segmentation, with most suppliers active in one or few contiguous geographic 
areas, is still the dominant characteristic.63 
Surveys conducted on behalf of Aeeg and by the Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat) 
point out the motives that induce residential consumers not to switch. About 70% of a 
representative sample of Italian families did not know of the possibility to change 
supplier. Among those that were informed, 25% did not receive any alternative offer. 
Relevant factors were also the loyalty to the historical local supplier, the limited savings 
available, the difficulty to judge the benefits of switching, the fear of quality 
deterioration. It must be added that marketing strategies (for the competitive acquisition 
of customers in new areas) are primarily focused on medium to large customers. 
Sometimes they are defensive tools aimed at stopping entry by new competitors. 
The most recent inquiry conducted by Aeeg also revealed many unfair commercial 
practices that erected barriers to entry of new suppliers or discouraged switching. 
Advertising messages are often deceptive, do not specify the discount offered and 
propose pejorative contractual conditions. Switching procedures are often delayed or 
blocked without legitimate reasons. Complaints about double billing and penalties paid 
in the switching period were sent to the energy regulator. High meter reading costs are 
an additional barrier to entry for suppliers not connected to distributors. 
This sorry state of affairs is partly explained by limited competition in the 
wholesale gas market. Because of the difficulties they face in purchasing natural gas at 
cheaper prices, suppliers prefer to sell in one or a limited number of regions where they 
act as monopolists. The resulting segmentation moves retail markets away from 
anything resembling competition. However, it must be added that Aeeg can be blamed 
for having delayed the implementation of measures needed to reduce entry barriers and 
help residential consumers to choose. Such measures include the regulation of the 
contractual relationship between the supplier and her customers, the switching 
procedure and the spreading of information.  
As far as the contractual relationship is concerned, in 2004 Aeeg introduced the 
commercial code for the supply of gas, but it became binding only at the end of the 
same year, that is, almost two years after the opening of the residential market.64 The 
                                                 
63 See Aeeg dec. n. 135/06 and Annex A.  
64  See Aeeg dec. n. 126/04 and subsequent amendments. An early and much less detailed version of the 
commercial code was introduced by Aeeg dec. n. 237/00 before the opening of the residential market. The 
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commercial code regulates the pre-contractual phase, requesting the suppliers to 
communicate with the consumers through a specific format aimed at simplifying the 
comparability of offers. Moreover, the code regulates marketing practices, the terms to 
be included in each contract and the procedure for their modification, consumers’ 
termination rights and automatic refunds in case of breach by the supplier.65 Aeeg also 
issued regulations warranting gas bill transparency.66 
Switching procedures are included both in the code for the national gas transport 
network and in the code for the local gas distribution network. The first one was 
regulated in 2002, the second one in 2004.67 At the distribution network level, Aeeg’s 
principal objective was to build a uniform framework for the hundreds of distributors 
active across the country. Different rules for each network increase administrative costs 
for new entrants and could reduce competition. However, in this case, too, the 
implementation of a uniform distribution code has been delayed for a long time. The 
final version of the model code was adopted in June 2006.68 Therefore, different rules 
have been applied by distributors long after the complete opening  of the residential 
market. Meanwhile, various amendments have been introduced to simplify the 
switching procedure. Notice that no electronic information exchange platform has been 
agreed on.69 As noted above, Italian gas suppliers sometimes ask consumers to pay 
                                                                                                                                               
commercial code for electricity supply was introduced by Aeeg dec. n. 105/06 and entered into force for 
eligible clients from 1st January 2007. 
65 For a more detailed description see AEEG, Annual Report  2005, p. 68f.. 
66 See Aeeg dec. n. 42/99. For electricity bill transparency see Aeeg dec. n. 55/00, replaced by Aeeg dec. 
n. 152/06. The new guidelines provide that the electricity bill must contain two distinct sections for the 
presentation of data (a simplified section and a detailed section), as well as additional information 
concerning the type of consumption. It is also envisaged that at least once a year customers should be 
informed of the mix of sources used in electricity production in Italy. It is interesting to note that Aeeg is 
willing to enforce aggressively the rules on bill transparency: at the beginning of 2007 the former 
monopolist Enel was fined with 11.700.000 Euros because it did not comply with the duty to 
communicate to its clients at least one free payment modality: see Aeeg dec. n. 66/07. 
67  See respectively Aeeg dec. n. 137/02 and n. 138/04. 
68 See Aeeg dec. n. 108/06. At the  end of 2006 almost all gas distributors had already adopted the model 
code. 
69 But see Aeeg dec. n. 294/06, which established the binding national communication standard to be 
adopted in communications between companies operating in the gas sector. According to the energy 
regulator, the provision aims at rationalising and standardising information flows between about 390 
natural gas sellers and 430 local distributors, in order to provide greater protection for consumers by 
introducing simple, innovative channels of communication between operators. The new national standard 
should encourage: (1) respect for the maximum timescales set by the Authority for the commercial 
services most often requested (such as connections or activation of gas supplies); (2) the entry of new 
competitors in the sale of gas; (3) changes of supplier by consumers (switching); and (4) the promotion of 
technological innovation in the exchange of information. With effect from 1° July 2007, information 
concerning requests for commercial services or supplier switching will be exchanged – by gas 
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freely determined charges when they switch suppliers and when they terminate the 
contractual relationship (e.g. for meter reading). Such charges are clearly incompatible 
with Annex A of the second gas directive, stating that the change of supplier must be 
completely free.  
Another factor affecting the low level of switching is the lack of easily accessible 
information. Although Aeeg publishes the economic conditions on its website, they are 
not described in a user-friendly manner and do not allow for a comparison among 
suppliers. Consumers can search for information browsing the suppliers’ websites or 
contacting their call centers, but such strategies multiply search costs. 
 
4.3 Evaluation 
 
The description of the experiences of some pioneer countries shows that, when 
retail markets were opened to residential consumers, the needed institutional 
infrastructure was not put in place. With the exception of the Flemish region, the low 
levels of active participation on the demand side and the high levels of concentration on 
the supply side can be traced back to the lack of regulatory measures that reduce search 
costs, switching costs and entry barriers.  
As far as search and switching costs are concerned, relying on general consumer 
law does not seem to be a fruitful strategy. Numerous factors foster consumers’ inertia. 
Therefore, their active participation depends on more specific measures aimed at 
reducing the cognitive efforts they must face in the new competitive scenario. 
Moreover, we noted in chapter one that energy companies are interested in raising 
search costs and making it difficult for consumers to compare alternative offers. 
ERGEG best practice propositions and Eurelectric Guidelines for Customer Switching 
are first steps toward the harmonisation of the different systems adopted in Member 
Countries. However, it is submitted that more attention should be paid to the heuristics 
residential consumers employ when comparing alternative offers. From this point of 
view, the way information is communicated by firms and regulators, as well as the 
                                                                                                                                               
distributors, wholesalers and sellers – by “certified e-mail”, with a consequent reduction in all other types 
of communication (letters, faxes etc). Gas distributors will, however, have the option of using more 
advanced internet-based or “application to application” systems; distributors will be required to make 
these available in a non-discriminatory manner to all users of the service with effect from 1° October 
2008. 
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contractual terms concerning the beginning and the end of the commercial relationship 
with the supplier, carry more weight than is generally supposed. Moreover, stricter 
sanctions should apply to deter incumbents from delaying or hampering switching 
procedures. For example, specific performance standards could be set that provide for 
financial penalties to be paid to the consumer if the transfer to the new supplier is 
completed beyond the time limit. 
Entry barriers are the other side of the coin. Economics literature is increasingly 
supporting legal unbundling of distribution and retailing as the only measure able to 
stop cross-subsidies and difficult to detect strategic behaviour against new entrants.70 
Besides structural measures, it is clear that successful retail markets presuppose efficient 
solutions for information exchange and switching procedures. Timing, too, is of 
fundamental importance. It is useless to anticipate opening if the institutional 
infrastructure is not ready to work.  
In its January 2007 communication the European Commission says that the Unfair 
Practices Directive puts in place a robust framework for addressing issues of misleading 
marketing and selling strategies. However, even though all Member States will 
implement it without delay, it is highly plausible that both the national courts and the 
European Court of Justice will spend many years trying to fix the meaning of such 
general terms as professional diligence or material distortion of the economic behaviour 
of consumers.71 Residential energy markets need more specific measures, to be adopted 
as quickly as possible. The experience of early liberalizations shows that  the failure of 
competition in retail markets could be avoided if the following solutions are 
implemented:  
a) a code of commercial practice that regulates the precontractual 
phase. NRAs should try to enhance the comparability of offers and to 
discourage energy firms from creating unnecessary complexity in their 
offers. Belgium and Italy provide useful examples. 
                                                 
70 In its communication on the Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market, SEC (2006) 841 fin., 
10 January 2007, the European Commission said that, to enhance competitiveness, full ownership 
unbundling and Independent System Operators were the two options to explore to provide the right 
incentives to network operators. ERGEG, too, suggested that ownership unbundling would be the 
preferred approach: see ERGEG’s Assessment of the Development of the European Energy Market 2006, 
6 December 2006, 6f.. 
71 See, e.g., the critical remarks by GOMEZ (2006). 
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b) a voluntary code of practice for advertising and marketing 
activities sponsored by NRAs. Specifying the general principles laid down 
in the unfair commercial practice directive could help NRAs to monitor the 
behaviour of energy firms; 
c) guidelines by the European Commission or by ERGEG on 
practices widely used in the energy sector like fidelity programs, rebates and 
tying clauses. Because the validity of such clauses depends on complex 
assessments that must balance various factors, it could be useful to set up a 
common starting point at the European level. This measure could be justified 
on two counts: first, it avoids replicating the same assessment in each 
national regulatory system; second, it avoids the risk of contrasting 
judgements at national level.72 
                                                 
72 Improving the minimum level of information available to citizens, reduce red tape when customers 
change supplier and protect customers from unfair selling practices are among the contents of the 
forthcoming Energy Customers’ Charter proposed in the Communication by the European Commission 
on Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, 10 January 2007, COM (2006) 841 fin., 21. 
According to ERGEG (2006e), 12f., NRAs should be able to impose rules on marketing of services to 
household and rules relating to the switching process. 
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5. The regulatory systems in partner countries 
 
This chapter addresses two issues: firstly, how roles and competencies in the field 
of energy consumers protection are distributed among public and private institutions; 
secondly, which regulatory powers such institutions can use to discharge their duties. 
Our aim is to verify whether the choice of the regulatory structure impacts on the 
efficiency and efficacy of the measures that should protect energy consumers. 
 
5.1 The institutions of energy consumers representation 
 
Energy laws of all partner countries include consumers protection among the 
objectives of the regulatory framework. However, significant differences can be 
detected in the institutional solutions aimed at its implementation. Partner countries 
employed four models of consumers representation: 
 
5) The powers are shared among NRAs and Government authorities  
6) All the powers are attributed to the NRA 
7) Some or all the powers are attributed to a specialized consumer body 
8) Some or all the powers are attributed to a general consumer body 
 
 The following table summarizes the situation. A more detailed description is 
proposed thereafter. 
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Table 5.1 – Energy Consumers representation – Institutional solutions 
Country  NRA/Government  Specialized 
Consumer Body 
General 
Consumer Body 
Austria E-Control GmbH and 
E-Control Kommission 
- - 
Belgium VREG, CWAPE, 
BRUGEL, CREG, Fed. 
Gov. 
Comité Energie 
(Walloon Region), 
Cons. Usagers elec. 
Gaz (Brussels-Cap. 
Reg.) 
- 
Bulgaria SEWRC, Min. 
Energy 
- - 
Czech  
Republic 
ERO Advisory Corps - 
Finland EMV - Cons. 
Complaint Board, 
Fin. Cons. Agency 
Greece  RAE Settlement Body 
for metering disputes 
in the gas sector 
Consumer 
Ombudsman, Body 
for consumer 
protection of pub. 
serv. companies 
Italy Aeeg, Government - Chambers of 
commerce 
Lithuania NCC, State Energy 
Insp., Government 
- NVTAT 
Slovak 
Republic 
URSO, Min. 
Economy 
- - 
 
Most partner countries decided to give NRAs or other public authorities the power 
to represent energy consumers’ interests. Four partner countries (Finland, Greece, Italy 
and Lithuania) gave representation powers (in the field of dispute resolution) to general 
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consumer bodies. In other two partner countries (Belgium and the Czech Republic) 
advisory committees were introduced that included consumers representatives, together 
with representatives of the industry, the trade unions and other public authorities.  
The most important aspect emerging from this survey is the constant involvement of 
governmental authorities in the regulatory tasks directly related to consumers 
protection. Of course, the political, social and economic salience of such services as 
electricity and gas supply explains why public authorities rarely dismiss any power of 
intervention in these fields. Moreover, in many partner countries public ownership of 
energy companies is still widespread. Another interesting feature of the national 
regulatory systems is the amount of funds specifically devoted to consumer issues. 
From this point of view, there are manifest differences across Europe. In the UK 
Energywatch has 216 employees in the customer information service units, but they are 
only 7.5 in Austria, 6 in the Flemish Region and Italy.73 
 
5.2 Energy consumers representation and regulatory powers 
 
To assess advantages and shortcomings of each solution we need a more detailed 
description of the powers granted to the various institutions. For expositional clarity we 
distinguish four categories of regulatory powers:  
e) advisory powers: the institution can only make proposals to other 
authorities  
f) rule-making power: the institution can independently enact 
binding rules for energy firms 
g) enforcement powers: the institution can independently detect 
violations and decide the appropriate injunctive or punitive measures 
(usually subject to judicial review) 
h) dispute resolution powers: the institution can settle disputes 
between energy firms or between energy firms and their customers 
 
      The table below summarizes the distribution of regulatory powers among the 
institutions of the partner countries. 
                                                 
73 ERGEG, Customer Information Handbook – A review of Good Practices, 6 December 2006, 36. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
70
 
Table 5.2 – Energy consumers representation – distribution of regulatory 
powers  
Country Advisory Rule-
making 
Enforcement Disp. res. 
Austria   NRA  NRA  NRA  
Belgium  NRA/SCB GOV NRA NRA/GOV 
Bulgaria NRA GOV NRA NRA 
Czech 
Rep. 
SCB NRA  NRA 
Finland  NRA NRA GCB 
Greece  NRA GOV NRA NRA 
Italy  NRA/GOV NRA NRA 
Lithuania  NRA/GOV NRA/GOV NRA/GOV 
Slovak 
Rep. 
 NRA/GOV NRA/GOV NRA 
Abbreviations: NRA (National Regulatory Authority) – GOV (Governmental 
Authority) – SCB (Specialized Consumer Body) – GCB (General Consumer Body) 
  
Only in Belgium, Bulgaria and Greece sector regulators can exercise advisory 
powers, while formal rule-making powers were given to the competent Ministry. 
However, in Bulgaria it is suggested that the political authority usually accepts without 
significant modifications the proposals submitted by SEWRC. Because of the technical 
knowledge required to intervene in energy markets, we can safely assume that in other 
countries too the final decisions of the political authorities attach great weight to the 
opinions of the sector regulators.  
The fact that in most partner countries NRAs and governmental authorities share 
rule-making powers leaves space to at least two interpretations. On one hand, it could 
be suggested that the direct involvement of political institutions warrants careful 
consideration of consumers’ interests. On the other hand, it is equally plausible that 
governmental authorities give precedence to other interests, for example the 
maximization of the profits of energy firms under the control of the State. 
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The uncertainty on the consequences of direct governmental interventions in energy 
markets suggests that more attention should be devoted to an institutional solution 
adopted in a few partner countries, that is the appointment of an independent body 
charged with the exclusive task of representing consumers’ interests. Its main advantage 
is the enhanced probability that energy regulation will be more favourable to 
consumers.74  
As we mentioned in chapter one, this solution too suffers of its own shortcomings. 
A consumer body would need access to relevant information, strong technical 
competencies and adequate resources. Moreover, means of coordinating its activities 
with those of NRA and other institutions should be provided. There is also a serious 
danger that the consumer body employs its powers to oppose competition and forestall 
any reform proposals.  
So far, available evidence does not permit to establish the superiority of one 
institutional solution over anyone else. There are trade-offs involved that require careful 
consideration of the national legal and economic environment. What can be said beyond 
any doubt is that an excessive fragmentation of competencies among many authorities is 
a source of unnecessary costs. It enhances the probability of conflicts and raises the 
complexities of the regulatory process. Above all, the fragmentation of competencies 
increases information costs for consumers, who must search for the competent authority 
to address in case of complaints against suppliers. Moreover, it increases the risk of 
inadequate funding. From this point of view, there seems to be room for improvement 
in the Finnish, Greek and Lithuanian regulatory frameworks. 
Other aspects of the distribution of regulatory powers are discussed in the chapter 
on dispute resolution procedures and on the role of consumer associations. 
                                                 
74 Empirical evidence on the role of American public utility consumer advocates supports this view: see 
HOLBURN  and SPILLER (2002); HOLBURN  and VANDENBERGH (2006); FREMETH (2006). However, it 
must be underscored that these American institutions usually enjoy the power to participate to regulatory 
and legal hearings and are endowed with large financial resources. Consumer bodies in partner countries 
usually play a lesser role. For an assessment of the British experience, where the independent body 
energywatch was created in 2000, see SIMMONDS (2002); NAO (2004).  
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6. Econometric analysis of residential markets regulation 
 
 6.1 The field of regulation 
       Regulation analyses the institutional setups adopted to govern a market in which 
emergence of competition is hardly achievable. 
 Economic theory shows that free market institutions ensure the achievement of 
an efficient outcome, i.e., the one maximizing social welfare, in a certain set of 
circumstances. This striking result is derived from the two welfare theorems, which 
guarantee that, under an appropriate (in fact quite restrictive) set of assumptions, any 
market outcome is efficient.  
 One of the key assumptions is that the market under consideration displays a 
sufficient level of competition. While the paradigm of perfect competition, entailing a 
very large number of producers producing perfectly homogenous products, is not 
attainable in real markets, the issue is how far each market is with respect to that 
paradigm. According to the degree of potential competition of a market, we may in 
principle classify three types of industries: 
¾ those in which there is a very large number of potential competitors; in these 
markets, there is no need of specific policy measures; 
¾ those in which there is a limited number of competitors; in such markets, 
economists usually think that ex post regulation, in the form of antitrust 
enforcement, is needed in order to guarantee the preservation of the 
competitive playground; 
¾ those in which the number of competitors is very small; in such markets, 
economists believe ex ante regulation is required, in the sense of a regulation 
imposing a conduct to the firm or designing a market structure able to 
generate the correct incentives for the market participants. 
 The difference between ex ante and ex post intervention is crucial for the 
identification of the realm of regulation and of its border with the field of competition 
economics.  
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 Ex post intervention implies that a governmental agency checks ex post that free 
choices and strategies put in place by the relevant firms do not bear a negative effect on 
competition. If the agency envisages that some firms’ decisions violate the competition 
law, either it forbids them, or it imposes remedies, aimed at mitigating the anti-
competitive effects of the firms’ decisions. A typical example of an agency performing 
ex post interventions is the antirust authority. 
 Ex ante intervention, on the other hand, refers to the fact that the regulatory 
agency directly affects the choices of the regulated firm (for example, by imposing a 
cap on the price charged by the firm itself), or indirectly affects them by imposing a 
certain market structure within which various firms have to act.  
Within this framework, the field of regulation analyzes forms of ex ante 
interventions in the market, and in particular, its object of study consists in the 
investigation of rules, institutions, and market arrangements aimed at curbing agents’ 
behavior so as to increase economic performance.     
 
 6.2 Regulation and energy markets 
 Energy markets are necessarily heavily regulated.  
 Both electricity and gas, indeed, feature a multi-layer vertical structure, 
composed of production, transportation (transmission/distribution), and retail. As 
previously mentioned, transmission and distribution activities are regarded as natural 
monopolies, or, at best, as sectors in which competition is very hard to achieve, and 
situations market power prevail. From this observation, two sorts of problems are 
stemming: 
¾ First, liberalizing these sectors is not possible; hence, when the energy market as 
a whole is liberalized, transmission and distribution must remain regulated; 
¾ Second, the potential for exerting market power in the upstream sectors 
generates incentives for establishing market power even in the retail sectors. 
This is a relevant feature in terms of our analysis. 
 Indeed, suppose the transmission line owner/operator - also involved in the 
generation business, with a substantial share of the production plants - engages even in 
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the retail activity. By favoring its retail customers, it can de facto extend its dominant 
position even in the retail sector.  
 The just established arguments suggest a set of “competition” reasons that call 
for regulation of liberalized energy markets. However, competition is not the only 
concern; indeed, informational asymmetries (in particular for residential customers), 
and externality issues, which will be briefly discussed below, also may require some 
forms of policy interventions on the electricity sector.  
 The externality issue inherent in the retail sector, both in electricity and in gas, is 
due to the fact that, when supply is not sufficient to meet the entire demand, rationing 
has to occur on geographical basis rather than on economic basis (i.e., on consumers 
ranking based on the individual willingness to pay). Liberalization of the retail sector is 
not sufficient alone to take care of that externality.  
 
 6.3 Econometric regressions 
 The aim of the econometric section consists in measuring the effect of 
liberalization on prices paid by the residential customers. While price is not the only 
performance measure of a market, it is an important one, and furthermore it is relatively 
easy to identify. The available data on the liberalization process do not allow us to 
consider other performance measures, such as quality of service, or the degree of price 
volatility. 
 The purpose of the regressions is two-fold. First, we providing a quantitative 
assessment of how effective the liberalization process has been in terms of prices paid 
by the residential customers. Second, we identify the effects of different policy measure, 
of various forms of market structure, and of multiple institutional designs on post-
liberalization prices for residential customers. Our aim is to identify, through the past 
experiences, the ingredients of an effective liberalization process in keeping prices as 
low as possible. 
 The economics literature recognizes four major approaches in assessing the 
impact of regulation and deregulation on prices. For the specific case of residential 
energy market deregulation, the first and perhaps most obvious approach is a direct 
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comparison between the regulated and the unregulated, or liberalized, outcome. In this 
case, we may proceed in two alternative fashions.  
 First, one could compare prices in countries where the market has already been 
liberalized to prices in countries where the liberalization has not taken place yet. This 
method provides a consistent measure of the impact of liberalization on prices if we 
assume that countries that adopted a liberalization process are randomly picked. 
Alternatively, one could consider, for a given country, a time series pre-and post 
liberalization. This method also provides a consistent (although possibly characterized 
by high variance, hence potentially not very significant) estimator of the effects of 
liberalization, provided that the countries that liberalized their market did not do so in 
anticipation of an increase in future prices.  
 Second, liberalization of retail energy markets happens through various stages: 
the initial ones, which involve only large industrial customers, the intermediate ones, 
involving all industrial customers, and the most advanced ones, involving all customers, 
both industrial and residential. One could then measure the impact of the different levels 
of intensity of liberalization on prices, differentiating between the different categories of 
customers.  
 Third, one could estimate a fully specified structural model of the retail energy 
sector, thereby characterizing the cost and the demand functions, and precisely 
identifying the impact of different market rules (including, obviously, the stage of 
liberalization, and the categories of customers involved in it), on the market outcome. If 
the underlying model is based on the correct assumptions, this approach provides us 
with the most precise characterization of welfare changes, in the sense that it allows us 
to discriminate between static and dynamic efficiency. However, two major drawbacks 
may potentially undermine the accuracy of its predictions. First, the estimation of such a 
model requires a substantial amount of data. Second, getting the assumptions of the 
structural model right is very complex; the risk of model misspecification is surely high, 
and that would lead to poor predictions. 
 Finally, the last available option consists in simulating the effects of 
liberalization under a given set of assumptions. In this case, the results obviously 
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crucially depend on the validity of the assumptions, and it then becomes extremely 
important to provide for an appropriate testing of the validity of those assumptions. 
 The analysis developed in this study will adopt the direct approach, combining a 
time series and a cross sectional study in a panel data analysis. Prices are used as the 
measure of performance of the market. The risk of model misspecification is here 
overcome by running a multiplicity of regression. If we are able to clearly pin down a 
pattern in the results, then the probability of poor predictions drastically reduces. 
 Average prices are then used to measure the outcome of the liberalization 
process. Available data on residential liberalization in Europe are as of now scanty, 
mostly because of the relative recentness of the phenomenon; hence we are not able to 
consider more sophisticated measures of market performance, such as, for instance, 
price variability and service quality.  
 
6.4 Data 
The analysis is based on the data referred to the nine partner countries. The following 
data sources have been employed: 
1. the partners’ questionnaires; 
2. European Commission reports. In particular:  
- EU Benchmarking Reports, “Report on Progress in Creating the Internal 
Energy Market”,  Reports and Technical Annex for the years 2001, 2002 , 2003, 
2004, 2005; 
- “Study on Unbundling of Electricity and Gas Transmission and Distribution 
System Operators”; 
3. Documents from the National Regulators and from the ERGEG; 
4. Business Insight Reports. In particular: 
- The Eastern European Gas Market Outlook, 2006 and 2007; 
- The Eastern European Electricity Market Outlook 2006 and 2007;  
5. Global Business Report; 
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6. Eurostat sources; 
7. Foundation Eni-Enrico Mattei for State ownership of energy firms. 
 
6.5 The regression models 
 6.5.1 Retail markets opening and prices 
 Graph 1 and 2 show the average trend of electricity and gas prices in the partner 
countries, and its variation between industrial and residential customers:  
Graph 1: Average electricity prices (Eurocent/Kwh) across partner countries 
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Sources: Eurostat for member States countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, 
Greece), KEMA (Report on Energy Prices in Eastern European Countries) for yet non-
member States not included in Eurostat statistics (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Slovakia), and questionnaires from partner countries. When detailed information on 
differences between industrial and residential prices were not available, the same price 
has been attributed to both categories.  
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Graph 2: Average gas prices across partner countries 
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Sources: Eurostat for member States countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, 
Greece), KEMA (Report on Energy Prices in Eastern European Countries) for yet non-
member States not included in Eurostat statistics (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Slovakia), and questionnaires from partner countries. When detailed information on 
differences between industrial and residential prices were not available, the same price 
has been attributed to both categories.  
 
 Graph 3 shows how retail market opening has evolved, on average across partner 
countries, across years. It shows that opening has been a gradual, yet continuous, 
process. 
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Graph 3: Average level of openness of the retail energy markets: 
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Sources: Eurostat, Eu Benchmarking Reports, Global Business Insights, Questionnaires 
to partners 
 The previous three graphs suggest an interesting trend. As openness increases, 
the difference between residential and industrial prices tends to vanish. This trend is 
confirmed in Graph 4, which reports in the square purple line the average (at a European 
level) percentage difference between residential and industrial gas price, computed as: 
avg
tind
avg
tind
avg
tres
P
PP
,
,, −  where avgtresP ,  here indicates the average gas price paid by the residential 
customers in the nine partner countries at time t, while avgtindP ,  indicates the average gas 
price paid by the industrial customers in the nine partner countries at time t. The blue 
line depicts the average difference between residential and industrial electricity prices, 
computed in the same way as for the gas prices. The yellow and the blue line refer to the 
average percentage of openness in the nine partner countries of the gas and electricity 
markets respectively. 
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Graph 4: Openness and price differences 
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 Graph 4 also shows that the price difference tends at first to increase, with a 
small percentage of openness, and then to decrease when openness increases. Since a 
low degree of openness is associated to liberalization only for industrial customers (or 
for a portion of them), the graph hints to the possibility that, with a low degree of 
openness, firms – which are able to extract a lower profit from the industrial clients, as 
this liberalized market segment has become more competitive – tend to increase their 
margin in the residential segment. This interpretation will be further investigated in 
what follows.  
 The first regression explores the relation between observed prices for the 
residential customers and the stage of liberalization of involved countries. In this panel 
data model, we assume that liberalization is the only determinant of prices. While being 
extremely stylized, the model offers a first intuitive assessment of the outcome of the 
liberalization process for retail energy markets.  
 The econometric correlation is the following: 
( ) ( ) jitjitjitres libresIlibindIP jit ,,,,3,,21,, εβββ +++=∆  
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res
jit
res
jit
res
jitres
P
PP
P
jit
,,1
,,1,,
,,
−
−−=∆  indicates the percentage difference in residential prices between 
time t and time t-1 in country i in market j (where j may be electricity or gas). 
( ) jitlibindI ,,  is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if more than 50% of industrial 
customers in country i at time t in market j are eligible, and 0 otherwise. ( ) jitlibresI ,,  is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the residential energy market in country i at 
time t in market j is liberalized, and 0 otherwise. While the 50% threshold value is 
arbitrary, it may be regarded as a reasonable proxy for market openness in the industrial 
sector.  
t stretches from 1995 to 2005, i are the nine partner countries, and j are the two markets 
under consideration. The total number of 198 observations in the sample. Data are 
derived from the sources mentioned below the graph. 
 To wrap up, the regression is made using three comparison groups:  
¾ countries that liberalized the retail electricity (or gas) market for both 
industrial and residential customers; 
¾ countries that liberalized the retail electricity (or gas) market only for 
industrial customers; 
¾ finally, countries that did not liberalize their retail energy market. 
 The results of the regression are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Regression results 
Parameters Value of parameters Test Value of test 
1β  2.9% 2R  34% 
2β  2.8%   
3β  -4.7%   
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 The results of this regression show two phenomena worthwhile further 
investigation: 
¾ liberalization of the residential energy market clearly helps. In countries which 
have adopted the liberalization process for the residential customers, the 
residential energy prices have been shown on average to increase less than in 
countries in which the liberalization process has not taken place. 
Mathematically, this results from the observation 
that 321321 ββββββ <⇒<++ ; 
¾ when only the industrial segment is liberalized, then the price for residential 
customers tends to increase not only more than when also the residential market 
is liberalized (mathematically, this emerges from the observation that 03 <β ), 
but also more than when neither of the two markets is liberalized 
(mathematically, this stems from noting that 02 >β ).  
 Two main pitfalls stand out in this regression. First, the 50% threshold is 
arbitrary. Second, since we are interested in the impact of retail energy market 
liberalization on prices, ideally we would like to isolate the retail component from the 
average price residential customers pay. In particular, the fact of considering the 
generation component in this regression generates an unnecessary increase of price 
variability, which reduces the precision of the results. 
 In order to improve on the last remark, the above regression has been modified 
considering as dependent variable 
( ) ( )( )w jitres
w
jit
resw
jit
res
w
jit
res
PP
PPPP
PP
jit
jitjit
jit
,,1
,,1,,
,,
,,1
,,1,,
,,
)(
−
−
−
−−−=−∆
−
− , where 
w
jitP ,,  denotes the average wholesale prices in various years, 
w
jit
res PP
jit ,,,,
−  indicates the 
extra price paid by residential customers beyond the wholesale price, and )( ,,,,
w
jit
res PP
jit
−∆  
represents the yearly changes in the extra price paid by residential customers beyond the 
wholesale price. Such changes may be a good measure of the effects of retail prices. 
Spot market prices, illustrated in Graph 6 for the electricity markets even in some non-
partner countries as a matter of comparison, have been considered as proxies for 
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wholesale prices, and 2004 to 2006 data for markets in which a spot market exists have 
been employed. 
Graph 6: Evolution of spot market prices in Europe: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National TSOs 
  
 The results of the regression are not reported here, as they do essentially confirm 
those obtained in the first regression. The observation of a common pattern appears to 
strengthen the validity of the results. 
 We now address the other problematic issue encountered in the first regression 
model, that is the representation of the liberalization process for industrial customers as 
a binary process, whereas the actual liberalization processes has been characterized by a 
more gradual transition, with an increasing number of eligible customers over the years. 
Hence, we now estimate a more flexible model, in which the degree of liberalization of 
retail markets for industrial users is considered as a continuous variable. In particular, 
we use the percentage of eligible customers as our covariate, and we estimate the 
following regression: 
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 This regression focuses on the impact of industrial liberalization on residential 
prices. While the rest of the terms have exactly the same interpretation as in the 
previous regression, % ( ) jitlibind ,,  now indicates the percentage of industrial customers 
who can choose among different retailers at time t in country i in market j. For the 
observations of years, countries and markets in which the liberalization process for 
industrial customers had not started yet, the percentage takes, as expected, a null value. 
Because of data availability t now stretches from 1999 to 2005, i are the nine partner 
countries, and j are the two markets under consideration, for a total number of 126 
observations in the sample. 
 Data are derived by subtracting the proportion of residential customers to tables 
presented in Graph 7 and 8. 
 
Graph 7: Openness in the electricity markets  
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Sources: Eurostat, EU Benchmarking Report, KEMA, Business Insight Eastern 
European Electricity Outlook 2005-2007 
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Graph 8: Openness in the gas market 
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Sources: Eurostat, EU Benchmarking Report, Business Insight Eastern European Gas 
Outlook 2005-2006 
 Results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Regression results 
Parameter Value of parameters Test Value of test 
1β  -4.1% 2R  36% 
2β  0.023%   
 
 The interpretation of the result is that there is a positive correlation between 
residential prices and the liberalization of the retail energy market for the industrial 
customers. The regression provides a further reinforcement to the result that, ceteris 
paribus, when only industrial customers and not the residential ones enjoy openness of 
the retail sector, consumers are worse off. In particular, on average, when the 
percentage of industrial customers for whom the market is liberalized grows by 1%, 
prices in the residential market increase by 0.023%.  
 The general point we can infer from examining these first regressions is that 
liberalization creates an asymmetry between the portion of customers interested by the 
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liberalization itself, and these customers who cannot enjoy its benefits. Hence, 
liberalization for residential customers become particularly beneficial and welfare 
enhancing, as it eliminates, or at least reduces, this asymmetry, thereby bridging the gap 
between the two types of customers.  
 The result is not an obvious one. It is therefore interesting to explore the 
economic rationale behind it. Amongst the possible explanations, a plausible one is the 
following. The energy market is not perfect, because of the forms of market power and 
externalities that inherently characterize it. Firms operating in the energy market tend to 
stick to self-imposed restrictions on prices, and on profit. This may in turn be 
determined by many reasons, including, in some cases, State ownership, or the fear of 
regulatory “retaliations” in case of too high prices, or, more generally, of a very much 
profit oriented firms’ behavior.  
 Such constraints implicitly pin down target values of profit and of return of 
capital. When liberalization affects only industrial customers, while prices for 
residential customers are still regulated, competition drives prices charged to industrial 
customers down. In order to balance this relative loss in the light of their profit target, 
firms have to charge higher prices to residential customers. This rationalizes the surge in 
prices. If this interpretation is correct, it remains unclear what happens once both 
markets – residential and industrial – are liberalized. If firms, before liberalization, were 
adopting a self-restrained behavior, they could preserve the same rate of return on 
capital after liberalization by relaxing the self-imposed constraints (intuitively, the self-
imposed constraint would, after liberalization, be imposed by the market, at least 
partially). If, on the other hand, the self-restraint behavior before liberalization was not 
very relevant, then liberalization may turn out to be price-reducing.  
 
 6.5.2 Upstream market structure 
 After assessing the positive impact of liberalization, we now examine how 
various policy measures have affected the outcome of the liberalization process, as 
measured by prices. 
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 We estimate a set of regression using available data on prices, market structure, 
and regulatory institutions, in order to attempt to assess the direction and the 
significance of the above mentioned effects.  
 We start by investigating the impact of upstream concentration on residential 
prices. We estimate the following regression model: 
jitjit
res NP
jit ,,,,21
%5
,,
εββ +>+=∆  
res
jit
P
,,
∆  represents the percentage difference in retail prices for residential customers 
between years t and t-1.  
jitN ,,%5>  identifies the number of upstream firms with higher or equal to 5% share in 
the upstream market (generator for electricity, controller of available gas for the gas 
sector). The number of “large” upstream firm is used as a proxy variable for the 
concentration level in the upstream market. The largest the number of upstream firms 
with more than 5% market share, the lowest the concentration. Indeed, a low number of 
large upstream firms is generally associated with the presence of few dominant firms. 
Certainly, a HH concentration index (for a detailed illustration of the HH index, see 
paragraph 5.3.) would yield a more appropriate measure of market concentration. The 
choice of the number of large upstream firm over the HH index as dependent variable in 
the regression, in spite of the advantages of the latter on the former, is exclusively due 
to data availability. 
 Graphs 9 and 10 illustrate the evolution of the number of upstream firms with 
more than 5% market share for electricity and gas. 
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Graph 9: Number of upstream electricity generators with market share > 5% 
Number of large upstream electricity generators
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Years
Austria
Belgium
Czech
Finland
Greece
Italy
Lithuania
Slovakia
Bulgaria
 
Sources: EU Benchmarking Report, Business Source Premier, Partners’ Questionnaire 
 
Graph 10: Number of upstream firms with market share > 5% in gas 
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Sources: EU Benchmarking Report, Business Source Premier, Partners’ Questionnaire 
 Due to data availability, t stretches from 2001 to 2005. Results are presented in 
Table 4. 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Parameter Value of parameters Test Value of test 
1β  -1.63% 2R  28% 
2β  -0.42%   
 
While the model has a limited power (mathematically, this is evident in the relatively 
low value of 2R ), we may still infer the implication that upstream concentration 
positively affects retail prices. When concentration increases, prices increase and vice-
versa.  
 The result shows that concentration in the upstream market is an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of the retail liberalization process. In countries 
characterized by a more concentrated generation market (for electricity), or by a more 
concentrated control of the available gas, the price-reduction effect of liberalization is 
mitigated. In other words, the liberalization process can fully spread its beneficial 
effects only under a non-oligopolistic upstream sector. Probably, this phenomenon is 
due to the fact that, in a concentrated environment, upstream firms are better able to 
control the final prices, thereby limiting the beneficial effects of a more competitive 
downstream market.   
 We now analyze the impact of upstream State ownership on residential prices. 
We estimate the following regression: 
( ) jitjitw jitres shipStateOwnerIPP jit ,,,,21,, )( ,, εββ ++=−∆  
)( ,,,,
w
jit
res PP
jit
−∆  represents the yearly changes in the extra price paid by residential 
customers beyond the wholesale price, while the dummy variable referred to State 
ownership takes the value 1 in years, States and markets in which the upstream sector 
(generation for electricity, control of available gas for gas) is owned by the State for a 
share exceeding 30%. The computation of State ownership results from the following 
expression: 
∑ =Np pp MSs1  
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ps  indicates the State’s ownership share in firm p, while pMS  identifies the market 
share of firm p. For example, in the Italian electricity market in 2003, Enel’s market 
share was 60%, while the State’s ownership share in Enel was 45%. Hence, the total 
public share, computed according to the previous equation, amounts to 27%.  
t stretches from 1999 to 2005, and data on State ownership are obtained through the 
websites of national regulators, and through the Foundation Eni-Enrico Mattei. 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 5. 
Table 4: Regression results  
Parameter Value of parameters Test Value of test 
1β  -5.2% 2R  42% 
2β  0.893%   
 
State ownership positively affects the “non wholesale” component of prices. We may 
draw a parallel between State ownership and upstream concentration. Under State 
ownership, upstream concentration tends to increase. In a more concentrated upstream 
environment, upstream firms are better able to control the final prices; hence, within 
such a context, the retail market is less significant in end-users price determination. 
Hence, the positive effects of liberalization are not fully displayed under State 
ownership.  
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6.5.3. Retail market structure and market design 
We finally examine the features of the retail market, in terms of structure and design, 
affecting end-user residential prices.  
The regression takes the following form: 
jitjitjitjit
res IPOWNRNP
jit ,,,,4,,3,,21
%5
,,
εββββ +++>+=∆   
jitN ,,%5>  denotes the number of retailers with a market share of more than 5% 
operating at time t in country i in market j, jitOWNR ,,  identifies ownership structures of 
retail energy firms (namely, whether or not they are vertically integrated in the upstream 
production stages), and finally jitIP ,, identifies the presence of industrial policy 
measures, tending to favor industrial customers over residential ones. In particular, we 
focus on two such measures: 
- the possibility, restricted to industrial customers, to build and manage their own 
merchant line; 
- the availability of a voluntary bilateral contracts market only to industrial 
customers.  
The regression has two dummy variables: 
jitOWNR ,,  takes the value 1 if the retailer having the largest market share is owned by 
one of the two largest generators. Otherwise, it takes up the value of 0. 
jitIP ,,  takes the value of 1 if at least one of the two above mentioned industrial policy 
measures tending to favor industrial customers over residential ones are adopted at time 
t in country i in market j. In particular, we wish to understand if the rule according to 
which industrial customers have a special priority in acquiring imported energy 
generates a relevant effect on the results. This should theoretically be true, especially in 
countries in which import is a lot cheaper than locally produced energy. 
Regression results are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Regression results  
Parameters Value of parameters Test Value of test 
1β  -1.27%   
2β  -0.65% 2R  39% 
3β  0.04%   
4β  1.43%   
 
The results show that retail market concentration, expressed by jitN ,,%5>  matters. The 
lowest concentration (i.e., the highest the number of retailers with a more than 5% 
market share), the lower the prices. Indeed, 02 <β  indicates that the effects of 
liberalization are larger with a dispersed retail ownership. 
The level of vertical integration, captured by 3β , is shown to have a modest effect on 
prices.  
Finally, industrial policy measures tend to generate a substantial increase in prices 
( 4β >0). It is likely that, under such circumstances, the supply side in the electricity 
market shifts its revenue source from the industrial to the residential customers, thus 
damaging the latter. It is crucial to understand that industrial policy measures tend to 
thwart residential customers. On the policy side, this tradeoff has to be evaluated, and a 
complete welfare analysis, which includes also customers, has to be performed prior to 
undertaking any industrial policy actions.  
While the number of retailers is an important statistics of concentration in the retail 
energy markets, it does not convey all the relevant information one wishes to analyze. It 
would then be useful to integrate it with a proper measure of concentration. The most 
famous and widely accepted among them is provided by the jitHH ,, (Herfindhal – 
Hirschner) index, expressed, for country i, as follows: 
∑
=
=
N
l
ji sHH
1
2  
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where 2is  indicates the market share of each retailer l in country i. The theoretically 
possible values of the HH index range from 0 to 1. When the index is close to 0, the 
retail activity is extremely dispersed: there are many firms, and none of them has a 
dominant position. On the contrary, as the index gets closer to one, either there are very 
few firms, or one of them has a dominant position, in terms of market share. 
Unfortunately, unavailability of data does not allow us to build a well specified HH 
index for all partner countries, hence at the current stage it cannot be used. 
Finally, the econometric model can be usefully deployed to show the correlation 
between regulatory choices and the workings of retail markets. To this end, we propose 
to rank partner countries according to a set of indicators. The weight attributed to each 
indicator reflects its importance for the smooth functioning of retail markets. We chose 
to give more weight to the reduction of search and switching costs and to those which 
reduce barriers to entry. As discussed in the report, such measures allow competition to 
flourish on the supply and the demand side. The list of indicators and the scores are 
reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: List of indicators and scores classification 
 
List of indicators Scores  
Measures reducing switching and search 
costs 
Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(3), fully satisfactory (6) 
Measures reducing barriers to entry Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(3), fully satisfactory (6) 
Regulation of contract terms Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(2), fully satisfactory (4) 
Quality of supply Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(2), fully satisfactory (4) 
Dispute resolution Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(2), fully satisfactory (4) 
Consumers representation  Unsatisfactory (0), partially satisfactory 
(1), fully satisfactory (2) 
Source: Our elaborations based on data available on the report 
 
 
Table 7 shows the scores for each partner country. The reasons behind each assessment 
are explained in the final report. 
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Table 7: Scores for each partner country 
 
Country  Switching/search 
costs 
Barriers 
to entry 
Contract 
terms 
Quality Dispute 
resolution
Cons. 
Representation 
Total  
Austria 0 3 2 2 2 1 10 
Belgium 6 3 4 2 0 1 16 
Bulgaria - 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Czech 
Rep. 
0 0 0 2 2 1 5 
Finland 3 3 4 2 0 1 13 
Greece - 0 2 0 2 0 4 
Italy 3 3 3 4 2 2 17 
Lithuania - 0 2 2 2 0 6 
Slovak 
Rep.  
- 0 0 0 2 0 2 
 
  
Based on the previous scores, based on 2006 data, we perform a statistical analysis. 
The regression is the following: 
( )
jiii
iiiiji
indres
TIONREPRESENTADISPUTE
QUALITYCONTRACTBARRIERSSWITCHPP
,,2006,20067,20066
,20065,20064,20063,200621,,20062005
εββ
βββββ
+++
++++=−∆ −
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )ind jires ji
ind
ji
res
ji
ind
ji
res
ji
ji
indres
PP
PPPP
PP
,,2005,,2005
,,2005,,2005,,2006,,2006
,,20062005 −
−−−=−∆ −  indicates the 
percentage change between the years 2005 and 2006 in the difference between 
residential and industrial energy (electricity and gas) prices. A negative 
( ) jiindres PP ,,20062005−−∆  in market j and in country i shows convergence between 
residential and industrial energy prices between 2005 and 2006. On the other hand, a 
positive value of ( ) jiindres PP ,,20062005−−∆  shows a tendency for prices paid by industrial 
and residential customers to diverge in the considered time period. 
We regress ( ) jiindres PP ,,20062005−−∆  on a set of covariates, respectively switching/search 
costs, barriers to entry, contract terms, quality, dispute resolution, and consumer 
representation. The measure attributed to each of the covariates is represented by the 
previously mentioned score. 
The reason for the choice of ( ) jiindres PP ,,20062005−−∆  as our dependent variable is that, as 
previously mentioned, electricity and gas prices are clearly affected by exogenous 
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country-specific components, which influence both the industrial and the residential 
sector, and by time-dependency. The consideration of ( ) jiindres PP ,,20062005−−∆  should, 
hence, take care both of the country-specific components and of various evolutionary 
trends of prices in the last years.  
Graph 11 and 12 report industrial and residential electricity and gas prices respectively 
in 2006.  
Graph 11: Electricity prices (eurocent/KwH) 2006: Industrial and residential 
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Graph 12: Gas prices 2006: industrial and residential 
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While the number of observations is in this case insufficient to draw definite 
conclusions, Table 8 reports the results for the parameters displaying a significant trend. 
Table 8: Correlation results 
Parameters Value of parameters 
2β  -0.21% 
3β  -1.43% 
 
According to Table 8, a better switching cost regulation and lower barriers to entry are 
shown to have reduced on average the price differential between industrial and 
residential customers between the years 2005 and 2006. In spite of the necessarily 
limited predictive power of our last model, driven by the qualitative assessment (and in 
particular by the numerical ranking) that we assigned to partner countries, we can infer 
from it that market design matters, and in particular good rules on switching costs and 
on barriers to entry may help reducing the price differential between residential and 
industrial customers.  
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6.6 Policy implications 
The policy implications paragraph has necessarily to start with a caveat. The relatively 
small sample, both in terms of examined countries, and in terms of the time period 
considered (the European liberalization phenomenon is relatively recent) determines the 
possibility that estimators be not very precise.  
However, a number of policy implications seem to be emerging from the analysis in a 
quite clear way: 
1. the retail liberalization process has generated advantages for the categories of 
customers that have been affected by it. Residential customers have indeed been 
advantaged by the full retail market opening, where this has already been 
implemented; 
2. when the retail market is open only to industrial customers, then residential 
customers are disadvantaged, both in relative terms (with respect to the 
industrial customers located in the same country), and in absolute terms (with 
respect to the residential customers of the countries in which residential and 
industrial customers receive the same treatment). The full market opening of 
2007 should induce a homogenization of treatments between industrial and 
residential customers, hence it should mitigate the bias against residential 
customers; 
3. concentration in the upstream market is an important determinant of the 
effectiveness of the retail liberalization process. In countries characterized by a 
more concentrated generation market (for electricity), or by a more concentrated 
control of the available gas, the price-reduction effect of liberalization is 
mitigated. In other words, the liberalization process can fully spread its 
beneficial effects only under a non-oligopolistic upstream sector. Probably, this 
phenomenon is due to the fact that, in a concentrated environment, upstream 
firms are better able to control the final prices, thereby limiting the beneficial 
effects of a more competitive downstream market. Actions should be taken in 
order to enhance competition in the upstream markets, and to support more 
competitive generation electricity generation and gas markets; 
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4. partly linked to point 3., a strong presence of the state (in the 
production/generation and/or in the transmission sectors), also mitigates the 
effectiveness of the liberalization measures, probably for the same reasons above 
illustrated. Leaving aside the wide and debated issue of State ownership, we just 
mention here that a successful liberalization of the retail sector is more likely 
under private ownership than under the public one.  
5. the market structure of the retail sectors significantly matters. In particular, on 
average, the higher the number of suppliers, the lower the prices, and the lower 
the concentration, the lower the prices. Measures should be taken in order to 
favor the emergence of a more competitive market structure; 
6. the retail market design significantly shapes outcome. Countries in which 
consumers are more informed and in which switching is easier have on average 
relatively lower prices than those that do not display these features. Ensuring 
more information to consumers and a simpler and cheap switching procedure is 
crucial for an effective liberalization process; 
7. policy measures aimed at favoring industrial customers, such as, for example, a 
bilateral contract market and/or merchant lines accessible only to industrial 
customers, damage residential customers. It is likely that, under such 
circumstances, the supply side in the electricity market shifts its revenue from 
the industrial to the residential customers, thus damaging the latter. It is crucial 
to understand that industrial policy measures tend to thwart residential 
customers. On the policy side, this tradeoff has to be evaluated, and a complete 
welfare analysis, which includes also customers, has to be performed prior to 
any industrial policy decisions.  
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7. Energy consumers’ contracts 
 
In this chapter we explore the content of residential energy supply contracts.75 We 
firstly describe the type of intervention on contract terms chosen by each partner 
country. Then we describe in detail the contents of some terms relating to the most 
important aspects of the contractual relationship and the way they are regulated in 
partner countries. Finally, we report the results of a research on unfair terms in 
electricity and gas contracts performed in the CLAB Europa database. 
 
7.1 The control on residential energy supply contracts 
 
Partner countries exhibit different models of control. The choices they made can be 
categorized as follows, in ascending degree of intrusiveness:  
a) exclusive reliance on general contract and consumer law 
b) disclosure duties: regulators establish what terms must be 
communicated to consumers, but do not mandate their contents 
                                                 
75 The terms relating to commercial quality and continuity of supply are discussed in chapter 8.  
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c) approval of terms drafted by suppliers or their branch associations 
d) mandatory terms to be included in every residential supply 
contract 
 
The following table summarizes the position in each partner country. 
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Table 6.1 – Models of control on residential energy supply contracts 
Country  Information  General 
law 
Approval  Mandatory 
terms 
Austria  X  X  X 
Belgium  X   X X 
Bulgaria X  X  
Czech Rep.  X   
Finland X X X X 
Greece X  X X 
Italy X X  X 
Lithuania X X X X 
Slovak Rep. X X  X 
 
It is clear that most partner countries thought specific measures were needed to 
protect residential consumers. Only Austria (until the new rules introduced in 2006) and 
the Czech Republic are willing to rely on general contract and consumer law as the 
main protective device. All other partner countries supplemented general law with more 
focused interventions. It is interesting to note that Annex A to the second electricity and 
gas directives only asks the Member States to adopt fair contractual terms and to impose 
disclosure duties to suppliers. ERGEG best practice proposition on customer protection 
suggests some protective measures, but without detailing their contents. Most partner 
countries go beyond these minimal requirements and impose mandatory terms in 
residential energy contracts.76  
Different degrees of market opening partly explain the solutions adopted as to the 
control of energy contracts terms. Often eligible clients do not benefit from the 
protection of mandatory terms.77 In other cases (e.g. Finland) mandatory terms must be 
adopted only by dominant suppliers. It remains to be seen, however, if the formal 
completion of the liberalization process in July 2007 wipes out any request for 
protective measures. As we suggested in the first chapter, the problems energy 
                                                 
76 It should not be forgotten, however, that sometimes the law in the books does not match the law in 
action. For example, the Bulgarian partner says that, although written contracts with residential 
consumers are required by the energy regulations, they are almost never offered by suppliers. 
77 In Italy residential gas consumers can choose terms different from those mandated by Aeeg. However, 
they maintain the right to go back to mandated terms when they subscribe to a new contract. 
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consumers experience are common to other markets as well. However, the deeper 
question is whether general law warrants adequate levels of protection. Only a detailed 
analysis of the most important terms usually inserted in energy contracts can begin to 
give an answer. This is the task  we now turn to. 
 
7.2 The contents of residential energy supply contracts  
 
7.2.1 Termination of contracts by consumers  
 
Traditionally, contracts concluded by residential consumers with monopolist 
suppliers were of indefinite duration (the so called evergreen contracts). The consumer 
had the right to terminate the contract at short notice, whereas the supplier had the right 
to change the price and other conditions. In liberalized markets, contracts of indefinite 
duration are still the most widespread type of agreement in the domestic segment. 
However, suppliers increasingly offer fixed-price, fixed-term contracts ranging from 1 
to 3 years. These contracts cannot be terminated until the end of the agreed upon period, 
but neither can they be modified by the supplier. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that 
some consumers could prefer a fixed-price contract to a variable one. 
There are some drawbacks, however. First of all, we have to assume that consumers 
are perfectly able to choose the contracts best suited to their interests. If such 
assumption does not hold (because of cognitive errors or manipulation of consumers’ 
preferences by suppliers), many consumers could be locked in disadvantageous 
contracts for a long time. Secondly, longer contract durations could reduce the number 
of consumers able to switch at short notice. Consequently, there will be reduced 
headroom for profitable entry by new suppliers. These considerations should be borne 
in mind when discussing the rules on termination rights introduced in each partner 
country. There is a trade-off to address: easing the cancellation of contracts by 
consumers could reduce switching costs and increase competition, but it could also 
dissuade suppliers from offering fixed-price contracts that some consumers would like 
to conclude.78 
                                                 
78 For a thorough assessment of this issue see LITTLECHILD (2006), who concludes for the removal of the 
UK 28 day rule, a standard licence condition conferring to all consumers the right to terminate their 
contracts at short notice. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007), p. 237ff. (gas), 285ff., points out the possible 
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In Austria section 15(1) of the Consumer Protection Act gives consumers the right 
to terminate energy supply agreements concluded for an indefinite period or a period 
exceeding one year, subject to notice of two months up to expiry of the first year, and 
expiry of half a year thereafter. This mandatory rule seems to foreclose fixed-term 
contracts longer than one year, at least for residential consumers. BWB doubts that 
fixed-term contracts could have anticompetitive effects, but does not reach a general 
conclusion as to the validity of such clauses.79 
In Belgium the agreement sponsored by the federal government includes among the 
general terms to be applied by the suppliers the right of the consumer to terminate 
contracts of indefinite duration with a notice no longer than two months or, in case of 
contracts of definite duration, the right to oppose the renewal within two months from 
the beginning of the new contractual period. A study carried out by the Belgian federal 
regulator says that a discount of 1% in favour of clients that subscribe fixed term 
contracts does not violate antitrust and commercial law. The price reduction is justified 
by the marketing and sourcing costs that the supplier can avoid for more stable clients. 
However, the same study underlines that higher discounts could have anti-competitive 
effects. Moreover, this pricing policy could be lawful only if the consumers receive 
adequate information.80 
In the Brussels Region the ordonnances on the organization of the electricity and 
gas markets, as amended at the end of 2006, provide that supply contracts must be 
concluded for at least three years, but the consumers can withdraw at two months 
notice. 
In Bulgaria suppliers of electricity, gas and heat power are only asked to include in 
their general terms the duration of the contract and  the conditions for renewal and 
termination. These general terms must be approved by the SEWRC.81 
                                                                                                                                               
anti-competitive effects in downstream markets of long-term contracts with tacit renewal clauses and long 
notice periods. 
79 BWB (2005, p. 68). The Gas Market Rules of August 2003 provide that, for indefinite network access  
agreements, the network user may terminate the agreement at the end of any month, subject to written 
notice of one month. If a supplier transfer cannot be effected within the intended notice period the 
distribution network operator must inform the network user immediately upon receipt of notice and 
suggest an extension of the agreement [sec. XXX(1)]. 
80 CREG, Ètude( F) 050602 – CDC-441, 2 juin 2005.  
81 See Ordinance on licensing of activities in the energy sector, State Gazette n. 53 of June 22, 2004 
(unofficial translation at www.dker.bg/ ).  
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In the Czech Republic there aren’t specific rules on termination rights. The general 
rules of the Commercial Code apply. 
In Finland consumers can terminate electricity sale contracts of definite or 
indefinite duration whenever they wish at two weeks notice. However, if the contract is 
outside the obligation to deliver and was concluded for a period longer than two years, 
it can be terminated by the consumer after two years.82 
In Greece the Electricity Supply Code states that consumers can terminate contracts 
with a minimum notice of three months. In the gas sector the distribution license 
mandates that customers can withdraw from the contract at any time without charge. 
Usually there is one year duration of the contract with automatic renewal.  
In Italy Aeeg laid down specific rules on the termination of electricity and gas 
supply contracts. In the electricity sector Aeeg gave eligible clients the right of 
withdrawal with six months notice, reduced to 30 days for those clients that became 
eligible during the year.83 Civil code rules on contracts for the recurring supply of goods 
can be applied. Sec. 1569 It. civ. code provides that in contracts of indefinite duration 
parties can withdraw at any time with adequate notice. Mirroring this rule, the general 
conditions of the former electricity monopolist Enel state that the residential supply 
contract is of indefinite duration and can be  terminated at 30 days notice. 
In the gas sector sec. 3 Aeeg dec. n. 184/01 as amended gave the right of 
withdrawal to eligible clients with 30 days notice. However, many suppliers offer more 
restrictive terms, sometimes linked to penalties for switching clients. 
With a consultation document issued in May 2007 Aeeg proposed to harmonize the 
rules on consumers’ withdrawal in the gas and electricity sector. Low voltage 
consumers or with yearly consumption no higher than 200.000 cm can withdraw at 30 
days notice. However, if the consumer has already withdrawn once in the preceding 
year, from the second time on she must wait at least six months before withdrawing 
again.  
                                                 
82 See sections 25f and 25i Electricity market act 386/1995 and sub. amendments (unofficial translation at 
www.energiamarkkinavirasto.fi/ ). Rules on residential gas contracts are laid down in Chapter 4, section 7 
of the Natural Gas Market Act.  
83 Aeeg dec. n. 78/99 and 158/99. Of course, these rules only applied to non domestic consumers. More 
recently, Aeeg proposed to harmonize the provisions on withdrawal with the switching procedures. 
According to this proposal, the notice period should start the first day of the first month following the 
month in which the consumer notified the withdrawal: see the consultation document of 12 March 2007. 
This rule will apply to domestic consumers. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
105
In Lithuania electricity supply contracts are of indefinite duration and can be 
terminated by the consumer with a 30-calendar-days written notice. Gas supply 
contracts are usually concluded for a year and can be terminated without restrictions.  
Specific provisions for the purchase-sale of energy were included in the Lithuanian 
Civil Code, which entered into force in 2001. They apply only if other laws do not 
provide otherwise. With regard to termination, sec. 6.390.1 states that if “the subscriber 
is a natural person -consumer using energy for domestic consumption, he shall be 
entitled to unilateral rescission of the contract notifying the energy supply enterprise 
thereof, provided the he has paid for the energy used.”  
In the Slovak Republic there aren’t specific provisions on termination rights. 
 
7.2.2 Termination of contracts by suppliers 
 
Both electricity and gas satisfy fundamental needs and cannot be easily replaced. 
For this reason, most countries do not allow suppliers to withdraw at will. Significant 
differences can be detected in each partner country. It could be useful to distinguish 
among the causes of supplier’s withdrawal:  
a) causes linked to the business organization of the supplier (e.g. bankruptcy or exit 
from the market);  
b) consumer who does not want to pay or steals energy;  
c) consumer who can’t afford to pay.  
       These three situations ask for different regulatory answers. In the first case the 
problem can be addressed by introducing suppliers of last resort.84 In the second case 
the supplier should be allowed to terminate the contract, but the consumer should be 
given the opportunity to redeem her debt. In the third case termination should be 
forbidden and alternative means for paying the bills should be introduced. We shall now 
compare the procedures drawn by legislators and/or regulators to address this issue. 
In Austria the Gas Market Rules of August 2003 [sec. XXIX(1)-(3)] give the 
distribution network operator the right to suspend its performance if the other party is in 
breach of the agreement and such breach is material and is not immediately rectifiable. 
In four cases of breach the suspension can be immediate. Any other breaches of contract 
                                                 
84 On this issue see ERGEG (2005a, p. 39ff.). 
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including default on payment obligations entitle the parties to suspend performance 
after written notice or a request to cease and desist on pain of suspension of 
performance and fruitless expiry of a period of two weeks. 
The distribution network operator has reasonable grounds for termination if: 
• the network user is in arrears with payments despite action in accordance with 
Clause XXIX (3) above; in this case an extension of six weeks must be granted; 
• the network user persists in a material breach of contract despite notice and threat 
of termination, and an extension of two weeks; 
• the network user is insolvent, or petitions for bankruptcy, or a petition for 
bankruptcy is refused due to insufficient assets; 
• the network user rejects amended, approved general terms and conditions of 
network use (see Clause XXVI) despite being expressly advised of the distribution 
network operator’s right of termination. 
According to sec. XXXII (7) of the Gas Market Rules of August 2003, in the event 
that a party has wrongly given rise to reasonable grounds for termination the other party 
is entitled to sue for damages on grounds of breach of contract. 
In Belgium the agreement sponsored by the federal government forbids contractual 
terms that enable the supplier to immediately terminate the contract if she suspects the 
consumer can’t pay. More detailed regulations have been enacted by regional 
legislators.  
In the Brussels-Capital Region the electricity supplier can install a current limiter 
if the consumer does not pay the bill within 15 days from the notice. The supplier must 
also inform the local public social help center. The intervention of the center aims at 
verifying the presence of economic difficulties on the part of the consumer. If this is the 
case, the center can help the consumer to obtain the status of protected consumer and to 
agree a repayment plan with the supplier. Following the agreement, the initial power 
level can be restored. If the consumer breaches the repayment plan, he can be 
transferred to the supplier of last resort. Disconnections are forbidden without a judicial 
order.85 
                                                 
85 See sec. 25sexies ff. ordonnance 19 juillet 2001, as amended by the ordonnance 14 décembre 2006.  
The same provisions apply in the gas sector: see sec. 20quater ff. ordonnance 1er avril 2004, as amended 
by the ordonnance 14 décembre 2006.  
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In the Flemish Region consumers who do not pay their bills must be given the 
possibility to agree to a repayment plan or to use a prepayment meter with a current 
limiter. If the consumer does not avail herself of neither options, the supplier can 
terminate the contract. However, the consumer who in the following 10 days is not able 
to find another supplier must be supplied by the distributor with a prepayment meter 
and must be charged a social tariff. A current limiter can be installed if the bills are not 
paid because of reasons depending exclusively on the will of the consumer. In case of 
theft of electricity disconnection is allowed, provided it is not executed in winter 
months.86   
In the Walloon Region, too, consumers that cannot afford to pay their bills can 
avail themselves of different solutions: repayment plans agreed with the suppliers, the 
help of public social action centers, installation of prepayment meters. Disconnections 
are only allowed if the consumer could pay but does not want to.87 A local commission 
has been set up to decide on the disconnection of the supply of electricity and gas. A 
sanction of 125 euros per day must be paid for unauthorized disconnections.88 
In Bulgaria articles 122 and 123 law on energy of 2004 state that disconnection is 
allowed without advance notice to prevent security risks, in case of electricity theft or 
unauthorized connection. If the consumer does not pay the bill the advance notice and 
termination conditions are provided for in the general terms of contracts drafted by the 
suppliers and approved by SEWRC. Termination of heat energy supply contracts in case 
of payment default is regulated by article 154 law on energy. 
In the Czech Republic termination rights are regulated according to the commercial 
code. Sec. 25 (electricity) and 59 (gas) Energy Act 2000 entitle the distributor system 
operator to limit or interrupt distribution or supply in case of emergency or unauthorized 
consumption. The approach to customer disconnection does not differentiate between 
vulnerable and other customers. The various distribution companies keep the data on 
                                                 
86 See sec. 2-8 and 19-20 Arrêté du Gouvernement flamand relatif aux obligations sociales de service 
public dans le marché libéré de l'électricité of 31 January 2003. Analogous provisions have been enacted 
in the gas sector : see sec. 2-7 and 18 Arrêté du Gouvernement flamand relatif aux obligations sociales de 
service public dans le marché libéré du gaz naturel of 20 July 2003. 
87 See sec. 29ff. Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon relatif aux obligations de service public dans le marché 
de l'électricité of 30 March 2006 and sec. 32ff. Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon relatif aux obligations de 
service public dans le marché du gaz of 30 March 2006. New rules have been proposed in the Flemish 
and Walloon Region which aim at coordinating the procedures for the termination of contracts due to non 
payment and to the choice of a different supplier: see CWAPE, Ètude CD-6l19-CWaPE, 13 décembre 
2006.  
88 See sec. 46 Décret 19 decembre 2002 relatif à l’organisation du marché régionale du gaz. 
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disconnected customers, and the Energy Regulatory Office currently does not require 
any differentiation. 
In Finland the Electricity Market Act distinguishes between interruption of supply 
and termination of the contract. According to sec. 27i, interruption is allowed if the user 
of electricity has materially defaulted on the payments to be made to the retailer or to 
the distribution system operator, or has otherwise materially infringed against the 
obligations based on the contract. Before interrupting the supply of electricity, the user 
of electricity must be sent a written notification of the default on payment or of the 
breach of contract, and a separate warning of cutting the supply of electricity, which is 
sent at the earliest two weeks after sending the notification. The supply of electricity 
may be cut at the earliest five weeks after the payment has fallen due or after the user of 
electricity has been informed of some other breach of contract for the first time, and the 
breach of contract has not been rectified in time before cutting the supply of electricity. 
If the default on payment is caused by the user’s financial difficulties that he has run 
into because of serious illness, unemployment or some other special cause, principally 
through no fault of his own, the supply of electricity may be cut at the earliest two 
months after the due date of the payment. The supply of electricity may not be cut, 
because of default on payment, between the beginning of October and the end of April 
in a building or in a part of a building that is used as a permanent residence, if the 
building is heated by means of electricity, until four months have elapsed since the due 
date of the outstanding payment. 
Sec. 27k states that the distribution system operator has the right to terminate the 
electricity system contract and the retailer has the right to terminate the electricity sale 
contract if: 
(1) the user of electricity has materially violated the obligations based on the 
respective contract, and this breach of contract has not been rectified within a 
reasonable period specified in writing by the distribution system operator or the retailer; 
or 
(2) the supply of electricity to the place of use referred to in the contract has been 
cut on the grounds laid down in section 27 i(1), and this power cut has continued for at 
least one month. 
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Notwithstanding these provisions, an electricity system contract and an electricity 
sale contract may be terminated immediately, if the user of electricity is guilty of 
stealing electricity, of willfully damaging the equipment under the vendor’s or the 
distribution system operator’s responsibility, or of breaking the seals placed by the 
vendor. The distribution system operator or the retailer must send a written notification 
on the termination of the contract to the contracting party. This notification shall state 
the grounds for termination and the date when the contract will expire. 
In Greece the Electricity Supply Code allows contract termination by the supplier 
with a minimum notice of 12 months. However, unilateral termination of the contract by 
the supplier with less than 3 months notice is possible a) in case of unsettled debt (45 
days following payment date expiration) and b) in case of breach of contract terms by 
the customer. 
In Italy Aeeg dec. n. 200/99 introduced mandatory terms to be applied to electricity 
supply contracts. Payment can be asked no less than 20 days after mailing the bill. 
Interest due on late payments cannot be higher than the official bank rate plus 3,5%. 
Power cannot be interrupted if the supplier has not sent an advance written notice. 
Notwithstanding such notice, power interruption is forbidden if the bills are contested 
by the consumer, the supply is needed for the working of health-care machines or the 
defaulted bills concern minor sums. The supplier has the duty to permit payment by 
installments if the bill is much higher than the average. Interruption is allowed in case 
of theft of electricity. Aeeg dec. n. 229/01 provides for similar terms in the gas sector. 
During 2007 Aeeg plans to introduce new provisions for the supply of electricity to low 
income customers.89 The consultation document of 18 May 2007 proposes to give 
suppliers of electricity and gas the right to withdraw at three months notice.  
In Lithuania the supplier hasn’t the right to terminate the contract with household 
consumers, unless the consumer is not fulfilling his obligations. According to article 
47(2) Electricity Act of 2000, the transmission or distribution system operator may 
interrupt the transport of electricity to those customers who, upon receipt of a written 
warning, failed to pay the bills for consumed electricity or for its transport and related 
services within 15 days in case of household customers, and within 10 days in case of 
                                                 
89 See the Aeeg consultation documents 3 August 2006 and 18 January 2007. 
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other customers. Article 8(2) natural gas law of 2000 states that the gas undertaking 
may limit or interrupt the gas supply:  
1) when it is determined that the customer’s service poses a threat to people’s life, 
health or property; 
2) if the customer fails to implement or improperly implements the obligations 
assumed through the contract; 
3) in cases of  accidents, emergencies or other instances stipulated by laws; 
4) owing to the required repairs and other operations of accessing the systems of 
other customers, having co-ordinated with the free customers and having warned the 
regulated customers according to the procedure stipulated in the contracts of gas 
supplying. 
At a normal situation no security deposits are requested. But if the consumer 
violates the contract, the supplier acquires the right to seek security deposits. No special 
procedures for dealing with consumers in difficulty and late payments have been 
introduced. 
Sec. 6.390.4 of the Lithuanian Civil Code states that “Termination, suspension or 
limitation of energy supply without an appropriate agreement with the subscriber or 
without his notification in advance shall be allowed only in cases when this is necessary 
in order to prevent an accident or as a response to an accident in the energy supply 
network. However in such cases the subscriber must also be promptly notified of the 
termination, suspension or limitation of energy supply.” 
In the Slovak Republic sec. 24 Energy Act of 2004 gives the distributor system 
operator the right to restrict or interrupt the distribution in emergency situations, in case 
of unauthorized offtake of electricity and of non-adherence to the contractually agreed 
payment conditions for the distribution of electricity after notice has been served. 
Similar provisions apply to the gas distribution system operator (sec. 43). 
 
 
7.2.3 Modification of contract terms 
 
Because of the high variance of the economic factors influencing energy prices, it is 
generally assumed that the supplier should have the right to change its contractual 
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conditions without the consent of the customer. Most countries allow unilateral changes. 
At the same time, they try to protect the consumers by giving them rights of withdrawal 
and asking the suppliers to send advance notice of the change. ERGEG’s reports point 
out the great variability of the procedures regulating unilateral changes and the degree 
of protection afforded to consumers.90 We now describe in more detail the solutions 
adopted in each partner country. 
In Austria tariff changes must be agreed to between the parties. The supplier sends 
a personal communication 10 weeks before the changes. Explanations are given only in 
some cases. Usually the consumer can withdraw at any time with a 4 weeks notice. The 
Natural Gas Act (sec. 27) and the Gas Market Rules of August 2003 [sec. XXVI (2)-(3)] 
provide that the distribution network operator must immediately notify the network user 
of any amendments to the General Terms and Conditions of Distribution Network Use. 
The user must be accorded a period of at least one month to object to the amendments. 
In the event of an objection the distribution network operator may terminate the 
agreement in writing with three months notice, whether or not any suspension of the 
contractual duties or physical disconnection of the gas equipment takes place. Such 
termination does not affect any entitlement to the conclusion of a new network access 
agreement. 
In Belgium the agreement sponsored by the federal government forbids any 
changes depending exclusively by factors under the control of the supplier. Other 
changes, different from those implemented according to an indexation clause, give the 
consumer the right to withdraw within a month from the personal communication. 
There isn’t any duty to give reasons. The Walloon Region legislation asks for a two 
months advance notice specifying the consumer’s right to withdraw.91 
In Bulgaria the law on energy states that public suppliers shall publish the 
approved general conditions in at least one central and one local daily newspaper. The 
general conditions shall take effect 30 days following their first publication; no explicit 
approval by consumers is required. 
Within 30 days after the date on which the general conditions take effect the consumers 
                                                 
90  See ERGEG (2005c, p. 39ff.). 
91 Art. 4(3-4) Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon relatif aux obligations de service public dans le marché de 
l'électricité of 30 March 2006 and art. 4(3-4) Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon relatif aux obligations de 
service public dans le marché du gaz of 30 March 2006. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
112
who do not accept them may file with the corresponding public supplier an application 
proposing special conditions. Special conditions that differ from the general conditions 
accepted by the public supplier must be reflected in additional written agreements. This 
procedure shall also be applied for amendments to the general conditions.92 
In the Czech Republic the electricity trader shall notify small customers and 
households not later than two months in advance of its intention to change contractual 
conditions.93 
In Finland sec. 26 Electricity Market Act lists the cases in which changes to prices 
and other terms are allowed: 
(1) on the grounds specified in the contact, provided that the content of the 
contract does not change materially; however, a retailer may not on these 
grounds change a fixed-term electricity sale contract concluded outside the 
obligation to deliver; 
(2) if the change is based on an amendment to legislation, or on a decision 
made by the authorities, which the distribution system operator or the retailer 
has not been able to take into account when concluding the contract; or 
(3) if there is a special reason for the change, owing to an essential change in 
the circumstances, revision of outdated contractual or pricing arrangements, or 
implementation of measures necessary for energy conservation; however, a 
retailer may not on these grounds change a contract concluded outside the 
obligation to deliver. 
   The distribution system operator and the retailer shall provide their contracting 
party with information on how the prices or other contractual terms will change, when 
the change will come into effect, and what the grounds for the change are. The 
contracting party must be informed whether he has the right to terminate the contract. If 
the reason for the change is not a legislative amendment or a decision by the authorities, 
the change may come into effect, at the earliest, one month after the notification of the 
change has been given. 
                                                 
92 See art. 98 (electricity), art. 150 (heat energy) and art. 183 (gas) law on energy 2004.  
93 See sec. 30(2)(d) Energy Act 2000. For the gas trader the advance notice shall be sent one month before 
the amended contractual conditions become effective [sec. 61(2)(g)]. 
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In Greece the Electricity Supply Code states that the electricity supplier must 
publish any modifications in at least two national daily newspapers and one local 
newspaper. The publication takes place one month before the modification. 
In Italy Aeeg set up the procedure for the annual approval of residential tariffs. 
Within the 15th of October suppliers propose to the regulator the tariffs they want to 
offer the following year. Aeeg has between 45 and 60 days to approve or reject them. 
Within 30 days from approval suppliers shall publish their tariffs on newspapers, 
regional or provincial official bulletins and the regulator’s website. Once a year 
suppliers shall also communicate to the customer the best available tariff according to 
electricity consumption in the preceding 12 months, if different from the actual one.94  
Both in the electricity and in the gas sector the codes of commercial conduct state 
that unilateral modifications by the supplier are allowed if agreed to in the contract and 
supported by valid reasons. The supplier shall send the customer an advance notice no 
later than 60 days before the date the modifications will become effective. The notice 
must include the new text of the terms to be modified, a clear, complete and 
understandable explanation of the modifications and of their consequences, the date by 
which they will take effect, the conditions for customer’s withdrawal free of charge. 95 
In Lithuania art. 31 Law on Electricity 2000 states that undertakings of the 
electricity sector shall notify household customers in writing or by other means at least 
one month before the increase of prices and tariffs. Household customers shall have the 
right to unilateraly terminate the contracts without payment of charges if the revised 
contract terms are unacceptable to them. In the gas sector art. 14 Natural Gas Law states 
that every 6 months the gas undertaking shall set the gas prices for regulated customers, 
not to exceed the highest prices. New prices shall come into effect not earlier than 30 
days from their having been made public. The NCC, having established that the prices 
have been estimated without adhering to the established methodology or are incorrect, 
must point out their errors to the undertakings. Should the undertaking fail to implement 
the request of the NCC, the NCC shall have the right to unilaterally set the prices.  
                                                 
94 See article 4 Annex A to Aeeg dec. n. 4/04, Unified code concerning electricity transmission, 
distribution, metering and sale to the captive market services for the regulatory period 2004-2007. 
95 See sec. 12 Aeeg dec. n. 105/06 for electricity and sec. 13 Aeeg dec. n. 126/04 for gas. An inquiry 
conducted by Aeeg in the gas sector shows that many suppliers do not inform their customers of the way 
the modification will take effect and its consequences: see Annex A to Aeeg dec. n. 235/06, p. 25f.. 
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In the Slovak Republic sec. 20 Energy Act states that the household customer of 
electricity and the household customer of gas have, without prejudice to consumer 
protection rights laid down by separate regulations, the right to be given information on 
a change in the price of electricity or the price of gas, and on  an amendment to the 
conditions for the electricity supply or gas supply and related services, not later than 
thirty days prior to the entry into force of the amendment. They also have the right to 
withdraw from the contract if they do not agree with a change in the price of electricity 
or the price of gas and related services, according to the conditions specified in the 
supply contract. 
This survey shows that the protection afforded to residential energy consumers on 
the issue of unilateral modifications is far from uniform across partner countries. In 
regulating this aspect of the relationship between energy companies and their customers 
three principles should be borne in mind. Firstly, deviations from the general rule that 
requires the consent of both parties to change the terms of the contract should be 
allowed only when justified by the peculiarities of energy supply contracts. Secondly, 
enough information should be given to the consumer to enable him to understand the 
reasons of the change and decide whether to search for better offers.96 Thirdly, the right 
to change contract terms should work both ways. If the supplier is entitled to increase 
the price when its procurement costs rise, the consumer should be entitled to a price 
reduction whenever the procurement costs decrease.97 We now propose a possible list of 
conditions that warrant a coherent implementation of both principles. They could be 
inserted in the forthcoming European Charter of the rights of electricity and gas 
consumers. 
1) unilateral modifications should be allowed only with reference to 
prices and not to other terms. While the high variance of economic factors 
influencing the price of energy asks for recurrent adaptations during the life 
of the contract, there seems to be no reason to deviate from the general rule 
of mutual consent for any other terms; 
                                                 
96 In a similar vein, ERGEG (2007, p. 9) suggests that customers’ understanding of the reasons for price 
changes should be improved.  
97 This principle is recommended by the Finnish Consumer Agency. None of the partner countries seems 
to have adopted it, but  it could easily inferred from general consumer law. 
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2) unilateral modifications should be symmetrical. If the supplier has 
the right to modify the contract when it is disfavoured by market conditions, 
it must also pass on to the consumers the advantages connected to more 
favourable market conditions;  
3) the consumer should receive a personal communication well 
before the date from which the modifications will become effective (no less 
than two months) 
4) the personal communication should explain whether the 
modifications depend on the business choices of the supplier or on causes 
independent of its will and how large is the price increase  
5) the personal communication should specify the conditions for 
withdrawal without any charge. 
 
7.3 Case law on unfair terms in electricity and gas contracts  
 
In this paragraph we provide data on unfair terms in electricity and gas contracts. 
The aim of the research is threefold: first of all, we want to check whether there are 
consistent differences in the criteria applied to evaluate the terms of residential energy 
contracts. As is well known, the directive 93/13/EC required only minimum 
harmonization. Therefore, it is possible that differences in national statutes lead to 
divergent assessments of the fairness of energy contracts. Secondly, a survey of the case 
law helps to assess whether the proposal of European standard terms for residential 
energy contracts is worth pursuing. Finally, the survey shows the extent to which 
national consumers’ associations are able to resort to legal or extralegal actions to 
protect the interests of energy consumers. 
The source on which we rely is the CLAB Europa database, a collection of unfair 
terms in consumer contracts hosted by the European Commission.98 The main 
                                                 
98 It can be accessed free of charge at 
htpps://adns.cec.eu.int/CLAB/SilverStream/Pages/pgHomeCLAB.html . Detailed information on the 
CLAB database can be found in MICKLITZ  e RADEIDEH (2005). The results reported in the text were 
collected through a query performed at the beginning of March 2007. At the same date a query performed 
in the EU Consumer Law Acquis Database (www.eu-consumer-law.org/index.html ) gave only one result: 
Supremo Tribunal de Justiça  (PT) 06. May. 1993 P. 83348: Sont absolument interdites les clauses 
incluses dans un contrat de fournissement de gaz qui attribuent à l’entreprise le pouvoir de déléguer 
unilatéralement à une autre entité par elle choisie la responsabilité par le fournissement, le pouvoir de 
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advantage of the database is the classification of unfair terms according to the economic 
sector. In the category of basic services there are two subcategories for electricity and 
gas. Therefore, it is fairly easy to find all the cases relating to energy contracts.  
The CLAB database has two major drawbacks, however. The first is its limited 
geographical scope. It includes the case law on unfair terms from sixteen European 
Countries. The second drawback is its limited temporal extension. The most recent 
cases date from 2004. Therefore, cases discussed in the last years have not been 
included. Although these limits prevent more robust generalizations, the materials 
available offer interesting empirical insights for the three goals listed above.  
Table 1 shows the total number of terms from electricity and gas contracts included 
in the database for each country. In most cases, each decision included in the database 
assesses the fairness of more than one term. Therefore, the number of total cases is 
much smaller than the number of terms. We omit some terms that, although classified in 
the electricity and gas sectors, actually refer to tenancy, water supply and construction 
contracts. Moreover, we do not consider terms relating to liquefied gas supply contracts 
because they are not relevant for gas supplied through networks, the commercial 
activity which is the subject of the liberalization process and of the present research.  
                                                                                                                                               
modifier unilatéralement les prix de louage du compteur et le pouvoir de s’exonérer de responsabilité par 
dommages déterminés par des accidents relatifs au fournissement du gaz. 
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Table 1 – Total number of electricity and gas terms and total number of cases 
 
Country  Electricity terms Gas terms n. cases  
Austria  35 3 5 (elec.), 3 (gas) 
Belgium 18 4 16 (elec.), 4 
(gas) 
Germany 5 0 3 (elec.), 0 (gas) 
France 2 0 2 (elec.), 0 (gas) 
Greece 0 0 0 
UK 0 18 0 (elec.), 9 (gas) 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 49 18 5 (elec.), 5 (gas) 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 
Netherlands 4 1 4 (elec.), 1 (gas) 
Finland 7 0 7 (elec.), 0 (gas) 
Iceland 0 0 0 
Norway 13 0 9 (elec.), 0 (gas) 
Sweden 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 4 0 (elec.), 1 (gas) 
Spain 3 10 2 (elec.). 10 
(gas) 
Total 136 58 56 (elec.), 31 
(gas) 
  
Compared to other economic sectors included in the CLAB database, the electricity 
and gas contracts raise a limited number of controversies on unfair terms. This situation 
can be explained by pointing out that in many countries energy suppliers are not free to 
choose the terms of their contracts. Public authorities exert a preventive control and 
avoid the insertion of abusive terms. Moreover, many controversies between consumers 
and energy firms are resolved through extrajudicial procedures. In this case, the issue of 
unfairness is not discussed at all.  
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As the liberalization process goes forward, many states could lift their ex-ante 
controls. Therefore, the unfair terms statutes will be invoked more often. For this reason 
it is useful to assess which terms have been judged unfair in the countries considered.99 
First of all, of the 194 terms included in the CLAB database, only 37 (36 for 
electricity and 1 for gas) were judged to be not unfair. Of course, the same term can be 
the object of more than one case. However, it seems that in Europe there is a discrete 
number of terms that cannot be used in all countries. To assess whether the same criteria 
are applied by the national courts we need to consider the type of terms in more detail. 
Table 2 shows the different categories.  
 
Table 2 – Type of terms 
 
Term  Electricity Gas  
Contract conclusion 4 4  
Presentation 5 4  
Payment 37 6 
Liability  28 13 
Obligations  26 17 
Modification  12 6 
Termination  15 1 
Access to justice  9 7 
 
The first thing to notice is that there is a higher number of judgements on unfair 
clauses in electricity and gas contracts in those countries where consumers’ 
associations, consumer ombudsmen, chambers of commerce and public authorities 
started legal actions against energy firms. This is the case in Austria, Italy, Finland, 
Norway and UK. Suppliers were hard pressed to write more balanced contracts. On the 
other hand, individual legal actions have been few in number and often met with a 
                                                 
99 It is interesting to note that, according to Eurobarometer data, 20% of electricity users and 19% of gas 
users consider unfair their contract terms. Moreover, these percentages are stable or increasing between 
2000 and 2004. See Special Eurobarometer 219 – Consumers’ opinions on services of general interest – 
Summary Report, p. 41. This perception is confirmed by the analysis on the CLAB database, where many 
unfair terms in the energy sector are collected. Its stability over time seems to suggest that the national 
measures introduced in that period did not produce visible improvements for consumers. 
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rejection in court. It is suggested that an effective control on unfair terms can be 
obtained by enlarging the space for collective actions, for example by giving 
consumers’ associations the right to claim damages.  
Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of the content of the terms.100 As far as 
the conclusion of the contract is concerned, two issues surface. The first is the fairness 
of a unilateral commitment which bounds only the consumer and lets the supplier free 
to decide whether to conclude the contract. In Italy two different judges of first instance 
gave contrasting judgements: while the first deemed a unilateral commitment unfair, the 
second observed that no obligation can be imposed on the consumer before the 
electricity is made available. Therefore, the imbalance within the parties’ rights was 
excluded.101 The same problem was resolved in favour of the consumer in Austria. The 
period of 30 days, during which the consumer is bound to his offer and the supplier can 
decide to accept or reject, was considered unreasonably long.102 
The second issue related to the conclusion of the contract is the relevance to be 
given to representations made by suppliers’ agents. The clauses stating that the terms of 
the contract are those contained in the written documentation to the exclusion of all 
other terms, denying liability for representations of employees and requiring variations 
to be in writing are deemed unfair both in the UK and in Austria.103 
 The presentation of the contract raises the issues of the clearness and transparency 
of the terms. It was deemed unfair to include generic reasons among the causes that 
justify the interruption of supply,104 to ask the consumer to pay for “taxes and other 
charges”,105 to ask for a bank or insurance guarantee without specifying the conditions 
for request, the lack of precision in the reference to a price list, to charge the consumer 
for the administrative costs of contracting and for inspection of the installation without 
giving him the right to know the amount to be paid, to give the company complete 
discretion to estimate the amount of gas used with no requirement that the estimate be 
based on previous consumption, or subject to any other limit of reasonableness.106 In 
                                                 
100 The clauses relating to the choice of the jurisdiction are common in any economic sector and will not 
be discussed here. 
101 See cards n. IT000590 and IT000669 in the CLAB database.  
102 See card n. AT002198. 
103  See cards n. GB000686, GB000711, GB001006, AT002034. 
104 See card n. IT000583. For the opposite view see card n. IT000666. 
105 See card n. IT000586. For the opposite view see card n. IT000667. 
106 See resp. cards n. IT001086, ES000107, ES000448, GB000352. 
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Austria it is also unfair to oblige the parties to the contract to substitute the regulation 
which is legally inadmissible or not performable with a regulation which is 
economically reasonable and as equal as possible because it conceals the legal situation, 
advantageous for the consumer.107 Moreover, the ambiguity of the contract is 
interpreted against the supplier who drafted it.108 
The case law on payment terms shows that national judges exert their control on the 
following issues:  
a) fairness of extra charges 
b) modalities of payment 
c) right of the consumer to set off his counter-claims against the supplier 
d) monetary interests due in case of delayed payment 
e) proof of effective consumption and correction of billing mistakes 
 
Before considering in more detail the issues listed above, two observations are in 
order. Firstly, it should be remembered that the European directive on unfair terms does 
not allow a direct judicial control on the fairness of the price.109 Secondly, electricity 
and gas retail tariffs are still set by public authorities in many countries. Therefore, the 
judicial control is limited to the terms that establish how the payment has to be made, 
but cannot be extended to its amount.  
As far as extra charges are concerned, it is deemed unfair to ask the consumer to 
pay twice for meter reading, to pay a deposit of at least £100 during the term of the 
agreement for no specified reasons, or to pay the costs for credit transfers.110  However, 
it is not unfair to ask for connection fees if they reflect the cost of a service to the 
consumer, to ask for an extra on account amount  if it did not lead to any raise of the 
fare per kWh, or to ask the consumer to pay for the maintenance of the pipe laid in his 
special interest . 111  
                                                 
107 See card n. AT002155. 
108 See card n. FI000032. 
109 See on this aspect see card n. DE001461. 
110 See cards n. FI000227, FI000228, GB001192, AT002201. 
111 See cards n. NO000220, NO000305, ES000743, AT000441.  
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Turning to the modalities of payment, it is deemed unfair to establish very short 
terms for payment (within 8 days from mailing date in Italy)112 or to send payment 
reminders before at least 14 days after the payment is due.113  
Standard business conditions exclude the right of the consumer to suspend payment 
in case of non performance or to set off his claims against the supplier. This term is 
deemed unfair in Italy because it forces the consumer to comply anyway with his 
obligations and therefore to wait for the results - and bear the costs - of the action for 
restitution so as to recover what he had unduly paid in connection with the defaulting 
behaviour of the utility company.114 It is also unfair to provide that, should no objection 
against the accuracy of the invoice be raised within 14 days from the receipt, the invoice 
is deemed to be expressly acknowledged by the customer.115 
In case of delayed payment, it was deemed not unfair to charge overdue interests of 
7.5% per year plus any increases of the bank discount rate in force as well as additional 
costs.116 However, in Austria a clause establishing that the consumer has to compensate 
all costs incurred in making request for payment and collection expenses without any 
limit  is unfair because the code of civil procedure (ZPO) allows only the costs serving 
for an appropriate prosecution.117 
Finally, clauses limiting the consumer's power to raise objections against meter 
readings have been deemed unfair.118 In Spain the supplier is not allowed to claim the 
payment of the difference not previously billed if the consumer is not responsible for 
the mistake.119 However, in Norway it is provided that the supplier can ask for 
supplementary payment for actual consumption for a period of maximum 3 years when 
it was being discovered that the calculations were too low, while the consumer is 
                                                 
112 See card n. IT000571. But for a different view see card n. IT000663, where the Italian court of first 
instance observes that "the supply of electricity implies a lenghty steady relation, strongly characterized 
by automatic and repetitive performances which involves the issue of bimonthly bills of charge referred to 
the consumption reading, so that the consumer knows in advance - given the constant repetitiveness of the 
charge - that he will have to provide for the payment of power consumption". 
113 See card n. NO000303. 
114 See card n. IT000574. Clauses excluding or limiting set-offs are illegal in Austria, too (see card n. 
AT002646). In Germany counter-claims are allowed only if they are undoubted or legally confirmed (see 
card n. DE001462).   
115 See card n. AT002647. 
116 See card n. IT000663.  
117 See cards n. AT002197, AT002605, AT002644, AT002645. 
118 See cards n. IT001094, GB000683 
119 See card n. ES000765. 
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entitled to a refund corresponding to the amount of extra time the mistake has caused, 
however for a period of time no longer than 10 years.120 
In the field of liability for interruption of supply or voltage variation the case law 
shows a great variety of national solutions. Two reasons explain this result. Firstly, the 
rules on contractual and extracontractual liability apply to this kind of controversies. 
Therefore, the courts interpret the terms on suppliers’ liability according to general 
contract law. Secondly, exclusion clauses can be regulated more or less strictly in the 
national statutes implementing dir. 93/13/EC. It is useful to summarize the different 
solutions in the following table:  
 
Table 3 – Legal validity of liability clauses in electricity and gas contracts 
 
Country  Legal validity 
Belgium Liability in case the continuity of public service is violated, but 
not for minor faults 
France Limitation is not valid, even for contracts with businesses  
Germany Limitation valid if the damage is not intentional or grossly 
negligent; in any case, statutory limit of compensation at DM 5000 
Italy Liability if the damage can be attributed to the supplier 
Netherlands Limitation unfair 
Norway In case of breach of safety invalid limitation to negligence for 
indirect and consequential losses 
Portugal No limitation for personal injuries, non-contractual material 
damages on goods of the party or of a third party, unfulfillment of 
the contract in cases of serious default, acts of employees and 
representatives in cases of serious default 
United 
Kingdom 
Liability for foreseeable losses, but not for loss of profits if the 
contract is with private dwelling 
Austria Limitation invalid for intentional or grossly negligent damages, 
or for personal injuries 
 
It is clear from table 3 that the extent of suppliers’ liability is largely dependent on 
the interpretation of vague legal concepts like “grossly negligent” or “foreseeable”. 
                                                 
120 See card n. NO000128. An Italian court accepted the following clause in the standard conditions of the 
former monopolist (card n. IT000582): The costs connected to meter inspections required by the user are 
to the charge of the user if mistakes are comprised between the limits established by the CEI regulations. 
If they are not so, they are the responsibility of ENEL S.p.A., which shall reconstruct the energy 
consumed on the basis of the error percentage actually ascertained, from the moment in which the 
irregularity occurred, if identifiable, or, otherwise, from the month in which the inspection was carried 
out. 
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Apparently, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal display a 
regime more favourable to the consumer. However, this general observation can be 
quickly reversed if a national court decides to charge the consumers with a more 
onerous burden of proof.  
Together with the primary obligations to deliver electricity or gas and to pay the 
price, secondary obligations can be included in the contract. Sometimes they have been 
deemed unfair because they are detrimental to the consumer. The first example is the 
joint liability of the old and the new consumer. This clause is invalid in Austria.121 
Another case relates to guarantees. Their function is to cover the supplier against the 
risk of insolvency, but they are valid only if there are weighty reasons to demand 
additional security.122 
A further example relates to the right of the supplier to occupy the consumer’s 
premises with his equipment, as well as to access the same premises for inspection. 
While occupation is generally allowed,123 there are limits to the right of access without 
the consent of the consumer.124 Standard conditions also provide for the duty to 
maintain the equipment on behalf of the consumer.125 
Finally, the clause that allows the supplier to hand over his contract to another 
company is valid in Italy and unfair in Austria and Portugal.126 In Italy the clause which 
excludes the option for the consumer to transfer the contract to a third party is deemed 
unfair.127 
As far as unilateral modification by the supplier is concerned, conferring this right 
is deemed acceptable only if there are objective reasons, they are independent from the 
will of the supplier, are described in the contract and there is an adequate advance notice 
to the consumer.128 
Let’s now turn to the grounds for termination of the contract by the supplier. In 
Belgium the legal concepts of abuse of power and abuse of process have been applied to 
stop the supplier from cutting off the power. Relevant factors are the monopoly 
                                                 
121 See cards n. AT002199,  AT002648. 
122 See cards n. FI000003, NL000006. 
123 In Italy with appropriate compensation: see cards n. IT000569 and IT000662. 
124 See cards n. IT001087, NL000051. 
125 See cards n. IT000577, IT000578, IT000665. 
126 See resp. cards n. IT000575, IT000664, AT002649 and PT000014. 
127 See card n. IT001090. 
128 See cards n. FI000249, IT000573, IT000576, IT000579, IT001085, PT000015, GB001355, 
AT002160, AT002161, AT002200, AT002602, AT002603, AT002604.  
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situation, the age of the consumer, his financial condition as well as his good faith.129 
Moreover, the consumer must, before the suspension is applied, be able to defend 
himself of the claim that he has not paid without any good reason.130 In Italy the 
prevailing case law allows suspension or interruption in case of non payment, but 
considers unfair the clause that permits the supplier to extend such measures to other 
services provided to the same consumer.131 In Norway the consumer that cannot pay 
should be given the opportunity for a suitable arrangement.132 It should be remembered 
that the case of non payment is regulated by specific rules in many countries. Therefore, 
it escapes judicial control according to the unfair terms legislation.  
It is interesting to assess the national perspectives in the field of contract duration. 
In Norway a provision regarding 12 months binding period from the cancellation date 
was not unfair.133 On the other hand, in Germany a contract that runs for 36 months and 
extends 36 months at a time, unless it is cancelled three months before expiration, is 
deemed unfair. The unreasonable disadvantage, which lies in a substantial extension of 
the contractual binding, cannot be compensated by a general "low priced" tariff. A 
lower price for the customer does not change the fact, that the electricity-supplier's 
running period regulation interferes with the facilitated change of the electricity-supplier 
that was pursued by the legislator.134 In a similar vein, an Italian court decided that a gas 
contract concluded for a term of 5 years and a minimum consumption of 4000 litres 
violated the Italian antitrust law because it prevented the customer from negotiating 
with third parties for a long time.135 
The analysis of the case law shows that, among European countries, the control on 
unfair terms in electricity and gas contracts is far from homogeneous. Differences are 
apparent for the conclusion of the contract, the interpretation of the transparency 
requisites, the legitimacy of extra charges and additional obligations, the modalities of 
payment, the limitation of suppliers’ liability, the termination in case of non payment. 
These divergences depend in part on the lack of uniform implementation of the unfair 
                                                 
129 See cards n. BE000083, BE000084, BE000086, BE000087, BE000091, BE000092, BE000093. 
130 See card n. BE000095.  
131 See cards n. IT000588 and IT000589 (disconnection terms unfair), IT000668 and IT001092 
(disconnection allowed), IT000587 and IT001093 (disconnection of other services forbidden). 
132 See cards n. NO000020, NO000304. 
133 See card n. NO000106. 
134 See card n. DE002552. 
135 See card n. IT001207. 
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terms directive. However, they are often linked to deeper differences in the substantive 
and procedural laws of European countries.  
What we are confronting here is a problem common to all other economic sectors in 
which the EU is trying to build a single market. Because of diverging national controls 
on standard terms, energy firms cannot use the same contracts all over Europe. The 
additional costs they face could discourage entry in new markets. Therefore, together 
with other traditional entry barriers, the lack of a uniform regulation of standard terms 
hampers the development of competition in retail energy markets.  
Two possible solutions could be devised. The first is the negotiation of a European 
standard contract. This possibility was advanced by the European Commission in 2003 
as one of the options to be explored within the debate on the development of a European 
contract law. In 2005 the Commission recognized that such proposal could face serious 
hurdles. For example, the differences among mandatory rules in national laws would 
force the European standard contract to comply with the most restrictive ones. This 
means that the common terms will be unattractive for businesses from more permissive 
jurisdictions. Moreover, the European Commission expressed its doubts about the 
amount of resources that would be needed to update constantly the standard terms, as 
well as about the willingness of European firms to invest in such an endeavour.  
In the academic literature the proposal for European standard contracts has both 
supporters and detractors. It has been suggested that a common standard contract could 
be negotiated through a procedure that recalls collective bargaining in labour relations. 
Businesses would be interested in taking part to such a procedure because the fairness 
of common terms would be difficult to challenge in courts. On the other hand, 
consumers’ representatives would be able to influence the content of the terms and to 
accept only those that balance the rights and obligations of the parties. As to the 
possible anti-competitive effects of this solution, it has been observed that firms do 
compete on a limited number of terms. The standardization would concern only those 
terms which consumers usually do not know and firms have no interest in 
communicating. Therefore, enough space would be left for differentiating the offers 
with respect to more salient aspects of the contractual relationship.136 
                                                 
136 See COLLINS (2004). 
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Various objections have been raised against the proposal of European standard 
contracts. Firstly, linguistic differences could produce diverging interpretations. 
Secondly, the links between standard terms and the national legal frameworks could 
nullify any advantage of a common point of reference. Thirdly, the lack of 
representative organizations could make it difficult to reproduce in every economic 
sector the same bargaining process developed in the employment field.137 
A second solution to the lack of uniformity in the national control of unfair terms 
has been suggested by the European Commission at the beginning of 2007. The Green 
Paper on the review of the Consumer Acquis lists, among the strategies that could be 
pursued, the introduction of a horizontal instrument that would apply to all consumer 
contracts. To solve the problem of fragmented implementation of European directives in 
national laws, the new instrument should shift from minimum to full harmonization. Of 
course, this approach would modify the level of consumer protection in some Member 
States. Moreover, it would transfer to the European institutions most of the powers in 
the field of consumer protection.  
At the moment, it is unclear whether such proposal will be widely supported. 
However, a horizontal instrument is not incompatible with, and could even simplify the 
adoption of, a European standard contract. If a substantial uniformity could be achieved 
on the side of unfair terms, the negotiation of a standard contract would not have to 
worry about national differences. Of course, the lack of representative organizations 
would still be a problem. However, it must be noted that interesting experiences of 
standardization have already taken place in energy markets. The European Federation of 
Energy Traders (EFET) has drafted a standard contract for the wholesale electricity 
market since 2000.138 In the US, the North American Energy Standard Boards (NAESB) 
is developing standard rules for retail contracts in the electricity and gas sectors.139 
These examples suggest that the task of developing standard terms for liberalized 
energy markets does not face insurmountable obstacles. The strategy of co-regulation, 
in which the public authorities help to organize consumer groups, provide technical 
                                                 
137 See WHITTAKER  (2006). Further reflections on this topic can be found in MCKENDRICK (2004) and 
COLLINS et al. (forthcoming 2007).  
138 The text is available at www.efet.org . 
139 See the materials available at www.naesb.org . On the role of NAESB see, generally, BOSWELL  e 
CARGAS (2006).  
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assistance and compel compliance with standardized terms could be the best starting 
point for this innovative solution.  
Even though collective bargaining procedures prove to be unavailable, the 
economic analysis of contract and corporate default rules suggests another route to 
standardization. The central idea is to exploit the signalling power of penalty default 
rules.140 In general, they are rules laid down by legislators or regulators with the explicit 
intention to favour one category of contracting parties. They can be contracted around 
by those that prefer different solutions, but the bargaining activity required to achieve 
such result forces the disfavoured party to disclose her private information. Now 
suppose that the Commission or NRAs enact a standard residential energy contract 
strongly unbalanced in favour of energy consumers. It could become a penalty default 
rule energy companies are free to contract around. However, their decision not to adhere 
to the official standard should be adequately publicized. For example, those companies 
that do not contract around can put a certification mark on their website and their 
bills.141 Conversely, those companies that do contract around should inform their 
customers with an explicit statement to be displayed on their websites and bills. The 
foreseeable effect of such measure is that many energy companies will not opt out of the 
official standard and could even turn it in a marketing tool.   
At the end of the day, it is clear that a truly European energy market cannot tolerate 
wide divergences in retail contracts. 
 
7.4 Evaluation  
 
  This chapter shows that most partner countries supplement general contract and 
consumer law with more specific protective measures. Of course, such measures can 
partly be explained by the lack of competition in those countries that did not complete 
the liberalization of residential markets. However, we can also uncover additional 
reasons why general contract and consumer law risks being inadequate to protect energy 
consumers. Its rules usually employ vague formulas aimed at catching many different 
unfair practices. Therefore, they leave to the judge the task to interpret their meaning ex 
                                                 
140 This notion was first discussed by AYRES e GERTNER (1989). See also AYRES (2006). 
141 This is akin to the marks widely adopted in electronic commerce to foster trust: see, e.g., HADFIELD 
(2005). 
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post. Such a control strategy inevitably produces a state of uncertainty until enough 
cases are litigated and dominant interpretations become settled. It is suggested that 
newly born residential energy markets can not tolerate any uncertainty as to the fairness 
of the most important contractual terms.  
The inquiry in the CLAB database highlights an additional problem. Differences in 
the interpretation of unfair terms statutes by national courts lead to diverging 
assessments of the most common terms in energy contracts. It cannot be excluded that 
such differences could hamper the development of competition on a continental level. A 
European standard contract could be the answer, but its drafting is far from easy.  
      Another and more fundamental reason for regulatory interventions on contract terms 
is the difference between protecting consumers and fostering competition. While the 
two objectives frequently overlap, it is by no means clear that it is always so. Take, for 
example, consumers’ termination rights in energy supply contracts. Allowing the 
consumer to exit from the contract at any moment frees her from the constraints of 
unfair terms, but could hamper those suppliers who would like to offer fixed term, fixed 
price contracts. Because of the possible conflict between competition and consumer 
protection, it would be preferable to give NRAs the power to regulate ex-ante the most 
important terms. Relying exclusively on the ex-post assessment of generalist courts 
without a detailed knowledge of energy markets could result in less balanced outcomes. 
A good example of the kind of considerations needed to assess the relationship between 
price and contractual obligations can be found in the study of the Belgian federal 
regulator mentioned in paragraph 7.2.1 above. 
      Several suggestions can be drawn from the above remarks. As far as the consumers’ 
termination rights are concerned, behavioral biases, search and switching costs all push 
in direction of too much inertia. At least in the first period after complete opening of the 
residential markets it would be preferable to forbid any constraint on termination. There 
is no reason to suppose that, because of such measure, suppliers will not be able to tailor 
their offers to customers’ preferences. No one will terminate a long term contract that 
shields from price volatility, provided it does not deviate too much from wholesale 
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prices. Of course, suppliers will bear some additional market risk, but they are in the 
best position to cover against it through financial instruments.142 
     Disconnections procedures are strongly intertwined with the presence of a supplier 
of last resort and with measures aimed at protecting vulnerable customers. While 
forbidding disconnection would impose too much risk on suppliers, it would be useful 
to draw some guidelines as to the procedure to be followed for those consumers who 
cannot afford to pay their bills. Useful examples are the guidelines for preventing debt 
and disconnection published by Ofgem in January 2003 and the industry-wide safety net 
procedure for vulnerable consumers developed by the British Energy Retail association 
in 2004.  
     Finally, unilateral modifications could be uniformly regulated across Europe. The 
main points of such regulation should be laid down as indicated in paragraph 7.2.3 
above. 
                                                 
142 See ROSSI (1998)  for considerations about the informative advantage of suppliers as to the evolution 
of market prices.  
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8. Quality of supply 
 
This chapter discusses the regulation of continuity of supply and commercial 
quality in partner countries. We first describe the main characteristics of quality 
regulation in each country, then try to assess its impact on consumers’ welfare. Finally, 
we describe the measure and type of compensation paid to energy consumers when 
quality standards are not met. The analysis in this chapter draws in part on CEER and 
ERGEG reports, but tries to update and complement it whenever possible.  
 
8.1 Quality regulation in partner countries 
 
Table 8.1 below shows that most partner countries provide for some kind of quality 
regulation. However, the details vary widely from one country to another. These 
differences have been already underscored in CEER Reports. We now summarize the 
main legislative and regulatory provisions for each partner country.  
 
Table 8.1 – Quality regulation in partner countries 
Country  Continuity Commercial Quality 
Austria  No  Yes  
Belgium Yes  Yes  
Bulgaria Yes  No  
Czech Republic Yes  Yes  
Finland Yes  Yes  
Greece No  No  
Italy Yes  Yes  
Lithuania Yes  Yes  
Slovak Republic Yes  No 
 
In Austria E-Control does not have the power to regulate continuity of supply. 
However, statistics about interruptions and outages are collected. New legislation on 
commercial quality was enacted in 2006. 
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In Belgium the regional legislators included continuity and quality of supply among 
the public services obligations the distributors shall implement. In the Walloon Region 
the technical regulations for the electricity and gas distribution networks ask the 
network operator to send CWAPA an annual report which includes information about 
continuity and quality of supply.143 In the Flemish Region the VREG audited the 
procedures applied by the distributors to collect data on quality performance. The 
results were used to draft a service level agreement with key performance indicators.  
In Bulgaria art. 4(2.4) Law on Energy gives the Minister of Energy the power to 
issue orders defining the indicators on the reliability of electricity supply. In the gas 
sector art. 190 states that operators of distribution networks shall ensure distribution of 
natural gas to consumers while adhering to safety instructions and quality requirements. 
Terms and conditions for activities of transmission and distribution networks operators 
shall be stipulated in an Ordinance issued by the Minister of Energy. According to art. 
21.12 SEWRC develops and controls compliance with the rules on supply of electricity, 
heat energy and natural gas to consumers, including the quality of service standards. 
Art. 88 of the 2004 Ordinance on licensing of activities in the energy sector provides 
that quality of supply indices shall be determined by resolution of the Commission. The 
particular values of the quality indices and the time frame for reaching these normative 
values shall be determined for every licensee by resolution of the Commission and shall 
become provisions of the license. Finally, chapter eight of the Grid Code establishes the 
procedures the Power System Operator shall follow for managing the quality of the 
power system.  
In the Czech Republic sec. 17(7)(a) Energy Act 2000 gives ERU the power to lay 
down regulations on the required quality of the supplies and services relating to the 
regulated activities in the electricity and the gas sector, including the amount of 
compensation for non-compliance with quality standards, time limits for claiming the 
entitlement to receive compensation, and procedures for the reporting on compliance 
with the quality of supplies and services. Quality standards were strengthened by the 
new regulations for electricity (n. 540/2005) and gas (n.643/2004).  
                                                 
143 See sec 5 of Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon of 16 October 2003 relatif au règlement technique pour 
la gestion des réseaux de distribution d’électricité en Région wallonne et l’accès à ceux-ci; sec. 5 of 
Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon of 18 November 2004 relatif au règlement technique pour la gestion des 
réseaux de distribution de gaz et l’accès à ceux-ci.  
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In Finland the Electricity Market Act states that the system operator has an 
obligation to develop the electricity system, which means that it has to secure the supply 
of sufficiently high-standard electricity to its customers (sec. 9).  Moreover, the Act 
provides for standard compensation upon delay in connection and for interruptions.144 
In Greece as regards the Transmission System, specific procedures, indicators etc, 
for quality of service regulation are not stipulated, since it is rare for power quality on 
the Transmission System to become a ruling factor on service quality of downstream 
distribution networks and their customers. Such regulation falls under the general 
authorities vested in the Regulator, with respect to monitoring and assessing the 
performance of HTSO in carrying out system and market operation. Network 
performance and quality of service standards and obligations have not yet been set for 
the Distribution System Operator, due to the lack of the Distribution Network Code, 
which is currently under preparation and is expected to be enforced by mid-2007. Under 
the existing legislation, there is no procedure for the formal evaluation of the quality of 
service offered either by the Transmission or the Distribution system operators. 
In Italy an advanced system of quality regulation has been introduced since 2000, 
both in the electricity and the gas sectors.145 As to the former, rules concerning 
unplanned interruptions of more than three minutes (defined as “long interruptions”) 
were introduced for the period 2000-2003 with Aeeg res. n. 202/1999, subsequently 
updated by Aeeg res. n. 4/04. Two objectives loomed large in the new regulations: 1) to 
bring the average continuity standard in Italy closer to the best average levels found in 
other European countries, in a time as short as possible; 2) to reduce the gaps among 
Italian regions after adjusting for the degree of user concentration, without impairing the 
situation in regions that currently have the best continuity standards. Aeeg laid down a 
system of distributor incentives and fines, determined in relation to the specific 
continuity target set for each year. The mechanism also provides incentives for areas 
that improve beyond their targets, and fines for those whose results are negative, with a 
5 percent leeway in either direction that gives rise neither to incentives nor penalties. 
New incentive mechanisms for short (less than three minutes) and prolonged or 
extended interruptions will be introduced in 2007. 
                                                 
144 On quality regulation in Finland see also TAHVANAINEN (2004). 
145 For an evaluation of the Italian system of quality regulation see AJODHIA  et al. (2006). 
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In the gas sector the continuity aspect of the service is regulated together with 
safety. Safety refers to the protection of people and things from damage due to 
explosions, bursts and fires caused by distributed gas. Key safety features include the 
artificial odourization of gas so that its presence in the air can be detected; the reduction 
of gas leaks through the inspection of distribution networks and the cathode protection 
of steel pipes; and the establishment of an emergency response service. 
In late 2000, the Authority issued res. n. 236/00, which established regulations for 
the safety and continuity of the gas distribution service. The resolution introduced a 
system of obligations and checks to regulate the safety and continuity of the service, and 
set country-wide basic and benchmark levels for each of the safety and continuity 
indicators for 2002-2003. Distributors were encouraged to improve their safety and 
continuity standards through the Authority’s publication of comparative data on the 
levels achieved and of the scores, broken down by indicator, for each plant and 
distributor. 
For the second regulatory period Aeeg res. n. 168/04 improved safety standards: in 
addition to the mandatory scheduled pipe inspections for the detection of gas leaks, the 
regulations introduce response time monitoring for the elimination of gas leaks at 
installations and meters, and fines for companies whose emergency response teams fail 
to reach the site of the problem within the maximum allotted time. Also, to reduce the 
risk of gas leaks, old cast iron pipes will have to be entirely replaced or restored within 
a 10-year time frame, and at least 30% of that work will have to be completed within the 
next four years. Monitoring is now in place for gas utility call centres, with a greater 
focus on complaints and on indemnities paid to end customers for the sake of easier 
comparison of utilities; the ultimate purpose of this is to help consumers choose the gas 
company that best suits their needs. The quality data submitted by utilities will be more 
easily verified through a new, standardized data control method, and companies that fail 
to comply with the Authority's directives will be fined.  
Aeeg dec. n. 243/05 introduced a system of incentives for improvements to the 
security of the natural gas distribution service. This rewards virtuous conduct by 
operators providing a service featuring higher security standards than the minimum 
standards established by dec. n. 168/04. The new system of incentives rewards 
reductions in gas leaks, increased numbers of checks on the degree of odourisation, and 
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a reduction in the number of gas-related incidents in distribution plants. For 2006-08, 
participation by distributors is voluntary, while from 2009 the system will gradually 
become compulsory, with the incentives being accompanied by penalties for failure to 
achieve the obligatory pre-determined improvement standards. 
The incentive scheme has two components: the first related to odourisation (rewards 
for operators carrying out more than the minimum annual number of checks set by the 
Aeeg) and the second related to leaks (rewards for reductions in the numbers of leaks 
located following reports by third parties). For the component relating to leaks, an 
annual improvement rate has been set with respect to the average level for the period 
2003-04. To apply these incentives, distribution plants are divided up on the basis of 
concentration of consumers connected to their networks. For each of the three 
categories (high, medium and low density) and with reference to the component 
envisaged for leaks, target levels have been set for attainment by 2016, along with 
benchmark levels (of excellence) above which rewards are not given. These target and 
benchmark levels will be reviewed and possibly revised at the end of the three-year 
period 2006-08 in the light of the improvements actually achieved. In the event of a gas-
related incident for which the distributor can be held responsible occurring in a 
distribution plant, a penalty equating to the reward applicable to that plant will be 
applied. The Aeeg’s provision envisages a ceiling on the incentives allowable, 
amounting to 2% of the distribution revenue constraint approved by the Aeeg. 
Commercial quality standards have been laid down by Aeeg in the electricity and 
gas sectors. The main features of the regulatory framework are: 1) national standards of 
quality that apply to all utilities; 2) automatic refunds paid by utilities that fail to meet 
guaranteed quality standards for any reason other than force majeure or causes 
attributable to the customer or third parties; 3) procedures for recording speed of service 
are now uniform, eliminating the discrepancies in measurement between one utility and 
another.  
In the electricity sector, standards of commercial quality were revised with the 
unified code  on quality issued with Aeeg res. n. 4/05. New and more specific standards 
were introduced to monitor different dimensions of electric services. In 2007 new 
standards for telephone services will be introduced. In the gas sector the regulation of 
commercial quality was first introduced with Aeeg res. n. 47/00. In the second 
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regulatory period it was superseded by the unified code for the quality of gas services, 
issued with Aeeg res. n. 168/04. 
In Lithuania on July 15, 2005 the Ministry of Economy issued the Order no. 4-265, 
approving the Electricity Transmission and Distribution Reliability and Supply Service 
Quality Rules, setting the quality of service standards and requirements for the 
monitoring of the consequent indicators. National Control Commission for Prices and 
Energy (NCC) is empowered by the Law on Electricity to monitor the transmission and 
distribution reliability and supply service quality standards and control the compliance 
of the network companies with the above standards. It is planned that the Commission 
will evaluate compliance with the quality of service standards setting the next price caps 
for the network companies in 2008. 
In the gas sector, pursuant to the Rules for Transmission, Distribution, Storage and 
Supply of Natural Gas approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Ministry of Economy is authorized to approve the quality requirements for licensed 
activities, and the NCC – to ensure the control over fulfillment of the aforementioned 
requirements. The Quality Requirements for the Licensed Activity Services have not 
been still prepared. However, the price cap methodology laid down by NCC in 2005 
provides an incentive mechanism that reduces the standard profit margin to the firms 
with worsening service quality and continuity of supply.  
In the Slovak Republic sec. 15 Energy Act 2004 gives the Ministry of Economy 
the power to impose on energy companies obligations in the general economic interest. 
Such obligations can be related to security, reliability and quality of electricity and gas 
supply. URSO started to work on a regulation laying down the quality of transmission 
and distribution of electricity and provided services in the power sector. The 
methodology for standard indicators SAIDI, SAIFI which quantify fulfilment of this 
task has been developed. After consultations with experts analyses of share of SAIDI 
and SAIFI were made according to voltage levels. Success rate of measures adopted by 
the relevant distribution companies is demonstrated by evaluation of SAIDI and SAIFI 
indicators. In the gas sector, in connection with securing quality of performance of the 
network operators, the Office regulation on quality standards of supplied products and 
provided services in the gas sector is currently prepared for approval. This regulation 
deals also with the issue of quality indicators. 
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8.2 The impact of quality regulation on consumers’ welfare 
 
As emphasized by CEER Reports, reliable measurement protocols are crucial for 
quality regulation. They are the preliminary step for setting standards and introducing 
incentive systems. Moreover, the publication of data on continuity and commercial 
quality allows both the regulators and final customers to control for the impact of the 
liberalization process on these two aspects. Unfortunately, only a few partner countries 
make available to the public  data on quality of supply. Therefore, we can only make a 
tentative assessment of the benefits gained by energy consumers since the beginning of 
the liberalization process. As far as continuity of supply is concerned, the performances 
of the best European countries, reported by CEER, can be employed as a benchmark. 
The two most important indicators for continuity are SAIDI (System Average Duration 
Interruption Index), which shows how long, in a given year, energy is not supplied, and 
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index), which shows how many times 
in a year energy is not supplied. For SAIDI the best performances are below 100 
minutes per year, for SAIFI the best performances are about 2 interruptions per year. 
Let’s now turn to the analysis of data from partner countries. 
In Austria E-Control reports that in 2004 average unplanned interruptions per 
customer were 30.33 minutes (51.04 including planned interruptions), with an 
improvement from 2002. According to CEER, in the same year no other country 
performed better than Austria on this indicator.146 In 2005 mean non-availability caused 
by unplanned interruptions was 31.35 mins/year. 
An entirely new development was the introduction of standards for the commercial 
quality of system services on distribution systems in the gas market rules that came into 
force on 1st January 2007. They included the principle whereby it will be possible to 
obtain independent certification of compliance with quality standards. 
In Belgium there weren’t any significant variations in the continuity indicators after 
the beginning of the liberalization process. In the Flemish Region in 2004 the average 
number of interruptions per customer were 0,527, with average duration of  41 minutes 
and 47 seconds. In the same year the average time lost was 22 minutes and 13 seconds. 
                                                 
146 See CEER (2005a, p. 116). 
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In the Walloon Region the average time lost in 2005 was 67,55 minutes. In the 
Brussels-Capital Region the average time lost in 2004 was 22,11 minutes in 2004, 
which decreased to 21,38 in 2005.147 
In the Czech Republic some improvements of continuity of energy services after 
the beginning of the liberalization process are reported. The distributors started to 
compete among them and made efforts to attract more customers. There are less failures 
of supply, the renewal is faster, there is more  information available on websites. For the 
three largest electricity distributors, in the voltage level of households (up to 1kV) 
SAIDI values range from 46 to 5.518 minutes per year. SAIFI values range from 0.308 
to 1.014.148  
In the gas sector the transport, distribution and storage operators are obligated to 
submit a report once a year on the quality and maintenance of the transmission and 
distribution systems and UGS facilities pursuant to Section 58, subsection 9(y), Section 
59, subsection 8(z), and Section 60, subsection 7(p) of the Energy Act. The content of 
these reports is specified in the MIT’s and ERO’s Common Methodological Guidelines 
(on the content of reports to be submitted by the TSOs, DSOs and SSOs on the quality 
and maintenance of the installations they operate), which are publicly available on the 
respective websites. No serious problems with service quality have been reported to 
date. 
In Finland average interruption time per customer was 174 minutes in 2005 
(including planned and unplanned interruptions), higher than in previous years. Because 
of the relevance of external events (weather or animals) it is not clear whether this 
performance could be improved with a stricter quality regulation. A survey conducted 
by Epsi Rating in 2005 measured customer satisfaction on various dimensions of 
service quality, like information during power cuts and complaint handling. No 
company reached the top of the scale and some fared quite badly.  
In Greece there are conflicting data on continuity of supply. On one hand, RAE 
reports that in 2003 there were 13,904 minutes of unplanned interruptions per customer, 
while 8,081 minutes per customer were lost because of planned interruptions. On the 
other hand, CEER reports that in 2003 there were 108 minutes lost for unplanned 
                                                 
147 CREG, Rapport Annuel 2005  cit., p. 22f.. 
148 The Czech Republic’s National Report on the Electricity and Gas Industries for 2005, July 2006, p. 15. 
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interruptions and 87 minutes lost for planned interruptions.149 It is plausible to suppose 
that such differences are due to the lack of reliable measurement protocols. In any case, 
there aren’t historical data that allow to verify whether continuity of supply has been 
improving in the last years. As far as commercial quality is concerned, percentages of 
failure rate for the most important standards are reported by the former monopolist, but 
they cannot be verified by RAE.150 
In Italy the results achieved during the first phase of economic regulation for long, 
unplanned blackouts indicate that the rules were effective in reducing the number and 
length of power outages. The new system has also been highly successful in reducing 
geographical disparities, especially between the northern regions and those in central 
and southern Italy. The continuity figures show that the total length of outage per 
customer, counting both short and long, unplanned interruptions, fell from 104 minutes 
lost in 2003 to 64 minutes lost in 2006, with an improvement from 1999 of 67%. The 
improvement in the total blackout duration per customer also entailed a benefit in terms 
of the number of interruptions per customer, which dropped from 2,7 in 2003 to 2.39 in 
2006 (37% less since 1999).151 It should be added that the improvement in service 
raised tariffs by very little. On the basis of a simulation conducted by Aeeg, for the 
entire period 2000-2003 the estimated tariff hike due to the incentives, net of fines paid 
by utilities that fail to meet their continuity targets, was less than three euro per year per 
customer.  
 Regulation of continuity in the gas sector achieved moderately successful results. 
From 2002 to 2003 the total number of long and short interruptions and of customers 
involved increased, but in 2004 there was a reduction of about 24% in the total number 
of interruptions and of about 25% in the number of customers involved. In 2005 a new 
incentive system was introduced that takes into account the percentage of network 
inspections, the number of emergency calls and the average response time and the 
number of leaks. 
As far as commercial quality is concerned, in the electricity sector it seems that 
Aeeg pushed firms to improve their performance.152 Compared to the pre-liberalization 
                                                 
149 See, respectively, RAE, Annual Report 2005 to the European Commission, p. 16 and CEER (2005a, p. 
116).  
150 See ERGEG (2005a, p. 14). 
151 Data on continuity of supply are available on the AEEG’S website. 
152 See the data reported in AEEG, Annual Report 2006, p. 50f.. 
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period, the number of refunds actually paid to customers because of substandard service 
has risen sharply. Moreover, in 2005 the cases of non-compliance with guaranteed 
quality standards are generally lower than 4.5% and, for several types of services 
(connections and disconnections, punctuality as far as personalized appointments are 
concerned), it is lower than 1%. The standard relating to invoicing was introduced 
during 2004 as a guaranteed standard which is subject to compensation, to remedy the 
critical points stemming from the use of the previous guaranteed standard on deadlines; 
the move from an overall to a guaranteed standard seems to have produced positive 
effects, given that as early as 2005 there was a significant reduction in the percentages 
of non-compliance with the standard (from 15% to less than 11%), while further 
improvements are expected in the coming years. 
As far as the average time for the completion of the service is concerned, in 2005 it 
was about 2/3 of the maximum time set by the regulator. In the same year, overall 
standards were generally respected. The only exceptions were the time for responses to 
complaints and requests of information on distribution and voltage checking. 
In the gas sector the new regime had a positive impact: in the 2001-2005 period 
there is a clear declining trend in substandard services, in spite of an increase in the 
number of services requested. In contrast, there was a mild improvement in service 
connections. For all of the services subject to guaranteed or overall standards, the 
Authority checked the actual average execution time based on the figures provided by 
the operators. The actual average times for the services subject to guaranteed standards 
are equal to 50% of the standards set by the Authority. For estimates and the execution 
of works, the phenomenon is even more accentuated. With regard to the management of 
complaints received by suppliers, the standard set by the Authority, according to which 
at least 90 percent of written complaints or written requests for information be 
responded to within 20 working days, was generally adopted. Refunds paid to 
customers increased significantly. 
In Lithuania a significant increase in the average number of minutes lost and 
number of interruptions per electricity customer was registered between 2002 and 2004. 
Worsening of continuity of supply can partly be explained by the introduction of more 
reliable measurement systems. However, actual data were very far from the best 
performing European countries. In 2005 the SAIDI (System Average Interruption 
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Duration Index) was 147 and 600 minutes for the two most important regional 
distributors, while the SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) was 1.1 
and 2.4, respectively.153 There were no significant improvements with respect to the 
previous year. 
In the gas sector, after inspection of principles for collection and classification of 
information on the planned and unplanned gas supply interruptions and reviewing the 
reporting of such information, from 2004 on, the largest natural gas undertaking in 
Lithuania Lietuvos Dujos AB started including the reports on short-term gas supply 
interruptions due to technical inspections of gas systems in buildings into its accounting 
system of data about the planned gas supply interruptions.  
In 2005 the average planned natural gas supply interruption number was 0.2335 
per system user and the average duration of such planned interruptions was 2.0658 
minute. The average number of unplanned gas supply interruptions was 0.00512 per 
system user, whereas the average duration of such unplanned interruptions was 0.1395 
minute per system user. In 2004 the average duration of unplanned supply 
disconnections per system customer was 0,064 minutes, while the average number of 
unplanned supply disconnections per system customer was 0.005 minutes. The 
restoration of the supply of natural gas to 99.8 percent of all customers was effected in 
less than 8 hours, for the remaining customers, in less than within 24 hours. In carrying 
out the planned disconnections of supply, the supply of natural gas in all cases was 
restored before than it was scheduled.  
As to commercial quality, in 2004 64 percent of the applications of the 
customers received by Lietuvos Dujos AB requesting to connect to the distribution gas-
main were examined in less than 30 days. Sixty-nine percent of the applications of 
customers were satisfied, 70 percent of the customer system connection agreements 
were fulfilled within the prescribed period, whereas 7.5 percent remained not fulfilled 
within the foreseen term due to the fault of customers. 
In the Slovak Republic the Office has at its disposal data for the Central 
Slovakian regional distribution company, SSE, a. s., for which in 2005 SAIDI 
represented 192.15 min per customer and SAIFI=3.59 long failures (failures with the 
                                                 
153 Annual Report on Electricity and Gas Markets in Lithuania Prepared for the European Commission, 
Vilnius, 2006, p. 22ff.. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
141
duration exceeding 3 minutes) per customer. These indicators are average per customer 
and all voltage levels. 
 
8.3 Compensation provided to residential consumers 
 
It is clear that quality regulation would be useless if firms would not be penalized 
when they do not comply with the standards. Two mechanisms can be devised to this 
end: an incentive system, such as that laid down in Italy, that sets up fines and 
incentives for distribution companies, or refunds to be paid to damaged customers. 
These two mechanisms are often combined. In this paragraph we are interested in 
describing the rules that give residential consumers the right to be compensated when 
energy companies do not comply with quality standards. These rules are usually laid 
down in the energy statutes and regulations, but sometimes general contract and tort law 
can be invoked.  
In Austria there is no system for the reimbursement or compensation of residential 
consumers in case of justified complaints. However, sec. 34 of the Natural Gas Act 
provides that transmission and distribution undertakings shall be liable for any damages 
arising in the course of operating their plants inasmuch as persons are killed or 
physically injured or their health is impaired or property is damaged. Specific limits to 
liability have been established in sec. 35, but they apply without prejudice to any other 
provisions under which system operators are liable for higher losses than under the 
provisions of the Natural Gas Act. 
In Belgium continuity of supply is included among the public service obligations of 
distributors in the three regions. In the Walloon Region any damages suffered by 
customers because of outages or voltage disturbances must be charged to the distributor, 
with the only exception of force majeure cases.154 According to the model regulation for 
electricity supply to captive low voltage customers laid down by CREG in 2003, the 
distributor must pay damages if the client gives proof of its fault, of the measure of 
                                                 
154 See sec. 18(3) of Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon 30 March 2006 relatif aux obligations de service 
public dans le marché de l'électricité and sec. 19(3) of Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon 30 March 2006 
relatif aux obligations de service public dans le marché du gaz.  
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damages and of the causation link. In case of damages to things, they must be paid by 
the distributor if exceeding a threshold of 245 euro.155  
In Bulgaria continuity and commercial quality standards are included in the general 
conditions written by energy companies and approved by SEWRC. Moreover, the law 
on energy states that energy companies are not liable to pay compensation for damages, 
caused by a scheduled outage regime, temporary interruption or limitation of generation 
or supply of electricity, heat energy and natural gas, except for the cases when 
breakdowns or lasting shortages have occurred through their fault.156 
In the Czech Republic ERU Public Notices No. 18/2002, on the conditions for 
connection and electricity transport in the electricity system, and No. 540/2005, on the 
quality of supplies and related services in the electricity industry, provide for the TSO’s 
and DSOs’ obligation to connect customers and continuously supply them with 
electricity at a high level of quality. Low voltage customers disconnected for more than 
18 hours (12 hours for high voltage customers) can claim a compensation within five 
working days. Its amount corresponds to 10% of yearly payments for distribution, with 
a maximum of 150 euro for LV and 300 euro for HV customers. Compensation ranging 
from 15 to 160 euro can also be requested when energy companies do not comply with 
other quality standards. Section 25(8) Energy Act 2000 excludes the liability of the 
distributor when he is entitled to limit or interrupt the supply of electricity because of 
emergency or system reliability problems. However, this provision shall not apply if the 
distributor fails to give notice fifteen days in advance or does not remove defects in 
distribution or transmission facilities.  
In the gas sector an ERO public notice is being drafted for the legislative process; it 
will focus in detail on the monitoring, assessment and publication of the quality 
standards prescribed, and on the penalisation of failures to keep such standards. It will 
contain similar quality-related provisions as the one on quality standards in the 
electricity industry currently in place. 
                                                 
155 EURELECTRIC (2004, p. 28) points out that in case the client concludes the access contract the liability 
of both parties is limited to compensation for direct material damage resulting from intentional fault or 
gross negligence and excluding indirect or subsequent damage (loss of production, loss of income or loss 
of profit). The liability will be limited to an annual amount of 5 % of the year invoice. See also the 
limitation of distributors’ liability included in the II and III Annexes to the technical regulation for the 
distribution network, approved by the arrêté du Gouvernement de la Région  de Bruxelles-Capitale 13 
juillet 2006. 
156  See art. 74 law on energy.  
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In Finland the Electricity Market Act contains provisions about interruption of 
supply, faulty supply and delay in connection. According to sec. 27f, the user of 
electricity is entitled to standard compensation for continuous interruption of system 
service, if the distribution system operator or retailer that sells electricity to users of 
electricity through an internal electricity system of a real estate or a corresponding 
group of real estates does not demonstrate that the interruption of the system service is 
the result of an obstacle beyond its possibilities of influence and that cannot reasonably 
be expected to be taken into account in its operations and whose consequences it could 
not have avoided or overcome by exercising due diligence.  
The amount of the standard compensation of the annual system service fee of the 
user of electricity is:  
(1) 10 per cent, when the interruption time has been at least 12 hours, but 
less than 24 hours;  
(2) 25 per cent, when the interruption time has been at least 24 hours, but 
less than 72 hours;  
(3) 50 per cent, when the interruption time has been at least 72 hours, but 
less than 120 hours; and  
(4) 100 per cent, when the interruption time has been at least 120 hours.  
The maximum amount of the standard compensation because of interruption is, 
however, 700 euros per user of electricity. The maximum amount of the standard 
compensation can be adjusted by Government decree to the change in the value of 
money.  
According to sec. 27c, any supply of electricity is faulty, if the quality of electricity 
or the method of supply does not correspond to what can be considered to be agreed 
upon. Unless otherwise agreed, the supply of electricity is faulty, if the quality of the 
electricity does not correspond to the standards adhered to in Finland or if there have 
been continuous or repeated interruptions in the supply of electricity, and these 
interruptions cannot be considered minor when taking into account their reason and 
circumstances. In case of fault, sec. 27d gives users of electricity the right to a price 
reduction proportionate to the fault. If the fault is based on interruption of electricity 
supply, the price reduction shall be at least the sum that corresponds to two weeks’ 
share of the annual system service fee. Such reduction is excluded if the user has the 
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right to the standard compensation established in sec. 27f. Additional compensation can 
also be claimed (sec. 27e), but indirect damages are allowed only if there is negligence 
on the part of the distributor or retailer. 
In case of delay in connection attributable to the distributor or the retailer, the user 
of electricity has three remedies: firstly, he can withhold payment until the connection 
has been made. After the connection has been made, the connecting party has the right 
to withhold such part of the fee as is needed to serve as security for a claim for 
compensation based on the delay (sec. 27). Secondly, the user is entitled to a standard 
compensation. For each beginning week during the first two weeks of delay, the 
compensation is 5 per cent of the connection fee. Thereafter, the compensation is 10 per 
cent of the connection week for each beginning week of delay. The maximum sum of 
the standard compensation is 30 per cent of the connection fee. It is, however, 1,700 
euros at maximum (sec. 27a). Thirdly, the connecting party and the user of electricity 
are entitled to receive compensation for damage suffered because of delay, unless the 
distribution system operator or retailer that is party to the contract can show that the 
delay is caused by an obstacle that is beyond its control and that it cannot reasonably be 
expected to have taken into account when concluding the contract and that has had 
consequences which it could not have reasonably avoided or overcome (sec. 27b). The 
distribution system operator or retailer is required to compensate for indirect damage 
only if the delay or damage is caused by negligence on its part. This compensation can 
be added to the standard compensation provided by sec. 27a. Finally, sec. 44 states that 
whoever causes damage to another through an act or omission in contravention of the 
obligation to connect, to transmit and to deliver, or because of an interruption of 
electricity supply for a reason attributable to the user of electricity, shall compensate for 
the damages thus caused.  
Terms concerning liability for interruptions are also contained in the general 
conditions for electricity sale drafted by the branch organization SENER (SME 99). The 
electricity vendor is not liable for the fault within network service (interruptions in 
delivery and quality faults). If the user’s electricity delivery is interrupted or stopped 
against the conditions of sale contract due to a fault from the vendor’s part, the vendor 
is liable for the damage thus created. The user has a right to have a compensation for an 
indirect damage only if the damage is caused by negligence on vendor’s part. If the user 
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is not a consumer and there is no agreement, the vendor’s liability for indirect damages 
is at most the sum that corresponds to the amount of one year’s electricity sales tariffs, 
however at most EUR 8,409.40. If the vendor has caused the damage on purpose or by 
gross negligence the cap will not be applied. A consumer is also entitled to receive 
compensation for damage caused to his/her family or a member of a family on the same 
grounds than for a damage caused to him/herself.157 
In Greece there aren’t any specific provisions (besides general contract or tort law) 
on the compensation of customers in case of interruptions or other quality failures. 
In Italy automatic refunds must be paid to HV and MV customers when distributors 
do not comply with standard imposing the maximum number of interruptions per 
year.158 Following some major interruptions caused by exceptional weather events in 
the winter of 2003-'04 and the blackout of 28 September 2003, in May 2005 the Aeeg 
started a consultation process issuing a document that describes possible criteria and 
presents initial recommendations for a system of refunds to be paid to customers for 
long and widespread interruptions of service.  The Authority recommends that 
customers be awarded a refund if the interruption extends beyond the resumption of 
service deadlines it has established. Exemptions from these deadlines would only be 
allowed for areas that are evacuated by order of the authorities. 
 If power is not restored by the deadline, customers would receive refunds in 
proportion to the length of the interruption. The Authority suggests the following 
approximate amounts: for residential customers, €30 if the standard redemption period 
was not complied with, to be increased by €15 for each subsequent 4-hours period. 
Non-residential customers would be entitled to higher refunds, partly in proportion to 
kW of available power. There would be caps on the refunds, which would be paid 
automatically and on a forfeit basis, without prejudice to the customer's right to seek 
damages through the courts or to institute arbitration.159 
Failure to comply with commercial quality standards entitles customers to receive 
automatic refunds. The amount of refunds is defined by the Authority, and is higher for 
the categories of users who pay more for energy and use of the network. In the second 
                                                 
157 See EURELECTRIC (2004, p. 52). 
158 See sec. 32 and 33 Aeeg dec. n. 4/04. This provision applies from 2007.  
159 See consultation documents of May 2005, June 2006 and January 2007. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
146
regulatory period (2004-2007) it was set at € 30 for domestic customers.160 Automatic 
refunds must be given by deducting the amount due from the first subsequent bill, and 
in any case within 90 calendar days from the initial deadline for providing the requested 
service. A utility that fails to meet the refund deadline has to pay double or quintuple 
the standard amount, depending on the extent of the delay. Payment of the automatic 
refund does not prevent the customer from seeking additional damages in court. A 
special notice to that effect is printed on the bill from which the refund is deducted. 
The Italian blackout of 28 September, 2003 caused the disconnection of 32 millions 
households. In some parts of the country the average duration of the outage was above 
1000 minutes lost per LV customer. 30.000 of them claimed pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary damages from former monopolist Enel and the transmission network 
operator before justices of peace. While claims against the network operator were 
generally rejected, most of those filed against Enel were successful. However, appeal 
courts seem to impose to customers heavier burdens of proof, disallowing damages 
already granted in the first instance.161   
Enel’s general conditions for electricity supply list the causes that allow the supplier 
to cut power: objective danger, organizational reasons (e.g. repairs, maintenance and 
rebuilding of facilities), security reasons, force majeure. In these cases clients cannot 
claim damages or terminate the contract. However, Italian case law suggests that 
suppliers’ liability is judged according to general rules on contractual liability contained 
in the civil code.  
In Lithuania in case electricity supply is interrupted or restricted to a user or 
electricity quality parameters on the site of provision of electricity transmission or 
distribution services are not in compliance with the ones specified in respective service 
sales and purchase agreement, the operator or supplier reimburses the direct damages 
incurred by such user. The operator or supplier is not bound for reimbursement of such 
damages to the user, when electricity supply is interrupted or restricted, or electricity 
quality parameters contravene the contractual ones due to the impact caused by the Acts 
of God or fire, war, acts of terror, Force Majeure, third person’s activities (electricity 
theft, equipment impairment, when side items fall on overhead electricity lines, etc.), 
system pre-emergency automation effect (in cases of breakdowns or failures in other 
                                                 
160  See tab. 7 in Aeeg res. n. 4/05 for electricity and sec. 53 Aeeg dec. n. 168/04 for gas. 
161 See the analysis of the case law in BELLANTUONO (2006). 
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energy systems), due to acts of the state authorities, or when a single interruption time 
for a user does not exceed the longest allowable disconnection time for that particular 
continuity of supply category, or when respective automation or security systems 
disconnect power supply to the user’s equipment due to the user’s acts or negligence, 
inappropriate maintenance of its own equipment or breaches of requirements contained 
in applicable legal acts.  
An application for reimbursement of damages must be supplied in 10 calendar days 
after the date of occurrence of damages. In 10 calendar days after its reception date at 
the latest, such application must be considered at the general commission meeting. 
Operator or supplier and user’s representatives must participate in the work of such 
commission. The commission formed especially for this reason must investigate causes 
of interruption or restriction in electricity supply and establish the amount of the 
damages.  
Where the parties involved fail to agree, the amount of damages must be set by 
court. Damages incurred due to the interruption or restriction in electricity supply must 
be reimbursed in 30 calendar days after the date of establishment of the value thereof. 
Sec. 6.386.2 of the Lithuanian Civil Code provides that “If the energy supply 
enterprise violates the energy quality requirements, the subscriber may refuse to pay for 
the energy. However, in this case the energy supply enterprise shall be entitled to 
request that the subscriber compensate for the value of what the subscriber saved 
without a legal justification by using energy.” 
In the Slovak Republic new regulations on transmission, distribution and quality of 
supply were introduced by URSO in 2006. 
 
8.4 Evaluation  
 
The survey presented above clearly shows the many differences among the partner 
countries in the field of quality regulation. While most of them have been introducing 
new regulations in the last few years, their contents, extent and effectiveness are far 
from uniform. The reference to the right of household customers to enjoy the supply of 
electricity of specified quality at reasonable prices, inserted in art. 3 second electricity 
directive, is too vague to be of much help in building a regulatory system for quality of 
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supply. Both CEER and ERGEG are trying to foster awareness of best practices in the 
European context and to suggest the course of action that promises to improve the 
performance of energy companies as quickly as possible. Tough, we argue that various 
kinds of official initiatives at European Union level could ease the convergence toward 
common models. Our proposals are threefold:  
d) insert quality regulation among the powers to be attributed to each NRA 
e) provide that continuity of supply be fostered through incentive systems 
f) provide for mandatory automatic refunds to consumers in case of quality 
failures. 
 
As to the proposal under a), art. 23 second electricity and gas directives laid down 
the main competencies of NRAs. They are circumscribed to those thought to be most 
relevant for introducing competition in the energy markets. However, quality regulation 
is mainly directed to the monopolistic networks and is a permanent feature of such 
markets. At present, the responsibility for this subject is often conferred to the 
ministries. Transferring it to NRAs has two advantages: it reinforces their role as 
technical experts and makes more transparent the links between quality and price 
regulation. Choosing the optimal amount of quality to deliver to customers is a difficult 
endeavour. Big mistakes can be avoided if this task is put in the hands of those 
institutions that have better knowledge of energy markets.  
We suggest that the European Commission employs the power included in art. 28 
second electricity and gas directives with reference to high levels of public service and 
submits to the European Parliament and the Council a proposal aimed at extending to 
quality regulation the competencies of NRAs.162  
The second intervention which we argue for [(under letter b)] is about incentive 
systems improving continuity of supply. Few European countries have already 
implemented such systems and they appear to be among the best performers. The Italian 
experience suggests as much. Two initiatives could be pursued: on one hand, CEER and 
ERGEG should be encouraged to draft more detailed proposals aimed at harmonizing 
the measurement protocols and at developing common indicators for incentive schemes; 
on the other hand, the forthcoming Charter on the rights of electricity and gas 
                                                 
162 The same proposal has been recently advanced by ERGEG, 3rd Legislative Package Input – Paper 5: 
Power and Independence of National Regulators, 5 June 2007, p. 9f.. 
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consumers should include specific reference to the duty to adopt incentive schemes that 
promote supply of good quality.  
The third intervention is the easiest to justify. Automatic refunds are the best means 
to transfer to consumers the benefits of quality regulation. If adequately calibrated, they 
also push firms to make new investments that improve continuity and commercial 
quality. We suggest that the Charter lists the main continuity and commercial quality 
standards whose breach gives the customer a right to compensation. The amount of 
compensation could be left to the discretion of NRAs, but it should be high enough to 
stimulate firms to comply with quality standards. 
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9. Energy consumers’ complaints and dispute resolution procedures 
 
This chapter discusses the procedures that partner countries adopted for resolving 
disputes between energy companies and residential customers. According to Annex A 
second electricity and gas directives these procedures should be transparent, simple and 
not burdensome. They should provide fair and fast resolutions of the disputes and 
mechanisms of redress for consumers. Their structure should reflect the principles laid 
down in the Commission recommendation 257/98/CE.  
A preliminary assessment of dispute resolution procedures in the energy sector was 
conducted by ERGEG and CEER.163 We now describe the procedures for dispute 
resolution in each partner country and try to assess their effectiveness. Data on the 
number and object of consumers’ complaints come from NRAs’ annual reports, 
partners’ answers to the questionnaire and specific requests addressed to the energy 
regulators. 
In Austria, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of normal courts, each party - including 
grid users, suppliers, grid operators, other natural gas companies or special interest 
representatives - can file complaints with Energie-Control GmbH for disputes and 
complaints, especially those concerning settlements for the invoicing of balancing 
energy, disputes about the invoicing of electricity and natural gas supplies, and grid 
usage fees, provided the decision does not fall within the mandate of the E-Control 
Commission. E-Control GmbH is to do its utmost to bring about a settlement that is 
acceptable to both parties within six weeks. In cases of dispute settlements concerning 
consumers as defined in the Consumer Protection Act, the E-Control GmbH is obligated 
to consult the Federal Chamber of Labor. Natural gas companies are obligated to 
participate in such processes and provide all of the information needed to assess the 
situation. Energie-Control energy may consult independent experts toward a settlement 
for the parties. These experts may be from the staff of E-Control GmbH. If Energie-
Control energy is called upon to settle a dispute, the due date for the amount billed is 
postponed until the dispute is settled. Regardless, an amount corresponding to the mean 
of the last three invoices can be billed for immediate payment. Amounts paid in excess 
will be refunded including the legal interest rate from the day of collection. Energie-
                                                 
163 See  ERGEG (2005a, p. 19ff.) and CEER (2005b, p. 141ff.). 
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Control GmbH is to write an annual report of the settlements it made independently and 
provide it to the Federal Ministry of the Economy and Labor, the Federal Ministry of 
Justice, and the Natural Gas Council.164 
An informal written application (by letter, fax or e-mail), briefly outlining the 
events in question and enclosing all relevant documentation, is sufficient to invoke the 
arbitration panel. Events or invoices dating back more than three years cannot be heard; 
neither can any matters which are the subject of pending litigation or have already been 
the subject of an arbitration procedure. Of the 666 procedures since the establishment of 
the arbitration panel, 160 took place in 2006. Most complaints were again connected 
with inexplicable increases in consumption or bills that consumers were unable to 
understand. There was a slight increase in complaints concerning connection costs 
arising from new or expanded installations, supplier transfers and tariff changes. There 
was a sharp rise in inquiries about outstanding debts, with a growing number of 
consumers seeking the arbitration service’s assistance in rescheduling instalments.165 
In Belgium consumers can apply to the mediation service instituted at the CREG 
for disputes not exceeding 5000 euros.166 The mediation service can also arbitrate the 
dispute, provided the parties agree to such procedure. Conciliation and arbitration 
procedures were instituted at the three regional regulators. However, their competence 
is limited to disputes on the access to the networks and does not extend to energy 
consumers’ contracts.  
In Bulgaria there are two dispute resolution procedures before SEWRC.167 The first 
one refers to complaints of consumers against licensees, in connection with: 
a) The right of the consumer to be connected for the purpose of being supplied with 
electricity, heat energy or natural gas; 
b) The right of the licensee to turn off the connection and delivery to the consumer 
of electricity, heat energy or natural gas; 
c) The terms of supply and the quality standards offered to the consumers by the 
licensee.  
                                                 
164 Sec. 10a of the Energy Regulatory Authority Act – E-RBG of 2000, as amended. 
165 See E-Control Annual Report 2006, p. 96.  
166 See sec. 27 loi relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité of 29 April 1999.  
167 See sec. 22 Law on energy and sec. 97ff. Ordinance on licencing of activities in the energy sector of 
June 2004.  
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The Commission shall pronounce its resolution on the complaint within 30 days 
after its filing. When the examination has found an infringement of the license terms, 
the Commission shall decide on imposing of compulsory administrative measures 
adhering to the procedures of the Energy Law. The resolutions of the Commission 
pertaining to this chapter shall be subject to appeal before the Supreme Administrative 
Court (SAC) by the procedure of the Supreme Administrative Court Act (SACA). 
If the object of the dispute is different from the three mentioned above, the 
Commission shall assist in voluntary settlement of disputes on reception of written 
request from the parties for commencing of a voluntary settlement procedure. The 
mediator shall use all reasonable means and effort for the settlement of the dispute and, 
with the consent of each side, reveal information, regarded as confidential, to the other, 
with the aim of contributing to reaching an agreement. The mediator may propose to the 
sides a solution of the dispute and, with their consent, to prepare the settlement 
agreement, signed by them.  The settlement agreement of the dispute may contain 
obligations for payment of production expenses, and other liabilities, related to the 
provisions of the license, signed contracts or normative and administrative acts. 
The total number of complaints lodged with SEWRC was 874 in 2005. In the first 
half of 2006 the number of complaints increased to 720. The number of complaints is 
highest for the heat-supply sector. In the electricity sector the highest number of 
complaints was for meter reading and billing errors, in the gas sector for the right to be 
connected, in the heat-supply sector for billing errors.  
In the Czech Republic sec. 17 (8) Energy law gives ERU the power to decide 
disputes arising from the failure to arrive at an agreement on the conclusion of a 
contract between individual licence holders and between licence holders and their 
customers or the failure to arrive at an agreement on essential elements of the contract, 
if such a contract is to be amended. In its Annual Report ERU says that in 2004 
received 30 complaints, but does not give enough information to understand whether 
they relate to residential consumers and which problems were raised. 
In Finland three different institutions can handle disputes for residential consumers, 
although none of them has specific competencies in the energy sector.168 Closest to 
consumers are the municipal consumer advisors, with about 100.000 contacts reported 
                                                 
168  See Konsument Europa (2005, p. 6ff.). 
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on a yearly basis. They also negotiate in disputes and, if negotiations fail, they are 
expected to give guidance about the Consumer Complaint Board handling possibility to 
consumers. 
The Consumer Complaint Board is a neutral and independent expert body, 
operational since 1978, from fall 2005 under the Ministry of Justice. This ADR has the 
task to issue recommendations. The decisions cannot be appealed. A case, which has 
been handled by the board, can be taken to court, however. 
The decision can recommend compensation, recommend no compensation or leave 
the matter unsolved. If the board recommends compensation the parties must contact 
each other to make practical arrangement. The parties are sent a postage-paid card, 
which they can return to report compliance. If the board recommends no compensation, 
the case is considered as closed. The board does not take cases to court or assist 
consumers in legal proceedings. The procedure is all written, the parties cannot be 
present at the section meeting, nor can the board hear witnesses. 
Handling at the board is free of charge to both parties. Should the board ask for an 
expert statement, expenses are covered from the board’s budget. The business’s consent 
to ADR procedure is not required as is the case in many member states. If the business 
involved does not give its response in the issue at hand, the board can issue a one sided 
decision. 
Considering that the Board’s recommendations are followed by traders 70-77% of 
times, the Ministry judges it quite effective. Consumer organizations and the Consumer 
Agency’s periodical “Kuluttajalehti” publish a list of traders that have not followed the 
board’s recommendations. 
However, less positive comments have been voiced. Lack of resources and 
expertise in the field of energy markets are the principal problems, as well as the power 
to issue binding decisions. The duration of the procedure has also been criticized. Since 
1978 the board has been given new tasks and handling times are longer than is tolerable. 
Depending on the section that is handling the case, handling times vary from 2 to 18 
months. If mediation is successful the handling time is considerably shorter than in 
other cases. 
The Consumer Agency’s mission is to protect and strengthen consumers’ position 
in society. The Consumer Ombudsman serves as the Director General of the Consumer 
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Agency. The main tasks of the Agency are the dissemination of information, the filing 
of petitions in the Market Court and assistance to consumers in legal proceedings. In 
2004 The Energy Market Authority has issued several decisions in which it found that 
electricity transmission companies had collected charges that were higher than the 
Electricity Market Act allows. The Consumer Ombudsman assisted a consumer in a 
case to determine whether such companies must refund excess charges to customers. 
The Espoo District Court rejected the suit. The case is now being considered by the 
Helsinki Court of Appeal. 
In Greece there are different dispute settlement procedures between customers and 
suppliers, not specialized for the electricity or gas sector. The standard process for the 
customer is to first try to solve the problem with the energy supply company. If no 
resolution is reached then there are several out of court options for dispute settlement 
through various authorities. The independent Authority of the Consumer Ombudsman 
has recently been established by law and deals with disputes between consumers and 
suppliers. When no settlement is achieved, the ultimate action of the Authority is to 
publish the case. There is also the authority of the Greek Ombudsman who is restricted 
to disputes between Public companies or organizations and individuals or companies. 
The authority investigates the cases with the cooperation of the public companies and 
may publish a conclusion report that is also sent to the corresponding Ministry and 
company. The company should respond to the conclusion report and its proposals. In 
Greece there is also a special Body for Consumer Protection of the Public Service 
Companies (established by the Law of Consumer protection) who puts forward 
proposals and recommendations to the public service companies, for the improvement 
of their services, on aggregated consumer complaints. The Minister of Commerce may 
impose a penalty to public service companies, after the proposal of the Body, in case the 
public service company refuses to provide explanations or information asked by the 
Body. The Regulatory Authority of Energy (RAE), although has no legal authority for 
imposing measures of economic compensation to consumers, encourages consumers to 
report their complaints to RAE in order to observe the market complications and take all 
necessary measures pertaining to the observation of rules of competition and the 
protection of the consumers in the energy market. RAE may impose penalties to the 
companies, in case they violate the existing legal framework. Answering a specific 
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request we made, RAE reported that in the period 2004-2006 only 19 complaints from 
electricity households and 16 from gas households were registered. These numbers refer 
to written complaints only. The Greek regulator mentioned various objects of the 
complaints, e.g. electricity interruptions without notification, refusal of connection and 
erroneous billing. However, it did not give us any information on the outcome of the 
disputes. 
In the gas sector, the Gas Law 2364 allows for the establishment of a special 
settlement Body, recommended by RAE, which is concerned only with metering 
disputes. The final option for the energy consumer is to appeal to the court.169 
In Italy there is the possibility to apply for the conciliation procedure before the 
chambers of commerce, but the vast majority of complaints from energy consumers is 
addressed to the sectoral regulator. Aeeg has been charged by law with the task of 
evaluating complaints about electricity and gas service and managing out-of-court 
disputes solution procedures. The authority evaluates a complaint only after the 
customer has made an attempt to resolve the problem with the supplier. The authority 
won’t evaluate disputes which are not addressing service supply or disputes concerning 
liability issues. When a complaint is found to be justified, the Authority may make an 
attempt to persuade the utility to comply (moral persuasion, informal procedure) or 
issue an order to comply (formal procedure). The Informal approach usually leads to the 
solution of the case. If an order to comply is issued and the utility does not take the 
expected measures, the Authority has the power to fine the utility. However, the 
regulatory authority may fine the utility also in the cases where an investigation proves 
that a provision issued by the regulator was violated.  
The total number of complaints addressed to Aeeg has  been increasing constantly 
in the last years. From 221 in 1999-2000 it raised to 1.686 in 2005-2006. While 
traditionally the largest number of complaints concerned the electricity sector, in the 
period 2005-2006 there was an increase of 103% of complaints in the gas sector. In the 
same period half of the complaints in the electricity sector was about interruptions and 
billing, while in the gas sector 40% concerned connection, 18% contractual issues and 
quality of supply. 
                                                 
169  See ERGEG (2005a, p. 22). 
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In Lithuania three authorities have powers in the field of consumers’ dispute 
resolution. First, the National Council for Consumer Protection under the Ministry of 
Justice holds a preliminary extra-judicial hearing of complaints by customers 
concerning the application of unfair conditions on the sale or service agreements. 
Second, the State Energy Inspectorate holds a preliminary extra-judicial hearing of 
complaints concerning the malfunctioning of energy facilities and breakdowns of 
equipment and metering instruments, breaches of the requirements of maintenance, 
energy quality, accounting of and payment for energy, accidents, interruption, 
suspension or restriction of energy supply. Third, the National Control Commission for 
Prices and Energy (NCC) holds a preliminary extra-judicial hearing of complaints 
concerning acts or omissions of energy enterprises in supply, distribution, transmission, 
storing of energy, failure to grant them a right to use networks and systems, connection, 
balancing of energy supply flows, application of prices and tariffs. 
Pursuant to the Preliminary Extrajudicial Procedure for Examination of Complaints, 
approved by the Commission, five disputes were investigated in 2004. The Commission 
in its work accorded special attention to the fact that complaints examined in the pre-
trial procedure and decisions adopted thereof should be lawful and justi.ed, i.e. that the 
decision taken by the Commission will not be followed by the litigation of the 
complainants in the court. Quite a number of residents apply to the Commission with 
various issues concerning heat transmission. In 2004, a pre-trial complaint of a resident 
from a block of flats in Ukmerge was examined. The Commission, having evaluated the 
identi.ed circumstances and the documents submitted, and after hearing both parties to 
the dispute, obligated the heat utility to recalculate the charges to all residents of the 
house for consumed heat according to the procedure approved by the regional 
municipality.170 
The State Energy Inspectorate reported that during 2005 506 claims were collected: 
283 relative to electricity, 19 relative to gas and 204 relative to heat. The main subjects 
of the claims in the field of electricity were illegal connection to electric networks, 
illegal suspension of electricity supply and consumption of electricity without metering 
devices. In the field of gas the main subjects of the claims centered around gas supply 
                                                 
170  See NCC Annual Report 2004. 
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agreements, gas accounting and payment for the gas consumed. The Inspectorare did no 
give any information about the outcome of the complaints. 
According to the Lithuanian partner, ADR procedures are still inadequate in the 
energy sector. It is suggested that converting the recommendation 98/257/EC in a 
binding directive could force the State to enact more effective measures. Another 
proposal is to follow the Canadian example and to give each consumer the right to hire 
an expert that should assist him in the dispute against an energy company. The costs of 
this procedure should be included in energy tariffs. 
In the Slovak Republic within surveillance activities URSO ensured the settlement 
of initiations and complaints that were delivered to the Office by citizens, private 
businesses and state authorities. The most frequent problems were associated with 
charging the prices for supply of heat, electricity, gas and water, and with the reading of 
the consumed amounts of energy made at the end of an invoicing period. In addition, 
there were the problems related to the allocation of costs for supply of heat and hot 
domestic water, which are not subject to regulation since the end of the year 1997. As 
regards the settlement of initiations and complaints a positive role was played by 
regional offices, which were increasingly contacted by citizens submitting their 
complaints about energy suppliers, or building management companies. Some of those 
complaints were settled on site - by providing consultation. In 2004 all the 31 
complaints and the 124 initiations received were settled.  
This survey shows that various problems must be solved to enhance the 
effectiveness of dispute resolution procedures in the energy markets. While in most 
cases NRAs are able to exert pressure on the firms to settle the controversy, there isn’t 
any proof that residential consumers are adequately informed about these procedures. 
Moreover, the experiences of Finland and Lithuania, that rely on general consumer body 
without direct knowledge of energy markets, advise against this solution. These findings 
are confirmed by Eurobarometer surveys on satisfaction with services of general 
interest. In the electricity and gas sectors the number of complaints increased between 
2000 and 2004. Moreover, 41% of electricity and gas users thought their complaints 
were dealt with badly.171 
                                                 
171 Special Eurobarometer 219 – Consumers’ opinions on services of general interest – Summary Report, 
p. 46f.. 
ENERGY REGULATION AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS - Convention de subvention 17.020100/05(04)408149 - 
D(2007)210013 
CTRRCE Italy – Via Cassa di Risparmio 6 – 39100 Bolzano T. 0039 0471 974945 F. 0039 0471 982499 info@ctrrce.it 
www.energyandconsumers.net 
 
158
The table below summarizes information on energy consumers’ complaints for each 
partner country. We also report available data on complaints from other Member States. 
 
Table 9.1 - Energy Consumers’ complaints 2004-2006172 
 
Country Electricity Gas  Most frequent object 
Austria  160 (Oct.2005-Sept.2006)    billing errors, connection 
costs, instalment payments        
Belgium N.A. N.A.  
Bulgaria 398 20 Billing errors, disconnections 
Czech Rep. 30 N.A. 
Finland N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Greece  19 16 Damage to household premises, 
delayed or denied connection, 
billing errors, quality of supply 
Italy  800 840 Interruptions, billing errors, 
network connection, 
contractual terms, quality of 
supply 
Lithuania 283 19 Illegal connection, illegal 
suspension of supply, billing 
Slovak Rep. 32 Tariffs, supply and business 
conditions 
Poland 609 (2004) Tariffs, connections, settlement 
of bills 
UK 
(Energywatch) 
62.075 (2005-2006) billing 
UK (Energy 
Supply 
Ombudsman) 
100 (2006-2007 Transfer procedures, billing, 
metering 
Portugal 567 (2005) 83 (2005) Billing, damages, safety 
Hungary 899 (2005) 341 (2005) Metering, measurement, 
invoicing, settlement 
Latvia 69 (2005) N.A. Electricity supply, metering 
and payments 
Total  1500 895  
 
 
                                                 
172 The time span considered can vary according to the availability of data. 
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10. The role of consumer associations 
 
This chapter discusses the role of consumer associations and the opportunities for 
direct participation of consumers to regulatory proceedings in partner countries. 
Existing evidence attests both to the benefits and the hurdles of consumers’ 
participation and representation in the energy sector.173 On the benefits side, enhanced 
involvement of consumers in regulatory decisions could increase their quality, reduce 
conflicts among the different categories of energy users, strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the choices made by appointed experts, reduce the influence of business 
and industrial interest groups. On the other hand, almost nowhere does consumers’ 
participation, directly or through their representative organizations, reaches adequate 
levels. The technical complexity of the energy markets is the most important factor 
hampering a larger involvement of people lacking the needed expertise in the regulatory 
process. Moreover, it is suggested that both NRA and governments rarely support the 
active participation of consumers in all aspects of regulation. This is because of elitist or 
technocratic traditions that tend to discard the contribution from the general public and 
to give almost exclusive priority to technocratic judgements.  
While enhancing consumers’ participation in the energy sector could improve the 
regulatory process, it must not be forgotten that consumer associations have their own 
agendas. They could pursue short-term interests that do not coincide with the collective 
interests of their constituency, for example because in so doing they can get more 
funding from public or private contributors. Consumer associations can also become 
entrenched in the political culture of their country and develop strong linkages with 
political parties that influence their action. Finally, consumer associations sometimes 
represent only a fraction of consumers and not the majority of them. For all these 
reasons, adequate mechanisms should be introduced that warrant responsiveness of 
consumer associations to the public’s long-term interests.  
Various models of consumer participation can be devised, ranging from the 
submission of written observations in regulatory proceedings to the creation of a 
consumer advocate funded by the State.174 It is interesting to point out that consumers’ 
                                                 
173  See especially the worldwide survey of participatory models by HIRA  et al. (2005). 
174 Seven different models of consumer participation are described by HIRA  et al. (2005, p. 70f.): 1) 
implicit representation by NRA; 2) public hearings; 3) formal representation by appointees or delegates 
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involvement in regulatory activities is much more developed in the practice of 
competition authorities, both at a national and an international level. A number of 
lessons can be learnt from these experiences.175 First of all, there are many forms of 
interaction and communication that the regulators can deploy. They range from capacity 
building for consumer organizations to regular consultative fora to targeted campaigns 
(media and multi-channel). Secondly, there are many challenges to overcome to build 
fruitful interaction with consumers. One of the most prominent is the difficulty of 
conveying the meaning of competition in a non technical form and to persuade 
consumers of its practical relevance. Thirdly, consistent resources should be leveraged 
to target communications to a diversified audience. 
What follows is the description of the forms of consumer participation in the 
regulatory process in partner countries’ experience. This theme is connected to the 
power of consumer associations to file legal actions against energy companies, 
commented upon in par. 7.3 above.  
In Austria sec. 26 Federal Act Regulating the Tasks of the Regulatory Authorities 
in the Electricity Sector, as well as the Establishment of Elektrizitäts-Control GmbH 
and Elektrizitäts-Control Kommission, provides that an Advisory Council for Electricity 
shall be set up in the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour with a view to 
advising the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Labour and the regulatory 
authority. However, no consumer representative is included among the members of the 
Council. 
In Belgium at the federal level the general council of CREG includes consumers’ 
representatives. The tasks of the general council are to supervise the activity of CREG’s 
direction committee, to lay down guidelines on the implementation of energy laws and 
to serve as a discussion forum on the objectives and strategies of energy policy.176 
At the regional level, various advisory committees were set down. In the Brussels-
Capital Region sec. 33 Ordonnance 19 July 2001 relative à l'organisation du marché de 
l'électricité introduced a Council of electricity and gas users. Eight members of the 
                                                                                                                                               
on regulatory boards; 4) corporatist representation by NGOs or government-created consumer 
associations; 5) tort-based representation in legal proceedings; 6) public survey/research model, with the 
regulatory board committed to seek input from the public; 7) direct public participation, in advisory 
committees or negotiations with other stakeholders.  
175 See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, Consumer Outreach by ICN Members. A Report on 
Outreach Undertaken and Lessons Learned, April 2005 (www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org ). 
176 See sec. 24  Loi 29 April 1999 relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité. 
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Council must be appointed as consumers’ representatives. The president of the Council 
is appointed by the government among consumers’ representatives. In the Walloon 
Region sec. 51 Décret 12 April 2001 relatif à l'organisation du marché régional de 
l'électricité introduced an Energy Committee with the task to advise the government and 
the CWAPE on the protection of the general interest in the regional electricity market 
and the public service obligations. Among the twenty nine members of the Committee, 
one is appointed as representative of residential consumers by consumer associations 
independent by public and professional institutions, another by environmental 
associations. Note that these two members have voting power, while  energy 
companies’ representatives do not have such power. 
In Bulgaria art. 14 Law on energy provides that SEWRC conducts public 
discussions with interested parties, including eligible consumers and consumer 
associations, when preparing its decisions. However, the NRA is said to be generally 
unresponsive to the questions of consumer associations and even distrustful of them.  
In the Czech Republic The ERO Chairman’s Advisory Corps, which was set up in 
April 2003 and is composed of experts delegated by governmental authorities, 
consumer and business associations, and trade unions, contributes significantly to the 
Chairman’s objective decision-making, in particular as regards the strategic issues of 
regulation. In 2005 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the 
Consumer Defence Association and the Office for the Protection of Competition. Its 
aim is to promote cooperation both with regard to the notification of infringements and 
to proposals for improvements of the regulatory framework.  
In Finland and Greece no specific consumers’ participation rights were provided 
by energy laws. The Finnish partner says that her consumer association has good 
relationships with EMA, but there seems to be no influence of consumer association on 
the energy industry.  
In Italy Aeeg maintains working relationships with consumers’ associations. Sec. 
2(23) law no. 481/95 provides that Aeeg holds periodic public hearings with the 
participation of consumer associations, associations for environment protection, trade 
unions, business associations.177 Sec. 2(12)(m) law no. 481/95 gives consumer 
                                                 
177 According to the implementing regulations (Aeeg dec. n. 33/03), the hearings must be held at least 
once a year. Special hearings can also be organized on specific themes following the request of 
representative associations.  
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association the right to send Aeeg complaints, appeals and reports as to respect for 
standards of quality and tariffs by the service operators. There is also the right of 
consumer associations to participate to regulatory proceedings.178 However, we do not 
have data on their effective participation. 
In October 2001 it entered into a protocol of understanding with the National 
Council of Consumers and Users (CNCU) aimed at developing ways of keeping gas and 
electricity customers informed, especially with regard to market liberalization. The 
Protocol of Understanding, in addition to confirming the Authority’s commitment to 
dialogue with the consumers’ associations, calls for a number of new initiatives. These 
include information campaigns geared toward consumers and associations that work in 
close contact with the public, ways of using to best advantage the associations’ 
monitoring activities in the electricity and gas sectors, and the possibility to attempt out-
of-court conflict resolution. With specific reference to this latter issue, in 2003 Aeeg 
entered into a new protocol with Unioncamere aimed at developing extra-judicial 
dispute resolution procedures. Initiatives by consumers’ associations in the field of 
dispute resolution have also been funded in 2007. 
One of the aims specified in the protocol was to make sure consumers’ associations 
were equipped to provide effective, thorough support and information to all consumers 
who seek their help in person or by phone. So many people were interested in this sort 
of training that the course had to be organized in stages, in a “top-down” configuration. 
Thus, the first stage was addressed to consumer association staffers who would then 
pass on the material learned to all other interested parties, through the organization of 
local training sessions. This project bears witness to the Authority’s growing concern 
for consumers’ associations, which it involves as extensively as possible in the 
consultation process, the evaluation of proposals and measures affecting consumers’ 
rights, the promotion of initiatives entailing study, research and dialogue into consumer 
problems, and informational campaigns. The Authority is also making a greater effort 
than ever to profit from the associations’ experience in their individual sectors. In early 
2004, the Authority and the CNCU looked into the development of an ongoing e-
learning programme that would keep operators up-to-date and enhance interaction 
between the Authority and the consumers’ associations on the issue of information and 
                                                 
178 See the presidential decree 9 May 2001, no. 244. 
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training. In the first year of activity the participation of 500 members of consumer 
associations was planned. 
With regard to the direct involvement of consumers’ representatives in the 
regulatory institutions, a proposal was advanced to reserve to the Italian Single Buyer 
the role of supplier of last resort. This new task should be supported by a new system of 
governance: a surveillance board with the participation of consumers’ representatives 
would have the power to verify that the strategies of the Single Buyer do not clash with 
their interests.179 
In Lithuania consumer associations can participate in regulatory public hearings. 
From time to time they are even invited to take part. But the NCC does not pay attention 
to their arguments. In recent times the Lithuanian National Consumer Federation 
succeeded in forcing the NRA to defend consumers’ interests. It was also able to 
persuade the legislator to introduce changes in consumer protection statutes. 
In the Slovak Republic sec. 15 Act no. 276/2001 on Regulation in Network 
Industries provides that URSO can decide to open some proceedings to the public on its 
own initiative or at request of other participants.  However, no specific reference to 
consumer associations is made. The Association of Slovak Consumers is regularly 
supplied with all the relevant information from the Office. It participates in the decision 
making procedure and about half of its suggestions are accepted by the Office.   
The survey proposed above shows that consumers’ participation in the energy 
regulatory processes is generally meager and could be greatly enhanced. Partners in 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovak Republic report difficulties in 
obtaining information by NRAs. The direct involvement of consumers’ representatives 
in the boards of regulatory institutions would help to overcome resistance to 
liberalization processes in the general public. More generally, consistent resources 
should be invested to spread information about the energy markets and increase 
awareness of their mechanisms. Enhanced participation should also be fostered through 
ICT technologies and the direct involvement of NRAs in the e-government programs of 
the European Union.180 
                                                 
179 See the consultation document on the liberalization of the retail market of 28 December 2006. 
180 See, e.g., the communication of the European Commission on i2010 eGovernment Action Plan: 
Accelerating eGovernment in Europe for the Benefit of All, COM (2006) 173 fin., 12 April 2006. Useful  
suggestions can be drawn from the American initiatives on e-rulemaking: see the materials at 
www.regulations.gov/RuleMaking.cfm, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/rpp/erulemaking/home.htm . 
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11. Final recommendations 
 
The general conclusion of the report is that, with few exceptions, most partner 
countries were not ready to take up the challenges stemming from the liberalization of 
retail energy markets. Faced with the pressing need to protect residential consumers, 
they tried to preserve the controls on prices and on other aspects of the supplier-
customer relationship. However, they did not pave the way for a smooth transition to 
competition. On the contrary, some protective measures were ineffective or hindered 
entry by new suppliers.  
We suggest that much work has to be done to put in place the institutional 
infrastructure that will allow the benefits of liberalization to be fairly distributed to all 
categories of final customers. The consumer protection measures included in the second 
electricity and gas directives do not seem to adequately support the development of a 
workable competition. For each problem discussed in this report we now propose a few 
recommendations aimed at improving the workings of retail markets. Depending on the 
type of problem, the institution better positioned to find effective solutions can be 
located at the national or the European level. Therefore, our recommendations can be 
addressed to the European Commission, to supranational organizations like ERGEG and 
CEER or to the NRAs. We also suggest that an ample variety of regulatory tools be 
employed, including mandatory rules, default rules, soft law and self-regulation 
schemes. 
 
11.1 Search costs and switching costs 
 
The reduction of both types of costs is perhaps the most important task European 
and national regulators should focus on. The low switching rates documented in most 
partner countries show that consumers find difficulties in exercising their power to 
choose. At the same time, energy companies try to make it more costly for consumers to 
compare alternative offers. To provide effective answers to such issues, we make the 
following recommendations: 
o Recommendation 1 
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NRAs should adopt a code of commercial practice dealing with the pre-
contractual phase. The code should enhance the comparability of offers and 
discourage energy companies from creating unnecessary complexity in their offers. 
Belgium and Italy provide useful examples of such codes. 
o Recommendation 2  
NRAs should sponsor a voluntary code of practice for advertising and 
marketing activities. It should specify the general principles laid down in the unfair 
commercial practice directive. Its main objective would be to help NRAs 
monitoring the behaviour of energy companies. 
o Recommendation 3 
The European Commission or ERGEG should draft guidelines on the legitimacy 
of practices widely used in the energy sector like fidelity programs, rebates and 
tying clauses. Because the validity of such practices depends on complex 
assessments that must balance various factors, it could be useful to set up a uniform 
legal framework at the European level. This measure could be justified on two 
counts: first, it avoids replicating the same assessment in each national regulatory 
system; second, it avoids the risk of contrasting judgements at national level that 
could hinder the development of the Internal Energy Market.  
 
11.2 Econometric analysis of residential markets regulation  
 
Econometric evidence tends to confirm that residential customers reaped the 
benefits of liberalization in those countries where full market opening has already 
been achieved. On the other hand, partial liberalization tends to thwart residential 
consumers, both in relative terms (with respect to the industrial customers located in 
the same country), and in absolute terms (with respect to the residential customers of 
the countries in which residential and industrial customers receive the same 
treatment).  
Although the full market opening of 2007 should induce a homogenization 
between industrial and residential customers and mitigate the bias against residential 
customers, a number of persistent problems must be addressed.  
o Recommendation 4 
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                  High concentration levels in the upstream and downstream markets soften 
the price-reduction effects of the liberalization process. Therefore, more aggressive 
actions should be taken in order to enhance competition in electricity and gas markets. 
In particular, a strong supervision (either by sectoral Authorities or Antitrust authorities) 
on anticompetitive conducts, predatory pricing, and collusive behaviour by the key 
players in the retail market is strongly recommended. 
o Recommendation 5 
      The retail market design significantly shapes outcomes. Countries in which 
consumers are more informed and in which switching is easier have on average lower 
prices than those that do not display these features. Ensuring more information to 
consumers and a simpler and cheap switching procedure is crucial for an effective 
liberalization process. 
o Recommendation 6 
      Policy measures aimed at favouring industrial customers, such as, for example, a 
bilateral contract market and/or merchant lines accessible only to industrial customers, 
damage residential customers. It is likely that, under such circumstances, the supply side 
in the electricity market shifts its revenue from the industrial to the residential 
customers, thus damaging the latter. It is crucial to understand that industrial policy 
measures tend to thwart residential customers. On the policy side, this trade-off has to 
be evaluated, and a complete welfare analysis, which includes also customers, has to be 
performed prior to any industrial policy decisions.  
 
11.3 Energy consumers’ contracts 
 
Regulation of contractual terms in residential energy markets should balance the 
need to protect consumers with that of fostering competition. It is submitted that, at 
least for the most important aspects of the contractual relationship, ex-ante regulation is 
to be preferred to the ex-post judicial control provided by the unfair terms directive. We 
make the following recommendations:  
o Recommendation 7  
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It would be useful to develop a model standard contract for electricity and gas 
supply at the European level. Industry associations could be charged with this task 
under the supervision of the European Commission or ERGEG. Alternatively, the 
model contract could be inserted in the forthcoming Charter of electricity and gas 
customers’ rights. The model contract could be applied on a voluntary basis in 
Member States, but it could also become the reference point for regulators and 
judges. To encourage its adoption, the model contract should escape additional 
public scrutiny at the national level.  
o Recommendation 8  
Residential consumers should have the right to terminate the contract at any 
moment. Allowing energy companies to apply restrictive conditions to consumers’ 
withdrawal risks increasing switching costs. Moreover, there isn’t any convincing 
evidence that energy companies are not able to bear the risk of early termination. 
o Recommendation 9  
NRAs should draw guidelines about the procedures to be followed for the 
disconnection of those consumers who cannot afford to pay their bills. The most 
detailed provisions on this topic are provided by the Belgian and Finnish statutory 
rules. Useful examples are also provided by the guidelines for preventing debt and 
disconnection published by Ofgem in January 2003 and the industry-wide safety net 
procedure for vulnerable consumers developed by the British Energy Retail 
association in 2004. 
o Recommendation 10  
As far as unilateral modifications by energy companies are concerned, three 
principles should apply. Firstly, unilateral modifications should be restricted to the 
price element of the contract. Because of the volatility of energy prices, it is 
reasonable to give the supplier the flexibility to adjust its offers to rapidly changing 
market conditions. Secondly, enough information should be given to the consumer 
to enable him to understand the reasons of the change and decide whether to search 
for better offers. Thirdly, the supplier’s right to modify the contract to its advantage 
when market conditions are unfavourable should be balanced by a symmetrical 
consumer’s right to a price cut when market conditions allow suppliers to reduce 
procurement costs.  
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11.4 Quality of supply  
 
The report shows that quality regulation in partner countries is far from uniform. 
Different quality standards and measurement protocols make it difficult to assess 
whether liberalization pushed energy companies to improve their performance or 
had negative effects on quality. We suggest that the following three 
recommendations could ease the convergence toward common models:  
o Recommendation 11  
The European Commission should employ the power included in art. 28 second 
electricity and gas directives with reference to high levels of public service and submit 
to the European Parliament and the Council a proposal aimed at extending the 
competencies of NRA to quality regulation.  
o Recommendation 12  
The implementation of incentive systems for improving continuity of supply should 
be encouraged. CEER and ERGEG should draft more detailed proposals aimed at 
harmonizing the measurement protocols and at developing common indicators for 
incentive schemes. Moreover, the forthcoming Energy Customers’ Charter should 
include specific reference to the duty to adopt incentive schemes that promote optimal 
levels of quality.  
o Recommendation 13  
Automatic refunds to consumers in case of quality failures should be mandatory. 
We suggest that the Charter lists the main continuity and commercial quality standards 
whose breach gives the customer a right to compensation. The amount of compensation 
could be left to the discretion of NRAs, but it should be high enough to stimulate firms 
to comply with quality standards. 
 
11.5 Dispute resolution 
 
The report points out various problems with alternative dispute resolution 
procedures in the energy markets. Consumers seldom have adequate knowledge of 
their mechanisms. Often there isn’t the possibility to obtain financial redress without 
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filing an action in court. Moreover, general consumer bodies lack the financial 
resources and the expertise needed to adequately assist energy consumers. 
Therefore, we make the following recommendations:  
o Recommendation 14 
A specialized consumer body should be created through public or self-
regulatory schemes to assist energy consumers in their controversies with energy 
suppliers. It should have the power to award financial compensation. 
o Recommendation 15  
NRAs should have the task to spread information on the competencies of the 
dispute resolution body and make access by complaining consumers as easy as 
possible 
 
11.6 Consumer representation 
 
Various initiatives could be promoted to enhance consumer representation in 
regulatory proceedings. We make the following recommendations:  
o Recommendation 16  
Consumer representation should be guaranteed through advisory organisms or 
directly in the board of the NRAs. The Czech Republic and Belgium are examples 
of such solutions. 
o Recommendation 17  
The participation of consumer representatives should be enhanced both through 
periodic public hearings and the implementation of electronic consultation 
procedures. 
o Recommendation 18 
Training programmes, including e-learning, should be organized by NRAs to 
ensure consumer representatives have the skills needed to assist energy consumers 
and to actively participate in regulatory proceedings. 
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